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Abstract 
This thesis discusses the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) in the field of conflict prevention, management and resolution, from 
1990 until late 1998. Two theoretical perspectives, neo-realism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism, provide a framework for analysis. Both theories are able to highlight 
different strengths and weaknesses in the OSCE's approach which are described in 
three case studies. However, neither theory can fully explain the findings of the case 
studies. In the thesis's conclusion the shortcomings of both theories are discussed 
and the gaps in explanation are explored by reference to constructivist approaches. 
Three case studies are described in order to demonstrate different facets of the 
OSCE's work. Macedonia provides an example of the OSCE's work in conflict 
prevention (it is in the field of conflict prevention that the OSCE is seen at its most 
successful). The second case study, Nagomo-Karabakh, examines the OSCE's 
handling of an ongoing conflict and attempts to arrange both a peace conference and 
a peacekeeping mission. The issues surrounding the conflict here demonstrate the 
complexity of external involvement in mediation and negotiation processes, and the 
difficulties of trying to find solutions that are acceptable to the parties in a context 
complicated further by the interests of external actors. The third case study is an 
analysis of the OSCE's engagement in the post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This reveals the problems of implementing aspects of an unsatisfactory 
peace agreement. The case study highlights the enormity of the tasks assigned to the 
OSCE and the lack of coherent international support for the organization's work. It 
also discusses the effects of the interplay of both external and internal power political 
struggles on the OSCE's operations. The thesis concludes that the OSCE has in 
limited ways performed valuable work in all three case studies but that its real 
strengths are most apparent in the field of conflict prevention. 
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I 
Introduction 
Following the demise of Soviet style communism, violent conflict reemerged in 
regions of Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union (FSU) during the 
1990s. This led to debates over the possible courses of action that states and 
international organizations might consider to address ongoing conflicts and to prevent 
new conflicts from breaking out. This thesis is concerned with the work of one 
particular international organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) and its role in conflict management operations in areas of the FSU 
and Eastern Europe. The research' seeks to specifically understand the OSCE's 
capability as a facilitating mechanism for inter-state cooperation in predominantly 
intra-state conflicts. Its analysis is framed in terms of what two theoretical 
perspectives, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism can offer when examining 
institutional involvement in violent or potentially violent conflicts. These two 
perspectives were chosen because each has something important and contrasting to 
say on international institutions. They also represent the mainstream debate in 
International Relations on state action, prospects for cooperation and the role of 
international institutions. 
The OSCE was selected as a source of study for several reasons. Firstly, it is the only 
pan-European security organization in Europe. The fifty five states participating in 
the OSCE do so on a basis of equality. This has meant a potential for all states to 
possess a legitimate and considered voice within the OSCE. The second reason 
relates to the rapid institutional adaptation that the organization has undergone since 
the early 1990s. This has allowed for new instruments and mechanisms to be devised 
in order to address issues of conflict. Adaptation has not, however, resulted in a 
military capability. This is important in view of the overtly violent nature of several 
of the conflicts the OSCE has been involved with. This is a strength as well as a 
weakness. It makes the organization attractive to governments reluctant to commit 
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military resources to resolving violent internal conflicts. Questions over military 
capabilities form part of a wider debate on the structure and future development of 
the OSCE. Such discussion concerns ideas as to how the organization could be 
further developed along with its relationship towards other international institutions 
and its own participating states. 
Turning now to questions regarding why violent and potentially violent conflicts have 
reemerged in Europe during the 1990s and have arisen predominantly in the form of 
intra-state conflict, here different levels of explanation have been offered. 
Structuralists following neo-realist premises have suggested that hegemonic restraints 
have been removed following systemic change. The change from bipolarity to 
multipolarity has enabled increased instability to enter the international system due to 
the removal of hegemonic discipline making wars between states and within states 
more likely (Mearsheimer 1990 pp5-9). In other words, it has become more likely 
that disputes will arise over wealth, territory, ethnicity, religion and population. 
From a neo-liberal institutionalist perspective, multipolarity has been considered 
conducive to developing international cooperation rather than contributing to the 
outbreak of conflict. The distribution of power is more evenly distributed, something 
that allows for increased interdependence (Pentland 1991 p65). In turn, multilateral 
institutions can assume responsibilities that were previously undertaken by the 
hegemon, therefore providing confidence and stability in the system (Keohane 1984, 
1989 cited in Hettne 1995 p17). 
Europe can also be understood as a continent divided into both `zones of conflict and 
`zones of peace. ' The `zones of conflict' are located in regions peripheral to Europe 
and are characterized by varying degrees of a lack of order, disintegrating and fragile 
structures of government, an absence of institutionalized interdependence between 
neighbouring states, dire economic conditions and outbreaks of violent conflict 
(Keohane and Nye 1993 p6). The concept of `zones of conflict' and `zones of peace' 
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is closely related to the idea of core/periphery structures offered by Goldgeier and 
McFaul (1992 p469). Here, Western Europe constitutes a core set of states (or `zones 
of peace'). This is consistent with the liberal model of politics, where conflict within 
and between states is settled by non-military means. Eastern Europe and the FSU to 
varying degrees constitute the periphery. Here states are characterized by a variety of 
political systems and expansionist pressures. Interdependence between these states is 
subsumed by their dependency on core states. The core/periphery model is 
interesting because it suggests the validity of neo-realist tenets to the peripheral states 
and those of neo-liberal institutionalism to the core set of states (Goldgeier and 
McFaul). 
The characteristics of states and their leaders may be equally important in 
understanding violent conflict. Areas of Eastern Europe have seen the rise to power 
of virulent nationalist leaders determined to destroy civic or multiple identities in an 
effort to create homogeneous states. There are many reasons why such leaders are 
able to assume power. Among them may be political culture, ethnic complexity and 
economic misfortune (Armstrong and Croft 1993 p61). 
Western Europe has appeared relatively immune to the immediate effects of these 
conflicts. Nevertheless, Western states are interested in developing techniques of 
conflict management through an international organization like the OSCE for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, pressure on governments to respond to crises may come 
from politicians, interest groups, the public and the mass media stemming from a 
basis of humanitarian concern. Secondly, there are fears over stability and insecurity 
arising from violent conflict or chaos that may result in the illicit dealing of nuclear 
materials, large scale migrations of refugees, environmental catastrophes, the spread 
of organized crime and disease along with the possibilities of conflicts spilling over 
into adjacent states or minorities in one state requesting support from their 
indigenous state. These types of problems transcend state borders, do not respect 
state sovereignty and lead to the need for coordinated multilateral responses. 
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In terms of violent or potentially violent conflict, such instability poses the question 
as to how to devise suitable policies to deal with this type of conflict. The post-Cold 
War period has seen an emphasis towards a more fluid concept of state sovereignty 
whereby internal intervention is increasingly accepted and demanded (Freedman 
1994 p2). States in both East and Western Europe have accepted a variety of third 
party involvement in managing their conflicts. 
Forms of intervention have been developed in a manner that is increasingly sensitive 
to the variety of ways that conflict may become manifest. This is reflected in the 
willingness of states to invest the OSCE with conflict resolution functions in post- 
Cold War Europe. Through a range of conflict management techniques the OSCE 
also offers the possibility of engaging in conflicts at different points of the conflict 
cycle. It also offers flexibility in terms of the period of time that the OSCE may 
become involved with a state and the different levels of operations that can be 
applied. 
The thesis sets out to discuss the various means of OSCE intervention in three 
different types of conflict. These are areas that have received varying levels of 
research attention by journalists and academics. OSCE documentation was analyzed 
and consideration given to commentary that was available through reports compiled 
by non- governmental organizations (NGOs), alongside a selection of secondary 
sources. Each case study is illustrative of a distinctive method of OSCE intervention. 
Macedonia details the OSCE's involvement in preventive diplomacy. The case of 
Nagorno-Karabakh discusses OSCE mediation in an ongoing conflict along with its 
first attempts to establish both a peace conference and a peacekeeping mission. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina provides the setting for the OSCE's engagement with post 
conflict reconstruction. The research focuses on an eight year time frame starting 
from 1990 until the end of 1998. 
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From the three case studies general conclusions will be drawn concerning the 
OSCE's ability to facilitate international cooperation when channeled through an 
international organization. Conclusions will also be drawn that highlight the OSCE's 
strengths and weaknesses. The thesis also seeks to demonstrate the extent to which 
neo-realism or neo-liberal institutionalism are useful in understanding the operations 
and structures of the OSCE. This will involve an examination of the OSCE as a 
facilitator of cooperative policies and by contrast as a gatekeeper through which 
individual state interests are pursued. The thesis concludes by seeking to demonstrate 
that the OSCE has made a small but positive contribution to embryonic conflict 
management techniques during the time frame of the study. 
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Chapter One: Two perspectives on the prospects for cooperation 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses two theoretical perspectives: neo-liberal institutionalism and 
neo-realism. The purpose of the discussion is to outline the central tenets of each 
theory and to consider what each theory has to say about cooperation when it is 
channeled through an international organization. This is necessary because the 
development of prevention, management and resolution mechanisms in relation to 
conflicts could be partly dependent on effectively utilizing international cooperation. 
The chapter attempts to assess the relevance and utility of each theory to issues 
surrounding conflict. Neo-realism in the context of this study focuses upon 
describing the inevitability of the security dilemma as it relates to conflict and the 
effects of states' interests on international cooperation. In contrast, neo-liberal 
institutionalism is used to examine international cooperation and how it can be 
utilized to develop measures designed to address conflict. The reason for outlining 
the two theories is in order to understand how the OSCE's work with conflict can be 
assessed in the light of each theory. The case studies will subsequently be used to 
assess how the two theories can be interpreted in real life situations. 
The two theories stem from the Anglo-American tradition that has dominated 
discourse in international relations. The theories were chosen for pragmatic reasons, 
they both take a clear and testable position on the role of international organizations 
and have explicit views on the utility of international cooperation. The two 
approaches have influenced mainstream thinking on how the OSCE is understood. 
Policy makers appear to intuitively hold assumptions that reflect neo-realist or neo- 
liberal institutionalist's concepts. 
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Institutions which are the focus of the neo-liberal institutionalist debate have been 
defined as `practices composed of recognized roles coupled with sets of rules and 
conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles. ' Organizations 
are a sub-type of institutions, being `physical entities possessing personnel, 
equipment, budgets' and so forth. In turn, international organizations are `material 
entities established by groups of states to pursue specific goals of interest to their 
members' (Young 1995 p201). 
International institutions vary in their levels of effectiveness. Where participants 
share values and possess similar political systems the results are likely to be more 
effective. Where participation is more diverse a lack of a deep and shared 
commitment may be noted (Keohane 1998 p91). The cumbersome nature of OSCE 
decision making based on achieving consensus amongst its large and heterogeneous 
participating states appears less likely to produce radical policy and lends support for 
cautious and incremental policies that may be derived from adopting tenets of either 
or both of the two theories. 
Neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism 
Neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism can both be seen as problem solving 
theories. This involves taking the world as given and attempting to find solutions to 
problems within the established order. Both theories are epistemologically positivist 
and rationally deductive (Cox 1992 ppl69-173) 
The two theories recognize the condition of anarchy in the international system. This 
means that there is no higher authority above states to control, regulate or define the 
behaviour between states in the international arena. The fundamental difference, 
however, between the two perspectives is the emphasis that each places on how 
malleable the concept of anarchy can become through institutionalized intervention 
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in the international system when channeled through systems of cooperation. To neo- 
realists the order that arises from the state of anarchy stems from the interests of the 
dominant powers, along with the ways in which power is manifest in the international 
system. `There is no governance or standards that are divorced from these 
considerations' (Wayman and Diehl 1994 p255). Neo-realists suggest that decisions 
taken regarding institutionalized cooperation merely reflect the interests of the 
dominant states of an international organization. Neo-liberal institutionalists agree 
that this can be the case but, by contrast, suggest that institutionalized cooperation is 
necessary in order to meet the demands bought by international interdependence. 
Interdependence is a strong condition in the international system. It compels states to 
work together in cooperative frameworks. Therefore states are interconnected 
through multiple channels and multiple issues creating systems of complex 
interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1989 pp24-25). 
In terms of intra-state conflicts the effects and aftermath of internal conflicts may 
impact in a variety of ways on outside states making it difficult for states to isolate 
themselves from these conflicts. International organizations offer the potential to 
devise collective responses to external conflicts, reducing costs, risks and inhibitions 
of involvement for individual states. Neo-liberal institutionalists also assert that 
cooperation facilitates more subtle and sophisticated outcomes than neo-realists 
acknowledge, for example, by providing sustained dialogue and linkages and 
increased confidence regarding the anticipated patterns of behaviour between states 
(Keohane and Martin 1995 pp49-50). 
The aim of neo-liberal institutionalism is to explain how international organization 
has modified anarchy in the international system by creating relationships between 
states with new systems of authority and thus providing levels of governance above 
those of state governments. For neo-liberal institutionalists international cooperation 
can result in mechanisms being utilized which transcend the direct control and 
individual interests of participating states and may aim to transform rather than 
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merely reflect states' interests. This can result in needs being met which would not 
otherwise be addressed. 
By contrast, cooperation to neo-realists is inherently problematic because of the 
adverse outcomes that could be generated from attempting to achieve such 
cooperation between states (Waltz 1979 p106). `International cooperation is 
embedded with a structure of competition, rivalry and insecurity' (Stein 1990 p172). 
Neo-realists consider that cooperation is inherently unstable. However, states 
according to this view, will cooperate when faced with threats and crises (Wallander 
et al., 1999 p4). Nevertheless, cooperation increases the risk of dependency and 
creates interdependency. Interdependence is interpreted by Waltz as mutual 
vulnerability, multiplying the conditions under which conflict could occur. However, 
Charles Glaser (1994/5 p52) offers what he terms `contingent realism. ' He maintains 
that `under a wide range of conditions, adversaries can best achieve their security 
goals through cooperative policies, not competitive ones, and should, therefore, 
choose cooperation when these conditions prevail. ' 
Neo-realists imply that both dependency and interdependency can be avoided for 
some states. This may not however, prove to be the case in terms of the effects of 
internal conflicts. For example, large numbers of refugees fleeing a state as a result 
of intra-state conflict may force regional or neighbouring states to become involved 
either directly or indirectly in the conflict. This may then require the cooperation of a 
number of states in order to resolve issues, for example, housing refugees. Therefore, 
states can benefit from cooperation. In this instance, dealing effectively with a 
refugee crisis may be beyond the means of one particular state. 
Waltz (1979 p138) states that the worst wars have been fought between states and 
peoples who were highly similar and whose concerns were inter linked. Not only 
could dependency results from interdependence but advantage could be bestowed on 
an allied state. If the allied state later became a foe this could lead to the other state's 
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demise (Grieco 1990 p47). Waltz maintains that states are concerned with `who will 
gain more' from a particular course of action, therefore, `with relative rather than 
absolute gains. ' States are therefore concerned with counterbalancing the power of 
other states rather than cooperating with them. Here neo-realists maintain that states 
pursue a balance of power policy, `transcend, ' `hide' or `bandwagon' (Schroeder 
1994 p116-117). 
Alternatively, initiatives developed through international organization allow states to 
forego short term advantages by concentrating on securing long term gains (Kupchan 
and Kupchan 1991 p125). Neo-liberal institutionalists consider that international 
organizations may assist in reducing uncertainties surrounding the enforcement of 
agreements by enabling states to achieve collective gains. Institutions can become 
facilitating mechanisms through which the opportunities for cooperation are 
enhanced because they are able to resolve distributional issues and reassure states that 
gains are evenly distributed (Keohane and Martin 1995 p49). The linkage of issues 
enables institutions to provide states with more credible guarantees that measures will 
be enforced against states who decide to renege on agreements and provide an arena 
which is conducive to mutually beneficial exchanges (Keohane 1998 p86). 
In a situation of anarchy where the concerns of states may be with relative as opposed 
to absolute gains, institutions can remove the concern that cooperation may yield 
unequal gains. Cooperation is facilitated because a failure to cooperate may result in 
adverse consequences, for example, `if your refuse to work with others they may 
work together and gain even more relative advantages over you than they had 
otherwise' (Milner 1995 p484). In this regard the provision of information about the 
distribution of gains resulting from cooperation may be particularly important 
(Keohane and Martin 1995 p45). Where situations are complex and concern 
different states as intra-state conflicts do, institutions may become coordinating 
mechanisms and provide `constructed focal points' that make cooperative outcomes 
possible. The development of a complicated network of institutionally sanctioned 
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relationships provides the means by which conflicts can be diffused and discussed 
(Ned Lebow 1995 p42). 
In cases where there are even balances between states in terms of the power they 
possess and where their interests may conflict, international organizations may 
facilitate relationships by enabling leading players to adopt stable relationships by 
preventing the escalation of local conflicts and by monitoring the levels of 
compliance with for example, arms control agreements. In addition, international 
organizations may provide `impartial channels of communication and opportunities 
to work out face saving devices' (Young 1968 cited in Young 1995 p202). 
The security dilemma and neo-realism 
A central tenet of neo-realism is the notion of a security dilemma which is perceived 
as one of the causes of inter-state and intra-state conflict (Herz 1950 pp157-158). 
Whereas neo-realists attach inevitability to the concept, neo-liberal institutionalists 
consider that the problems inherent in the security dilemma can be moderated and in 
some circumstances overcome. 
To neo-realists states are unitary and rational, autonomous and sovereign and 
concerned with their own survival (Grieco 1988 p488). States are free to make their 
own choices given their own particular constraints and situation. Choices are made 
according to the strategy states consider will best serve their interests, which is often 
complicated by competing and conflicting choices (Stein 1990 ppl5-21). This 
creates dilemmas in a state's choice of policy direction. Neo-realists assume that 
states automatically know what is in their best interests and possess the necessary 
information with which to make informed choice. Unaccounted for here is the issue 
of whether states possess leaders who may act against the interests of their states 
because the need to secure their own position takes precedence. This may be 
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relevant to intra-state conflicts where, for example, securing an ethnic power base 
becomes more important than a broader more elusive concept of national interest. 
Neo-realists emphasize maximizing military security. Competition spirals as states 
seek to collate more power than other states and ultimately more than they can 
utilize. The resources of a given state may prove threatening to other states who will 
respond by increasing their own military resources. Because relative power is 
difficult to determine and assess, resources that are deemed as a defensive capability 
to one state will appear as an offensive capability to another. This triggers the 
`security dilemma' whereby a state seeking to increase its own security increases 
insecurity between itself and neighbouring states due to the reaction that it provokes 
in other states (Posen 1993 p104). Attempts to ameliorate the security dilemma will 
prove to be futile because states cannot risk another state's cheating. This could 
leave the state at a military disadvantage and open to conquest by other states. 
The security dilemma has been transposed by neo-realists from an inter-state to an 
intra-state setting. This has occurred since the end of the Cold War as neo-realists 
have sought to tailor neo-realism to explain the new circumstances that have emerged 
in Europe. The security dilemma, however, is not strictly transferable to intra-state 
conflict because groups within states `rarely find themselves in a situation of 
anarchy. ' However, where groups launch an effective challenge to a government's 
authority a situation resembling anarchy can prevail. In cases where domestic groups 
or organizations threaten a government's ability to protect its people and the group or 
organization's leaders possess the ability to offer alternative forms of protection, such 
leaders have assumed enough of the attributes of sovereignty to propel a security 
dilemma (Kaufman 1996 p151). 
In other words, where central government becomes ineffective, groups, religious, 
ethnic or national will provide for their own security. This then creates a self-help 
system at the domestic level resembling the international system (Roe 1999 p189). 
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For example, when the former Yugoslavia disintegrated rival groups were placed in 
an anarchic setting. This heightened fear and encouraged different ethnic groups to 
use force to improve their relative positions. Territories controlled by one ethnic 
group also contained enclaves populated by rival ethnic groups. This in turn 
exacerbated tensions and led to the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing (Walt 1998 p35). 
In such situations distinctions between the offensive and defensive capabilities of 
states (or groups within states) remain blurred. Groups who seek to protect 
themselves from the uncertain intentions of their neighbours may unwittingly 
provoke their neighbours onto the offensive because the neighbouring side may view 
the build up of military resources as a sign of an impending attack. This state of 
affairs may be exacerbated because the history of each sides' behaviour in past 
conflicts may be the only indicator of possible future courses of action that the 
opposing groups possess (Posen 1993 pp104-107). Thus, the security dilemma 
renders conflict diplomacy that much more difficult. 
Implicit in the security dilemma is the idea that perceptions held of rival groups' 
behaviour in accruing arms equates to aggressive intentions even though the other 
side may not be aware that their behaviour is being construed as such. This implies 
that the security dilemma can be caused, as is any resulting war, through 
misperception rather than the outright desire to bring about war. There is 
nonetheless, an inevitability in this analysis that does not seem to be borne out in 
practice. States or groups developing their military resources are not necessarily 
prone to war. This may in part be due to the contribution made by international 
institutions in mitigating the security dilemma between states or groups sharing 
similar values. 
The security dilemma may explain the type of reaction that is common when a 
conflict has reached a particular stage. It does not adequately explain the 
circumstances by which groups of people come to view each other with increasing 
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hostility. It negates the involvement of both inside forces and outside powers seeking 
to influence the internal events in a particular state. This amounts to a denial of the 
political processes involved. Such an error is implicit in neo-realist analyses which 
takes no account of the `type of government, the quality of its decision making or the 
particular features of its leaders' (Glaser 1994/5 p55). For example, during the 1990s 
Croatia under Franjo Tudjman and Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic were able to 
manipulate and create hostility, in order to strengthen their power bases and serve 
expansionist aims. External involvement by Germany was designed to support 
Croatian independence. This is turn played a role in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. 
If alternative leadership styles and external support systems had been available to the 
former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s this may have resulted in a different set of 
outcomes. 
Neo-liberal institutionalists and institutions/organizations 
Neo-liberal institutionalists maintain that states have a tendency towards cooperation 
and this is demonstrated through their willingness to invest resources in international 
organizations. Institutionalized cooperation allows states to realize common interests 
and solve problems. Institutions also enable states to deal with uncertainty 
(Wallander et al., 1999 p5). In developing cooperative measures to deal with 
conflicts, when these are processed through an effective international institution, 
states can benefit by pooling resources, reducing risks, increasing stability and 
security, thus providing gains, to differing extents, to the states involved. 
Institutional responses can add legitimacy to forms of intervention in intra-state 
conflicts especially when the state(s) experiencing conflict are also a member or 
participant of the institution in question. Comprehensive measures are now in place 
across Eastern Europe and the FSU designed to address different forms and stages of 
internal conflicts. There are, nonetheless, difficult ethical issues for states to resolve 
when considering intervention in the internal affairs of another state. Where 
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intervention is institutionalized it may be easier to resolve such issues and can serve 
to legitimize intervention and mitigate fears of entrapment. Direct responsibility for 
external involvement in an internal conflict is removed from individual states and 
instead becomes the collective responsibility of the institution's members. 
Institutions provide states with an increased choice of alternative responses to 
inaction or unilateralism. Outcomes are affected because the power resources 
derived from an international institution which states can utilize to develop responses 
are changed. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization `(NATO) is far 
more than the sum of its national militaries' (Wallander et al., 1999 p9). Institutions 
and processes can in the long run transform and change both structures and systems 
(Mottola 1993 p5). 
Although cooperation entails costs, such costs may be higher if states refuse to 
cooperate than if they comply. If cooperation is to be effective at a multilateral level 
it may require regulation by law and institutional procedures which give states 
confidence to engage in cooperation. Institutions can facilitate cooperation because 
they can `provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more 
credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation 
of reciprocity' (Keohane and Martin 1995 p42). Because institutions can create and 
convey information to states this can become a source of influence (Wallander et al., 
1999 p9). 
Inter-state cooperation, when institutionalized through an international organization, 
makes it possible for states to coordinate responses to infra-state conflict. Rather 
than relying on bilateral responses or the ad hoc efforts of groups of states responding 
to individual conflicts, an international organization charged with developing a 
conflict management programme can establish comprehensive measures designed to 
address internal conflicts. Such programmes can help to define new international 
norms and acceptable modes of behaviour. For example, when an intra-state conflict 
develops, an international organization can respond using measures that have gained 
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international legitimacy and acceptance. Such measures have gained legitimacy 
because they have been devised with the agreement of the organization's participants. 
Where states are influential in shaping norms within an institutional setting and 
behave according to these norms such states can be said to command `soft power' 
(Nye 1990 cited in Wallander et al., 1999 p9). If other states accept these norms their 
preferences and ideas of self interest can be affected (i. e changed) (Wallander et al., 
1999 p9). 
The contribution of neo-liberal institutionalists towards understanding intra-state 
conflicts lies in applying ideas underpinning the utility of institutions and 
organizations to situations of internal conflict. Neo-liberal institutionalists are 
concerned with creating structures to devise systems of governance in the 
international system. They emphasize that existing structures can be modified to 
work more smoothly reducing the conflictual nature of international relations and 
providing mechanisms to allow cooperative behaviour to function more smoothly in 
an anarchic system (Cox 1992 ppl72-173). These ideas stem from a body of thought 
which considers that through law, organization, exchange and communication, peace 
and security can be enhanced. This can be achieved through the development of 
political, economic, social and cultural relationships between states (Goldmann 1994 
ppl9-32). It is therefore possible to extend these ideas to examine how cooperation 
between states when channeled through an international organization can allow 
conflict prevention, management and resolution techniques to be applied within 
states. 
Neo-liberal institutionalists do not argue that cooperation is easy to achieve for if so 
there would be no need for institutions to facilitate it. Keohane (1988 p291) argues 
that international institutions are significant because of the function they perform in 
producing a platform whereby the `potential value of the agreements and the 
difficulty of making them' are brought together. Cooperation then occurs `when 
actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, 
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through a process of policy coordination' (Charles Lindblom cited in Milner 1995 
p467). 
Neo-liberal institutionalists maintain that states are rational egoists who operate in an 
international environment where agreements cannot be legally enforced. In this 
atmosphere neo-liberal institutionalists consider that cooperation between states can 
occur if states share `significant common interests' (Keohane and Martin 1995 p39). 
They do not argue that cooperation will always result from collective or cooperative 
agreements but that `in conjunction with power realities' institutions can make a 
significant contribution to facilitating cooperative relationships between states. The 
impact of international institutions on the outcomes they seek to influence is variable 
according to the nature of power and interests they seek to affect (Keohane and 
Martin 1995 p42). Institutions may be more important in some issue areas than 
others. Cooperation can vary according to the issues addressed and can vary over 
time (Axelrod and Keohane 1986 p226). 
In describing the function of an international organization Harold Jacobson (1984 
cited in Goldmann 1994 p39) makes five points. International organizations are 
informational, normative, rule creating, rule supervisory and operational. Karns and 
Mingst (cited in Goldmann 1994 p39) distinguish between the functions of agenda 
setting, norm setting and dispute settlement. In addition, policies are harmonized, 
and frameworks for communications developed (Claude 1965 p8). This means that 
by establishing `informational structures' international organizations are able to 
establish the principles that form the basis for procedures designed to reduce conflicts 
along with the ability to decipher whether a government is acting in a legitimate or 
illegitimate manner (Keohane 1998 p191). These structures can be valuable in 
providing means to address infra-state conflict. 
International organizations may become a substitute for states as an object of 
allegiance (Goldmann 1994 p39). They may offer a means of multiplying previously 
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polarized identities, providing links across divides. Minorities can be provided with a 
platform to address their grievances above the jurisdiction of their own governments. 
Therefore, international organizations become a means through which a state can be 
held accountable for the treatment of it citizens. The international organization is 
itself accountable to its participating states. International organizations may exert 
influence on governments in order to modify or change domestic policy. For 
example, dialogue between the European Union (EU) and the Czech Republic has 
aimed to improve the rights and treatment of Roma minorities within that state. 
Institutions can become `providers of information and communication, developing 
pools of expertise that offer new approaches to complex issue areas' (Keohane and 
Nye 1974 p240). These facilitative roles may take the form of helping to prevent the 
escalation of local conflicts, to police arms control agreements and to resolve or 
manage crises involving leading players by `providing impartial channels of 
communication and opportunities to work out face saving devices' (Young 1995 
p202). 
`Institutions change as a result of human action, and the changes in expectations that 
result can exert a profound effect on state behaviour' (Keohane 1989 p10). They 
create hidden linkages that would not otherwise exist, these provide retaliatory 
mechanisms against cheating and provide an atmosphere conducive to mutually 
beneficial exchange (Keohane and Martin 1995 p49). This over time can lead to 
stable expectations of how states will behave (Axelrod and Keohane 1986 p277). 
`Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated 
preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination. Policy coordination 
implies that the policies of each state have been adjusted to reduce the negative 
consequences for other states. ' Institutions therefore appear essential if sustained 
cooperation is to be nurtured (Keohane and Martin 1995 p50). Cooperation `requires 
that the actions of separate individuals and organizations - which are not in pre- 
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existent harmony be brought into conformity with one another through a process of 
policy coordination' (Keohane 1988 p281). 
Neo-liberal institutionalists maintain their approach is particularly applicable to 
security issues because it `revolves around the role of institutions in providing 
information' (Keohane and Martin 1995 p43). This can prevent states (or groups 
within states) having to rely on worst case scenarios when assessing their 
relationships with other groups or states. This operates against the security dilemma 
by providing for openness and transparency. Institutions can provide neutral 
environments where parties to a conflict (who may be non-state actors) can gain 
access to a legitimate platform to address issues at the international level. 
Less positively, cooperative initiatives may be subverted to produce outcomes that 
privilege the few at the expense of the rest and can increase inequalities in some 
cases (Axelrod and Keohane 1986 p252). Multilateralism can operate `as an 
instrument for institutionalizing the core-periphery structure of domination' (Cox 
1992 p176). A number of particular problems have been noticed in attempts to 
achieve cooperative outcomes. Firstly, the degree to which there is a mutuality of 
interest; the prospect of how the future could be presented and the number of actors 
who fail to cooperate because the application of sanctions may prove costly in such 
cases. It remains unclear as to the extent to which defecting governments or groups 
are punished (Keohane 1988 p292). Problems may occur regarding how to measure 
whether states behave in the desired manner (Axelrod and Keohane 1986 p253). 
Negative effects can also arise in other forms. The case of the much criticized United 
Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation in Bosnia provides one such example. When 
an institution is incapable of meeting the demands of a mandate assigned to it 
disastrous consequences can result (Wallander et al., 1999 p9). 
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Conclusion 
Neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism both offer different perspectives on the 
utility of international cooperation with regard to intra-state conflict. The claims 
made by neo-liberal institutionalists in this regard are both qualified and modest. 
Neo-liberal institutionalists assert that international organizations must be of 
significance (even if that significance is the pursuit of self interest) in order for 
governments to invest resources in them (Keohane and Martin 1995 p47). This 
appears to suggest that there is a role for international organizations in dealing with 
internal conflict. Widening concepts of states' interests and their attendant security 
will allow for new norms of what is classified as acceptable domestic and 
international behaviour to emerge. International organizations have a role to play in 
fashioning responses to these emerging norms. 
Applying these insights, it can be argued that organizations like the OSCE offer states 
multilateral approaches to dealing with conflicts. Problems exist in ensuring states' 
compliance with decisions (Young 1995 p203). Nonetheless, `even an unchallenged 
superpower such as the United States (US) would be unable to achieve its goals 
through the bilateral (and unilateral) exercise of influence; the cost of such massive 
`arm twisting' would be too great' (Keohane 1998 p83). 
In the absence of organizations like the OSCE, neo-realists would argue that conflict 
situations may still produce optimal outcomes because conflicts would remain 
localized and would be less likely to be inflamed through international involvement. 
By contrast, neo-liberal institutionalists would assert that early forms of intervention 
serve to lessen the likelihood of conflict escalation, reduce the costs of long-term 
involvement and reduce the subsequent risk to lives. Therefore, international 
organizations have the potential to develop concerted responses to conflict. 
However, the effectiveness of an international organization is dependent upon the 
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expectations held by member or participating states and the level of commitment 
displayed in achieving such goals. The most fundamental problem has been that 
knowledge of impending or actual conflicts and methods to address conflict are 
independent processes from those of a willingness to consider and devise appropriate 
responses. A narrow application of neo-realism could see the OSCE only 
intervening in conflicts where the interests of the OSCE's major players are at stake. 
In practice, however, it will be seen that the OSCE has developed widespread 
involvement in many states across Eastern Europe and the FSU where the interests of 
prominent participating states appear to be only marginal. OSCE participants have, 
however, an interest in ensuring that economic and political stability prevails across 
Europe. The low key preventive projects that the OSCE has been particularly 
involved with are indicative of a serious attempt to deeply embed into the structures 
of recipient states Western political, economic and cultural values, however remote 
the possibility may be of achieving such aims. 
In subsequent chapters, the two theories outlined in this chapter will be applied to the 
case studies in order to demonstrate how OSCE mechanisms can be seen to be 
operating in low intensity through to major conflict. These ideas will be discussed in 
the thesis's conclusions which will outline the extent to which either theory can be 
seen to be relevant to each individual case study and to policies within the OSCE. 
The underlying idea being to make an assessment of the how theories are manifest 
within the workings of the OSCE and to arrive at general conclusions about the 
organization in relation to its work with intra-state conflicts. 
The focus of this chapter has been on cooperation and obstacles to it, especially the 
security dilemma. The next chapter continues this type of analysis and seeks to 
address what is meant by conflict and the various forms that it may take. It will 
examine ideas centred on conflict prevention, management and resolution. The 
chapter look at methods of managing conflict starting with concepts of cooperative 
security through to types of domestic political systems. 
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Chapter Two : Conflict prevention, management and resolution 
Processes to prevent, manage and resolve conflict operate constantly and largely 
unobtrusively within societies, governments and at the international level. Conflict 
regulation processes are intrinsic features of political systems. Political systems are 
in turn, a means through which diverse issues and competing demands are met and 
reconciled. It is when levels of conflict are perceived as threatening or involve 
increasing levels of violence that the political mechanisms involved in preventing, 
managing or resolving conflicts are tested and come under increasing scrutiny. 
During the 1990s conflict prevention, and to a lesser extent conflict management and 
resolution, have provided the means through which the OSCE has redefined its role 
and found new purpose in the post-Cold war period. This has involved a 
reorientation of the organization's structures and policies as it has sought to devise 
cooperative measures designed to address actual or potentially violent conflicts that 
have emerged largely in an intra-state form. It might be argued that the OSCE would 
have become redundant in the post-Cold War period without this new mission. The 
ability of the OSCE to adapt to changing circumstances in Europe and the FSU and to 
play a relevant role in developing conflict management initiatives has allowed the 
organization to retain its credibility as an international security institution. 
This chapter will start by examining the concept of cooperative security. The ideals 
associated with this concept have helped to shape contemporary conceptions of the 
OSCE. The chapter then progresses to look more closely at what is meant by forms 
of conflict management, the implications of applying different types of conflict 
management along with a consideration of the ethics involved. Also included within 
the chapter is a brief discussion of how conflict within states has traditionally been 
managed. This chapter aims to give context to subsequent chapters which deal with 
specific aspects of conflict management as they relate directly to the OSCE. 
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Cooperative security 
As an intergovernmental cooperative security mechanism, the OSCE seeks to 
regulate the behaviour of its participating states by offering a series of channels 
through which standards are set, disputes filtered, norms established and solutions to 
problems are sought. The work of the OSCE is based upon the belief that an 
environment conducive to cooperation can more easily be achieved multilaterally 
than by states acting in isolation. It is on this basis that conflict management 
programmes have been developed. 
Gareth Evans (1994 pp 6-7) sets out some of the ideals upon which concepts of 
cooperative security are based. A cooperative security organization consists of three 
components. Firstly, it can include a concept of collective security. This is 
predicated on the belief that member states collectively refrain from the use of force 
and jointly aid any member state which is attacked. The OSCE does not strictly 
embrace the concept of collective security, primarily because the organization lacks a 
military capability. Neither does it support a principle designed to automatically 
defend a state which has been attacked. The OSCE does offer, however, other forms 
of collective censure. The OSCE's suspension of the rump Yugoslavia in 1992 can 
be offered as an illustration of how the organization may choose to deal with a 
participating state acting against OSCE principles. 
Secondly, cooperative security embraces the concept of inclusive security where 
security is achieved with others and not against them. The principles upon which the 
OSCE were founded were considered to embrace values that are broadly reflective of 
European ideals and to which states purport to support in principle. This has led to 
the organization adopting inclusive rather than exclusive policies. Participation 
within the OSCE subjects states to processes of inculcation and monitoring in order 
to eventually acquire the accepted values. This approach is founded on notions of 
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assumed unity rather than division or difference. Within the OSCE there is no 
equivalent of the UN Security Council where politically powerful states can take key 
decisions on behalf of the organization's membership as a whole. Attempts to foster 
inclusive policies within the OSCE can also be seen through a consensus decision 
making process promoting equity between participating states. 
Finally, cooperative security is suggestive of the idea of comprehensive security. 
This is a holistic concept where attention is paid to different levels of security that 
include political and diplomatic matters along with issues relating to trade, 
economics, human rights and the environment. Such ideas expand traditional 
concepts of security away from narrow military interpretations. In part, this reflects a 
growing awareness that a range of issues can contribute to situations of conflict. The 
OSCE has concentrated on addressing political and human rights issues although 
limited attention is paid to other areas, for example, environmental matters. Issues 
surrounding trade and economics have received minimal attention being essentially 
the remit of other international organizations like the EU. 
Cooperative security suggests `consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance 
rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than 
correction and interdependence rather than unilateralism' (Evans 1994 p7). Schelling 
(cited in Mitchell 1981 p140) however considers that results may be difficult to 
achieve through a cooperative security system. For a cooperative security system the 
`problems of compelling an adversary to act in a desired manner are far more 
complicated than those involved in deterring an adversary, so that he refrains from 
action. ' Thus, within the OSCE security commitments are agreed between 
participants but in practice OSCE states vary widely in their ability to meet the 
requirements of the organization's principles and ideals. 
Furthermore, a cooperative approach to security issues does not prevent adversarial 
relationships between participating states developing. However, it does provide the 
25 
mechanisms through which such disputes can be monitored, regulated and resolved. 
Implicit in the concept of cooperative security is an assumption that it is possible to 
devise constructive rather than merely reactive courses of action when situations of 
actual or potential conflict are present. This is reflected in the OSCE by the 
increasingly strong emphasis the organization places on early warning systems and 
conflict prevention measures. Cooperative security offers the potential for a more 
controlled approach to issues of conflict than would the sole reliance on deterrence. 
The OSCE is constrained in its actions and remains unable to undertake a 
comprehensive commitment to cooperative security. Aside from the reasons outlined 
above, the OSCE's work is limited by the low level of resources with which 
organization is expected to function. The OSCE can nonetheless be construed 
broadly as a cooperative security organization, even though the criteria outlined by 
Evan's model are only partially fulfilled. 
From outlining the fundamental tenets of cooperative security which are concerned 
with managing conflict, it is to definitions and ideas surrounding concepts of conflict 
that this chapter now turns. 
What is conflict? 
Conflict can be defined as a product which results from a clash of interests, goals or 
ideas. Anthony Groom (1992) states that `all human transactions can be placed on a 
spectrum which runs from pure conflict to pure cooperation. ' It is rare to be at either 
end. Conflict possesses both positive and negative attributes enabling processes of 
change to occur. This can allow new ideas to arise and reformulations to be made of 
the means by which need is perceived and met. Most conflicts are transformed 
peacefully and do not lead to violence. 
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Conflict can be perceived as comprising three components: structure, attitudes and 
behaviour (Galtung 1989 cited in Mall 1992 p51). The structure is the situation of 
conflict which includes the parties involved and the issues of contention. The 
attitudinal component reflects the way that parties perceive the conflict and each 
other, for example, negative enemy images. The behavioural component reflects the 
parties actions towards each other. In order to prevent or manage a conflict one or 
more of these components needs to be addressed. In order to resolve a conflict the 
three components need to be acted upon in unison. 
Two types of conflict have existed throughout history. The one regarded as 
universally `normal' has been the competition between states or legitimate political 
authorities. The second type are wars between whole peoples or classes which have 
proven to be the more bitter and protracted especially when intertwined with rivalries 
between states (Smith 1986 p63). The post-Cold War environment, in particular, has 
seen volatile situations both within and between states resulting from an 
intermingling of these two types of conflict. Where these conflicts have arisen this 
`indicates that a state has failed to govern itself - that is to meet the needs and 
aspirations of its people and to effectively accommodate and reconcile the demands 
of competing groups within the framework of economic growth and stability' (Kumar 
1997 p4). 
Failure to accommodate the needs of minority groups within states has contributed in 
some cases to the onset of violent conflicts stemming from the desire to secure self 
determination or to maintain territorial integrity. The role of the OSCE is of 
particular relevance here because it is one of only a few international organizations 
concerned with examining the tensions between self determination and territorial 
integrity and their implication for conflict management programmes. Tensions over 
these two key OSCE principles are present within the cases cited in this study. The 
cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nagorno-Karabakh and to a lesser extent Macedonia 
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raise questions for the OSCE in particular on how to devise suitable approaches to 
such conflicts. 
Reasons to suggest why conflict arises can roughly be divided into three sets of ideas. 
To the strategist, conflict arises from an inherent drive for power, dominance or from 
the security dilemma. Therefore its prevention relies on deterrence. These views are 
reflected within the neo-realist paradigm. The conflict researcher assumes conflict 
arises subjectively resulting from `incomplete knowledge and the choice of 
incompatible policy outcomes' (Groom 1992). These are dependent on choice and 
can be avoided. This approach reflects neo-liberal institutionalist thought, where an 
organization like the OSCE has, for example, the potential to provide information 
thereby reducing potential points of conflict arising from a lack of knowledge or the 
failure to achieve transparency. Conflict also arises from a clash of ideas. The Cold 
War was illustrative of a clash of ideologies. Neo-liberal institutionalists consider 
that shared ideas promote cooperation. To the revolutionary, conflict results from 
structural incompatibilities. Peace can only be achieved when it is not disguising 
structural oppression (Groom 1992). This is similar to Johan Galtung's (cited in 
Miall 1992 p39) concept of `structural violence' whereby economic, social or 
political conflict may be an equally dangerous threat to life as overt violent conflict. 
Here solutions are considered by revolutionaries to lie in dismantling or replacing old 
systems and constructing new ones. 
These various ideas share similarities with the ideals underlying cooperative security, 
where there is an awareness that security is a multi-faceted concept. In order to 
address such conflict, attention needs to be paid to its various components. A 
distinction can be drawn here between armed violent conflict and `the haphazard 
infliction of suffering through economic forces' (Mall 1992 p45). Concentrating on 
potential or overt violent conflict can mask the violence and suffering that is 
perpetuated through economic systems. One example of this is the cumulative 
effects resulting from practices such as the international application of interest based 
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financial transactions and debt management policies enacted through institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. 
Conflict prevention 
Conflict management can be used as a generic term to encompass conflict avoidance, 
prevention, containment, suppression and resolution. Conflict management can also 
be used in a specific sense in order to refer to a particular way of handling a conflict. 
It is often alluded to in a similar way to conflict containment, or regulation, meaning 
that the conflict is not resolved but kept within permissible boundaries, spatially or 
politically. 
Making distinctions between forms of conflict management does not mean that they 
are necessarily separate and distinct when applied to real conflicts. Looking firstly at 
the concept of conflict prevention, it may for example, be difficult to detect whether 
an activity can be classified as conflict avoidance or prevention (Mitchell 1981 
p279). Conflict prevention moreover is distinctly different from conflict resolution 
because conflicts `which do not have the time to be formed cannot be resolved' 
(Miall 1992 p43). However, conflict prevention is often referred to when discussing 
post conflict reconstruction. Here a conflict may have been resolved or settled but 
the primary concern is with preventing further conflict. 
Conflict prevention can be defined as processes devised to avert behaviour likely to 
lead to a situation of conflict. It can also be seen as a means to confine behaviour 
within permitted limits. This could encompass conflict suppression through, for 
example, the imposition of economic and political measures such as sanctions 
(Mitchell 1981 p263). 
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Where a conflict is prevented such action can bring into question the legitimacy and 
ethics of preventing a conflict which may be considered to be just. ' In Europe, 
ideas of `just war' are derived from medieval concepts of jus ad bellum' outlining 
ethical reasons why war could be pursued (Howard 1977 p17). An example of a 
`just' conflict might include instances where an ethnic group resists forced 
assimilation or genocide, for example the Muslims of Bosnia. If a particular ethnic 
group was denied the ability to resort to war and the conflict was suppressed or 
prevented to the advantage of the dominant ethnic group, without consideration for 
the demands and rights of the other ethnic group(s) involved, this type of situation 
could result in continued discrimination, repression or forced assimilation. Such 
conflict can appear in different forms, for example, struggles for independence, 
revolts or armed resistance against economic and political oppression, clan warfare, 
`economic warlordism, organized crime and ethnic strife' (Costy and Gilbert 1998 
p15). 
Conflict prevention measures may prove to be both beneficial and benign. States 
remain, however, inherently suspicious of external interference and meddling in their 
internal affairs (Munuerva 1994 p99) especially in cases where intervention can be 
used to further the self interest of major powers (Buzau cited in Reychler 1994 p3). 
There remains an awareness that the self interest of states is `still far from being 
equated with the concept of the welfare and stability of the international community. ' 
States are concerned that initiatives involved in concepts of conflict prevention may 
require the `use of military force for peacekeeping or peacemaking and thus there is a 
fear of military interpretations of conflict prevention measures' (Reychler 1994 p3). 
Initiatives aimed at preventing conflict may also allow violence embedded in the 
structure of a state to continue and can thus result in the continuation of undesirable, 
inequitable or exploitative relations. This type of situation could occur where 
external support is offered to a regime that in turn oppresses or discriminates against 
sections of its population either on political, ethnic, religious or class grounds. 
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The implementation of measures designed to prevent conflicts can also be 
complicated by the difficulties involved in attempting to predict where a conflict is 
likely to occur and/or to escalate. Conflicts do not develop evenly which makes 
predictions of when tensions are likely to heighten or subside difficult to determine 
(Miall 1992 pp44,61). 
Distinctions can be drawn between `hard' and `soft' measures designed to prevent 
conflict. `Soft' or long-term measures may be more appropriate in cases where 
tensions between parties have not reached a critical stage as opposed to `hard' 
measures that may be more suitable in cases where the outbreak of armed conflict 
appears imminent. `Soft' approaches to conflict prevention include measures 
currently used by the OSCE such as in-country missions, fact finding missions and 
the work conducted by the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). 
These types of approaches can offer direct mediation, good offices and exert a 
stabilizing effect through an established international presence. Other international 
organizations are able to offer additional facilities, for example, the Council of 
Europe (COE) offers technical expertise. The prospect of EU and NATO 
membership and offers of economic assistance are also considered examples of 
mechanisms of conflict prevention (Munuerva 1994 p88) and can be applied in order 
to enhance economic and political stability. This type of approach has been in 
evidence through the EU's policies towards Hungary, Romania and the Baltic states. 
Such measures have the additional attraction in that they are undertaken with the 
consent of the state concerned and are designed to facilitate dialogue, communication 
and transparency rather than creating confrontation. 
The application of `soft measures' allows for the expansion of international 
intervention into the internal affairs of states, thus affecting their sovereignty and 
autonomy. Where such forms of intervention involve extensive, multi-sector, long 
term action this may translate into a `more permanent, penetrative form of foreign 
interventionism' (Costy and Gilbert 1998 p15). Tension could also exist between the 
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desire to promote conflict prevention policies and the need to allow parties to a 
conflict to take increased responsibility for the conflict and its resolution (Costy and 
Gilbert 1998 p15). However, if consensus can be achieved this provides further 
opportunities for players seeking to use international organizations in order to 
develop political integration between participating states in other issue areas. 
Investing political interest and resources in conflict prevention measures can 
therefore become a means to achieve other political goals. 
The effectiveness of conflict prevention is dependent initially upon problems being 
brought to light through competent early warning systems (Findlay 1996 p35). 
Although individual states like the US possess extensive intelligence gathering 
agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there has been a failure between 
states and international organizations to share and effectively utilize intelligence 
regarding impending conflicts. These issues are compounded by `an inadequate 
understanding of conflict dynamics' (Reychler 1994 p9). The OSCE has played an 
increasingly active role in developing forms of early warning systems though the 
intelligence gathering work of fact finding parties, in-country missions and the 
HCNM. 
Where early warning systems are in operation there remains the issue of how to 
create the political will to act upon information received. It is also difficult to make 
accurate predictions of possible future events. It may prove problematic to mobilize 
support in order to meet a potential threat that may not materialize. In addition, 
where conflict prevention is successful there remains a need to sustain the interests of 
politicians and the media (Findlay 1996 p3). This means that it is desirable to 
establish institutionalized `political forecasting and contingency planning' along with 
a need to promote `the development of future orientated thinking' (Reychler 1994 
ppl1-12). 
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Early warning systems are also problematic because they have the potential to 
become intrusive forms of surveillance. Intrusive surveillance could serve to 
exacerbate issues through for instance an increased scrutiny of one particular group 
of the population. Minority groups with ulterior political motives may manipulate 
situations of external scrutiny in order to further their own political goals. An 
international organization finding itself in the middle of a conflict between a 
government and a non-governmental group may inadvertently exacerbate a conflict 
`by bolstering the position of the minority group and leading it to harden its demands' 
(Chigas 1996 p31). 
Investment by international organizations in conflict prevention measures may appear 
to be a more politically expedient and economically cost effective way of preventing 
long term expenditure and engagement in ongoing violent conflicts. However, 
wealthier states are largely self absorbed and predominantly concerned with 
economic issues because self interest and materialism is the major concern of their 
electorates. Nevertheless, an overriding interest in economic concerns can in itself 
act as a conflict prevention mechanism according to the tenets of realpolitik because 
it `limits the causes of wars and large scale military intervention to circumstances 
where interests or assets are actually threatened and thus imposes a degree of 
rationality on the use of force' (Hirst 1994 p181). 
Turning now to `hard' measures, these include mechanisms designed to implement 
forceful policies. Diplomatic measures can include international conferences, such 
as those at Dayton and Rambouillet. Economic pressure can also be applied. This 
may take the form of sanctions. There is however, a great deal of skepticism 
regarding the extent to which sanctions are effective. Increasingly attention has been 
drawn to the detrimental impact of sanctions on civilians populations. Examples of 
such destructive action are evident in the effects of UN sanctions against Iraq. 
Frequently, however, a combination of strategies is used including economic 
inducements or punishments alongside military measures (Regan 1996 p340). In 
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order to implement strong measures rapid and coordinated responses are required 
along with high levels of resolve by collectives of international groups (Munuerva 
1994 p88). This has led in Europe to the setting up of rapid response units and 
missions of preventive deployment as in Macedonia. However, issues of sovereignty 
constrain the options available to international organizations or states regarding 
`hard' preventive measures (Munuerva 1994 pp94-95). 
Conflict regulation or containment 
Conflict regulation, or containment is designed to limit conflictual behaviour within 
parameters of `set, recognized and often accepted rules of action, ' (Mitchell 1981 
p263). This can include crisis management, the aim of which is not to resolve the 
conflict but to `limit and contain the intensity of the conflict' (Miall 1992 p42). This 
type of policy was in evidence throughout the wars involving Bosnia, Serbia and 
Croatia during the early to mid 1990s. Here international policies while seeking to 
develop peace proposals focused upon containment by preventing the conflicts 
spreading to the wider Balkan region. 
Where containment or regulation of a conflict require peacemaking or peacekeeping 
measures there are a number of potential obstacles to the effective implementation of 
such programmes. For example, the difficulties of persuading states or international 
organizations to consider such forms of response in cases where their perceived 
interests in a particular conflict may be minimal. This may result in ineffectual 
policies, a reluctance to make commitments to large scale expenditure or to risk the 
lives of military personnel. Implicit in approaches advocating forms of intervention 
is the idea that concerted international responses to violent conflicts can result in 
better outcomes to a particular conflict than non-intervention. This is a complex 
issue. Where international responses are involved there is a problem over the 
individual interests of powerful member states obstructing containment measures. 
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The interest of an external state in conflict regulation is not always incompatible with 
the goal of conflict regulation. Such interests can, however, direct and influence the 
course of action that the international organization proposes. There are issues over 
how to form concerted responses to conflict when state interests prevail over 
collective interests. This type of situation could lead to an intensification of a 
conflict rather than its containment or resolution. Illustrative of this type of problem 
was the break up of the Former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s when German 
interests along with the inability of other European states to agree on courses of 
cooperative action heightened the conflict between Serbia and Croatia. 
Approaches to conflict regulation have involved a variety of measures within states. 
These include genocide, forced mass population transfer, partition and secession, 
integration or assimilation. Policies of forced mass population transfer were evident 
during the apartheid era in South Africa, where black South Africans were compelled 
to live in undesirable areas of the country. Examples of forced assimilation were 
evident in Bulgaria during the 1980s and were directed against the Turkish minority. 
This involved measures designed to eradicate both Islamic and Turkish identity. 
Prohibitions were enforced on cultural and religious practices such as banning the use 
of the Turkish language, the closure of mosques and a refusal to allow the printing 
and importation of the Holy Qur'an. The attempts to assimilate the Turkish minority 
in Bulgaria led to the death of ethnic Turks who resisted the Bulgarian government 
and to large scale emigration. The secular government in Turkey has in turn been 
accused of the brutal oppression of Islamic groups and ethnic Kurds (Ryan 1990 pp6- 
12). 
Of a quite different order when using consensual methods there is potential for 
internal conflicts to be managed through hegemonic control, arbitration, 
cantonisation and or federalism, consociationalism or power sharing (McGarry and 
O'Leary 1993 pp3-5). The idea here is to create stable societies through the 
management of diversity. However, these approaches possess the potential to make 
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differences between different groups more pronounced by the continual concentration 
on divisive issues. Of these approaches consociationalism can be used to 
demonstrate one example of how states have devised mechanisms for handling 
internal conflicts. Consociationalism has been in existence in Belgium, Switzerland, 
Austria and the Netherlands. Lijphart (1984 cited in Ryan 1990 ppl6-17) cites four 
main characteristics that constitute consociationalism. Of fundamental importance is 
the idea that there is a coalition of leaders representative of all the main communities. 
A further requirement is the ability to veto which can be enacted by all the main 
communities in order to ensure that legislation reflects their vital interests. 
Proportional representation in parliament and government agencies and a high degree 
of autonomy is necessary in order that each community can run its own internal 
affairs. 
In order for consociationalism to work effectively, Lijphart outlines a number of 
conditions. There needs firstly to be a balance of power between the different 
population groups in order that no one group can dominate any agenda. A multiparty 
system needs to exist. The existence of clear boundaries are needed in order to 
prevent border disputes. However, in multi-ethnic states ethnic groups are often 
dispersed throughout a state and are not neatly confined to specific geographical 
areas which may therefore pose difficulties for this particular condition. Lijphart 
states that a small state may enable extensive contacts and cooperation to develop 
between elites. However, this does not mean that the contacts are necessarily going 
to prove to be favourable, as the small state examples of Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, 
Cyprus and Lebanon testify (Ryan 1990 p170). There are also doubts as to whether 
this model is transferable to non-Western states because the only examples of 
successful consociationalism are to be found in Western Europe. However, more 
universal methods such as federalism are widely used in practice. 
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Conflict resolution 
An increased emphasis was placed on conflict resolution following the end of the 
Cold War. This was because major powers wanted to extricate `themselves from 
local situations, which were now of lesser importance to them' and wanted to 
develop measures to deal with the new conflicts that were emerging (Wallenstein and 
Axell 1994 pp336-337). Out of 18 ongoing conflicts in Europe between 1989 and 
1993,15 were fought within the territories of the FSU and the former Yugoslavia. 
`By 1994 not one peace accord had been signed in these conflicts, testifying to the 
availability of weapons, the complexity of the incompatibilities, and the lack of a 
united international stand on an appropriate solution' (Wallenstein and Axell 1994 
pp336-337). This situation was a clear reflection of the need for effective 
international responses and to an understanding of how conflict resolution measures 
could be implemented. It is to definitions of conflict resolution that this section now 
turns. 
Conflict resolution can be defined as processes which allow the underlying source of 
a conflict to be removed in a way that is satisfactory to the parties involved. This is, 
however, an ideal and most conflicts are settled rather than resolved allowing 
elements of the underlying conflict to remain. Conflict resolution can be used in a 
normative or descriptive context. Normatively, it can mean that conflict is resolved 
in a manner acceptable to both parties. Descriptively, conflict resolution is used to 
refer to the end of a conflict regardless of whether parties to the conflict find the 
outcome acceptable (Miall 1992 pp43-44). 
In terms of resolving or settling a conflict, two stages are critical. In the early stage 
of a conflict, before it has had time to be come entrenched, it may be possible for 
dialogue to take place, for parties to discuss grievances and to allow third parties to 
interject in order to facilitate communication and to suggest ways of developing a 
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conflict settlement process. Dispute settlement mechanisms may be used and 
reciprocal moves taken to reduce hostilities (Mall 1992 pp6l-62). 
The later stage of a conflict is also considered as vital for attempts at resolution. 
Zartman (1989 p10) has argued that in many cases a point is reached where a 
conflict becomes `ripe' for resolution. Here the potential for peace is greatest when 
parties are in a state of hurting stalemate, where disaster is impending, where a way 
out of the conflict can be identified or where an effective mediator has emerged who 
might develop the negotiation and conflict resolution process. In such situations the 
costs of maintaining a conflict have risen to a level in which the parties are impelled 
to reach a settlement. However, settlements sought under these circumstances often 
mean that a conflict is merely suspended while the power relations allow for the 
absence of war. When the circumstances in the power relationship change war is 
likely to resume (Burton 1990 p89). The settlement of the Bosnian conflict can be 
interpreted in these terms. The Bosnian conflict was settled rather than resolved, this 
leaves the possibility that the conflict could be resumed when international 
peacekeeping forces are removed unless the peace process becomes integral to all 
sections of Bosnian society. 
Other approaches include the work of the Harvard Negotiating Project led by John 
Burton. This work is based on the idea that it is not necessary to wait until a ripe 
moment appears but rather that `Track Two' non-governmental forms of diplomacy 
can be started before this stage has been reached. This aims to develop a pre- 
negotiation stage wherein parties to the conflict are encouraged to arrive at analytical 
breakthroughs. Azar who has further developed this work found that by using these 
methods other components of conflict management were introduced into the process, 
for example, economic development and the creation of political institutions 
(Reychler 1994 p5). 
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Contrasting opinions are also offered by theorists who maintain that it is possible to 
resolve conflicts as opposed to those who consider that conflicts can only be 
managed. Theorists who consider that it is possible to resolve conflicts maintain that 
fundamental issues can be raised and resolved enabling the source of conflict to be 
removed. This is based on non-coercive approaches involving creative problem 
solving applications whereby parties to the conflicts are brought together to discuss 
issues of contention. Third parties act as facilitators encouraging the development of 
new types of relationships between the protagonists (Ryan 1990 p100). 
On the other hand, theorists who maintain that conflicts can only be managed 
consider that it is unrealistic to attempt to resolve conflict. Attempts to resolve 
conflicts may get in the way of effective management techniques and may operate to 
the detriment of workable containment or peacekeeping measures. Conflict can only 
be contained as conditions do not allow for long term compromise between parties. 
From this perspective conflicts are managed through the suppression or elimination 
of violence. This can be achieved through coercive third party intervention devised to 
impose order and stability by keeping the two sides apart, for example, through ethnic 
separation (Ryan 1990 pp105-115). This type of approach was applied to Bosnia, 
where the establishment of the Republic Srpska although nominally a part of a 
unified Bosnian state effectively constituted ethnic separation through partition. 
A number of studies conducted to determine the effect of third party involvement in 
conflicts revealed the following findings. Data collated by Butterworth (1976 cited in 
Miall 1992 pp124-126) giving information on general international conflicts 
suggested that 44% of all peacefully resolved conflicts involved forms of third party 
intervention. Butterworth's study also revealed that `less than a third of the cases 
with third party intervention at the phase of peaceful conflict became wars, while half 
of the cases without intervention ended in war. ' The research also found no 
significance `between the timing of intervention and whether conflicts were resolved, 
partially resolved or unresolved. ' An analysis of Butterworth's and other 
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commentators findings made by Miall found `a strong association between 
international disputes and peaceful outcomes. ' In the case of civil conflicts only 32% 
were conducted without major violence in comparison to 85% of international 
conflicts which involved only minor violence or were peacefully conducted. Such 
findings are indicative of the difficulties involved in resolving intra-state conflict. 
This gives substance to arguments proposing greater investment in programmes 
designed to prevent conflict. 
Consolidating the conflict settlement or resolution process 
Once a conflict has been settled or resolved, attention turns to measures that can be 
taken to enable the peace process to be sustained. The key challenge for international 
involvement after a peace agreement has been finalized is to secure the continued 
cooperation of the parties involved. A number of factors have been cited as 
important to successful implementation of peace accords. These are the `number, 
inclusiveness and cohesion of the parties to the accord, ' the `number and interests of 
external parties, ' along with the nature of the `transitional institutional framework. ' 
This latter factor is important with regard to how an international organization can 
influence the post-conflict course of events. Finally, also of importance is the `peace 
signatories' perceptions of their electoral chances' (Munck and Kumar 1995 pp163- 
164). 
Measures to sustain post-conflict reconstruction were outlined, for example, in the 
concept of peace building in the Secretary General's 1992 UN Agenda for Peace. 
This is mentioned here because similar types of measures have been applied to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, partially under the aegis of the OSCE. Post-conflict peace 
building is not however a new concept, the Marshall Plan implemented in Western 
Europe following the Second World War can be seen as an example of this type of 
work. 
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The aim of peace building is to construct an environment that offers political, 
economic and socio-psychological measures designed to promote reassurance. Peace 
building requires high levels of inter-party contact with the aim of building 
relationships between people (Reychler 1994 p6). Politically this involves measures 
such as election monitoring, and democracy building. Psychologically, measures 
such as operationalizing the media to counteract the development of stereotypes and 
war propaganda have been developed (Reychler and Bauwens 1994 p209). This type 
of approach has been utilized by the OSCE in Bosnia where peace building has 
involved social and political measures. A key area, economic development, (not an 
OSCE responsibility) has been poorly implemented. Peace building seeks to address 
the structural features of conflict. The idea is to enhance structural stability which 
has been defined as `a situation involving sustainable economic development, 
democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, healthy social and 
environmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resorting to 
violent conflict. ' Peace building therefore seeks to create the conditions under which 
'political, socio-economic and cultural institutions(are) capable of mediating conflicts 
equitably, providing security and integrating social groups into the mainstream' (EU 
Commission report cited in Costy and Gilbert 1998 p13). 
Policies of post conflict reconstruction, for example, the EU's Balkan Stability Plan, 
in order to be effectively implemented, require large scale economic and political 
commitment by external states. Where reconstruction aid is channeled through an 
international organization rather than unilaterally by individual states this may 
enhance the likelihood of sustained momentum and constant levels of specifically 
targeted resources vital to peace building measures. However, conditions attached to 
modes of assistance may impose particular forms of political and economic 
constraints upon the recipient state that may be devised to suit the interests of the 
donors rather than the recipients. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has defined and outlined forms of conflict management. It can be seen 
that programmes of conflict management range from the benign to the destructive 
and contain within them serious ethical implications. Much of the OSCE's emphasis 
has been placed on conflict prevention measures which is an area that the 
organization has developed a reasonable competence in. 
Contemporary programmes of conflict prevention, management and resolution are 
forms of intervention that have been legitimized and sanctioned through international 
organizations. Increased international scrutiny of potential or actual conflicts has 
occurred alongside demands by publics and politicians to devise effective policies to 
address conflicts and protect human lives. 
The next chapter will discuss in more detail how the OSCE has been structured to 
address situations of conflict. In particular the mechanisms, instruments and offices 
of the OSCE will be described and examples given as to how they have operated in 
practice. 
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Chapter Three: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the OSCE in terms of its structure, 
mechanisms and instruments as they relate to its work in conflict prevention, crisis 
management and post-conflict reconstruction. The discussion then provides a basis 
for a subsequent understanding, illustrated through the case studies, of the practical 
application and workings of OSCE instruments and mechanisms. 
The chapter introduces the OSCE by offering a brief guide to its history. The aim is 
to describe the function of the OSCE during the Cold War and then the changing 
nature of the organization as it has refocused upon demands presented by potential 
and actual conflicts arising in the post-Cold war period. The OSCE's ability to act 
effectively in preventing and managing conflicts has been constrained in part by the 
limitations of its mandate and also by the behaviour of a number of the OSCE's 
participating states towards the organization. 
The history of the CSCE/OSCE 
What was then the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), was 
established in 1975 as a `multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between 
East and West' involving thirty three European states plus the US and Canada (OSCE 
Handbook 1995 p7). By providing channels for discussion and dialogue involving 
human rights and Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), the CSCE in 
its early years can be seen as a forerunner of contemporary efforts by the OSCE to 
devise and implement procedures to manage conflict. 
43 
The CSCE arose from a Soviet proposal to convene a European security conference 
in order to develop economic, trade and aid links between Western and Eastern 
Europe, and to provide a means of establishing a predominantly European 
organization that was not the exclusive preserve of Western Europe. A further Soviet 
aim was to legitimize the division of Europe, principally that involving Germany and 
to draw Western Europe away from American influence. The West responded to 
Soviet ideas with proposals designed to balance economic and security measures with 
human rights provisions. The CSCE thus became a means through which the West 
could monitor Soviet and Eastern European domestic politics (Hurlbert 1995 (a) 
p10). 
The original conference culminated in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 -a set of 
principles, to which the participants of the CSCE process all agreed to abide. The 
comprehensive nature of these principles was designed to socialize participants into 
accepting an internationally sanctioned set of ideals. This meant that states would 
have clear expectations of how states should treat other states along with the manner 
in which they should behave towards their own populations (OSCE Handbook 1996 
p5). The ten principles of the Act were as follows - `sovereign equality, refraining 
from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, peaceful 
settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, equal rights and self determination of peoples, 
cooperation among states and fulfillment in good faith of obligations under 
international law' (Helsinki Final Act 1975). 
The Final Act was divided into four `baskets. ' These covered European security; 
economic, scientific, technological and environmental cooperation; humanitarian 
concerns; and follow up issues (Zagorski 1994 p150). There was considerable 
overlap between the different baskets and this enabled diverse combinations of issues 
to be raised and discussed together at CSCE conferences and meetings. 
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The CSCE worked unobtrusively to devise confidence and security building 
measures, however it was in the field of human rights that the organization was 
credited with significant achievement during the Cold War period. The CSCE 
produced internationally sanctioned documents defining human rights. America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics used human rights issues in order to launch 
ideological attacks on each other's systems of government. Following glasnost and 
perestroika CSCE conferences became a mechanism for exacting human rights 
concessions and reforms in the Eastern bloc (Huribert 1995 (a) p10). Such 
mechanisms were considered to provide a catalytic function for the `revolutionary 
processes' that swept across Eastern Europe in 1989 (Kuhn cited in Peters 1996 
p95). 
Following the collapse of Soviet style communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
the CSCE, along with other international organizations, was forced to reevaluate its 
relevance in contemporary environment in Europe. International organizations 
competed with each other for control over areas of competence. The ensuing 
political, social and economic uncertainty that had arisen throughout Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union provided a fertile ground for conflict and tensions 
between different groups of people to surface. For the CSCE this provided the 
opportunity for the entry of the organization into the field of conflict management; an 
area that was closely linked to the human rights emphasis of the organization which 
had been stressed during the 1970s and 1980s. The CSCE rapidly developed 
appropriate institutions in order to secure and consolidate this role. 
The CSCE/OSCE in the post cold war environment 
The redefinition of the CSCE saw the organization evolve from a set of revolving 
conferences to an institutionalized structure. The processes were inaugurated by the 
Paris Charter of 1990. The framework outlined within this document replaced a 
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number of previously ad hoc arrangements (Robertson and Merrills 1996 p186). The 
Paris Charter embodied a spirit of optimism that had embraced Europe following the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. The Charter's lofty statements were seen 
at the time, as ushering in `a new era of peace and democracy, peace and unity 
within Europe' (Duke 1994 p258). Such sentiments were also reflected in the 
subsequent creation of permanent institutions. From the Paris process a set of 
`lightweight' institutions emerged. This was in response to governmental concerns at 
avoiding unwieldy bureaucratic structures which could stifle the flexibility and 
pragmatism of the CSCE. The decision also appeased the American wish not to see 
NATO undermined and the French concern that the Council of Europe's role in 
human rights should not be eroded (Ghebali and Sauerwein 1995 p147). 
The Paris Charter also recognized an emerging pan-European concept of security, one 
that required `a corresponding institutional response' (Pentland 1993 p79). This, 
combined with the signing in the same year of the Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty, was considered to mark the start of `a new era of cooperation among 
European powers' (Hurlbert 1995 (a) p10). 
The institutionalization of the CSCE process 
The institutionalization of the CSCE process began with the development of 
measures designed to manage conflict. This was a complex process enabling 
mechanisms to operate at differing levels. For example, procedures were put in 
place that enabled the CSCE to be responsive to both macro and micro situations. 
This was exemplified by the biennial summit meetings of heads of state and by the 
establishment of grass root initiatives. 
At Paris, biennial conferences of heads of state were also introduced in order to 
review the CSCE's activities and to consider the implementation of CSCE decisions. 
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The review conference (before the 1994 Budapest Summit, known as a `follow up' 
meeting) immediately preceding the summit produces a `decision orientated 
document' for the following summit meeting of heads of state to consider and adopt 
(Huber 1993 p34). Review conferences are also tasked with an examination of how 
principles, norms and practices are implemented. This is significant because ongoing 
violations of commitments could signal the onset of conflict. For example, the 
failure of Yugoslavia to submit military data in December 1991 was an indication 
that forces were regrouping for aggressive purposes (Hoynck 1994 (a) p17). 
Foreign ministers meet via the Council of Ministers (since changes made at the 
Budapest Summit 1994 this has become known as the Ministerial Council) at least 
annually, and meetings of a Council of Senior officials (CSO) (since Budapest 
renamed the Senior Council) are convened as and when required. A Permanent 
Council (known from the time of its formation in 1993 until December 1994 as the 
Permanent Committee) is subordinated to the Senior Council and meets weekly in 
Vienna to give the participating states the opportunity to discuss political issues. The 
Permanent Council oversees the functions and decision making of the OSCE when 
the Senior Council is not in session. This structure enables high level meetings and 
discussions surrounding issues of conflict to be held regularly and convened rapidly 
when necessary. The Permanent Council allows participating states to discuss small 
issues or incidents in order to prevent them developing into greater problems (Chigas 
1996 p44). 
The Paris Charter also provided for the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly. 
This involves annual meetings of 254 parliamentarians from participating states. The 
idea behind the Assembly is to assess the implementation of OSCE objectives, 
discuss issues addressed by other OSCE bodies along with the initiation and 
promotion of measures designed to further security and cooperation in Europe (Lehne 
1991 p34). The Parliamentary Assembly could function to scrutinize OSCE policy 
and to inject new ideas into the OSCE process by parliamentarians not directly 
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involved in the day to day running of the organization. To date, however, the 
Parliamentary Assembly does `not have any formal status in the OSCE's decision 
making processes' which has resulted in a `democratic deficit' within the OSCE 
(Degn cited in OSCE Newsletter June 1999). 
In terms of the OSCE's hierarchy, the Ministerial Council and the Senior Council 
take authoritative decisions. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights along with the Conflict Prevention Centre (see below) in Vienna remain under 
the jurisdiction of the Senior Council. The Secretariat in Vienna provides 
administrative support for both Councils (Peters 1995 p73). The Senior Council can 
initiate crisis management measures and can instruct action to be taken in order to 
resolve a crisis. This can be achieved through the mechanisms devised to lead to a 
negotiated settlement, the use of rapporteurs or fact finding missions, or through the 
initiation and promotion of good offices, mediation or conciliation. 
The Chair in Office (CIO) is an appointment held for one year and is rotated between 
states. The idea is to make the CIO `geographically representative' of the diversity of 
OSCE states. The role of the CIO has been compared to that of an ambassador for 
the OSCE but with the additional responsibility for chairing major OSCE meetings 
and taking an active role in problem solving (Kemp 1995 p108). The CIO's 
responsibilities do not include the day to day running of the OSCE which is the 
concern of the Secretary General whose role is to facilitate coordination between 
OSCE institutions. The Secretary General supports the work of the CIO and oversees 
the OSCE's structures and operations (OSCE Handbook 1996 p12). The work of the 
CIO is also supported by `personal representatives' who can be dispatched into areas 
of conflict in order to make investigations, determine possible courses of action and 
informally mediate. The recommendations of the personal representative have 
provided the basis of mandates for in-country missions (Chigas 1996 p47). 
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As an early warning mechanism the CIO is able to raise issues that have the potential 
to become contentious at an early stage (Chigas 1996 p44). The CIO provides the 
basis from which short term missions are developed. This office provides a flexible 
mandate `to investigate situations, verify facts and opinions and prepare the ground 
for further OSCE involvement' (Hoynck 1995 (a). This can take the form of sending 
special representatives to trouble spots or convening ad hoc steering groups. The 
CIO, like the Permanent Council offers sensitive structures within which issues can 
be raised in a way that does not inflame delicate matters (Chigas 1996 p44). The CIO 
can form a troika with previous and future CIO's to facilitate initiatives. The purpose 
of this is to aid continuity and to share expertise and experience. The Lisbon Summit 
in 1996 acknowledged the increased powers of the CIO in initiating and 
implementing OSCE policies. The CIO was, for example, called upon to legitimize 
the outcome of the elections conducted in Bosnia in 1996 by voicing his approval 
(Bloed 1997). 
Intervention by the CIO is dependent on evidence of outright abuses of human rights. 
Such a course of action follows from the affirmation at the 1992 Helsinki Summit 
that `the commitments taken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are 
matters of direct concern to all participating states and do not belong exclusively to 
the internal affairs of the state concerned' (Hoynck 1995(a). As a concept `direct 
concern' has been unevenly applied and appears to be at times compromised when 
the interests of prominent OSCE players are at stake. For example, OSCE states 
responded mutely to the Russian invasion of Chechnya in 1994, placing their 
interests with Russia above the previously lauded international commitment to human 
rights and stood impotently by while tens of thousands of Chechnyan civilians were 
brutally murdered. It was not until April 1995 that the OSCE established an 
Assistance Group to Chechnya. Then the work of the Assistance Group became 
increasingly important because it was the only international body to be working on 
the ground in Chechnya. 
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Other field activities include the work of the Personal Representative of the CIO on 
the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, and a liaison office in 
Central Asia. The OSCE has also organized `Assistance in Implementation of 
Bilateral Agreements. ' This assistance programme consists of an `OSCE 
Representative in the Russian -Latvian Joint Commission on Military Pensioners, ' the 
`OSCE Representative to the Estonian Government Commission' and the `OSCE 
Representative to the Joint committee on the Skrunda Radar Station. ' In addition a 
High Level Planning Group (HLPG) was formed to coordinate the logistics of a 
proposed OSCE peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh (Survey of OSCE 
Long-Term Missions and other OSCE Field Activities, 26 February 1997, OSCE 
Newsletter, January 1997). 
Returning to the more formal institutionalized structure of the OSCE, the Conflict 
Prevention Centre (CPC) established in 1991 was sited within the Vienna based 
secretariat. Initially, the role of the CPC was to reduce the danger of inter-state 
warfare through an open exchange of military information (Huber 1993 p30). The 
CPC's establishment signified that the CSCE was expanding its role in conflict 
prevention to go beyond promoting and managing CSBMs (Greco 1995 p10). At 
Prague in 1992 the political functions of the CPC were enhanced allowing the office 
to hold more regular meetings and its Consultative Committee was accorded more 
authority. The mandate of the CPC was extended beyond its military-technical remit. 
The CSCE Council meeting in Berlin on 19-20 June 1991 saw the CPC become the 
`nominating institution within the framework of the CSCE Peaceful Settlement 
Mechanism. ' At the Helsinki Follow-up meeting (March 24-July22 1992) the 
Consultative Committee of the CPC was endowed with further preventive powers 
enabling the office to establish fact-finding and rapporteur missions and assist the 
Senior Council with peacekeeping (Zagorski 1994 pp93-94). The CPC supports the 
work of the CIO and OSCE decision making bodies. It now possesses wide ranging 
responsibilities including conducting surveys of OSCE missions (OSCE Handbook 
1999 p32). The inclusion of new tasks into the CPC's mandate has made it more 
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competent to deal with issues arising from the prevailing political climate within 
parts of Eastern Europe and the FSU. 
The Paris Summit also provided a mandate to establish an Office for Free Elections 
(OFE) based in Warsaw. This was part of a comprehensive package of measures 
designed to provide the states of Eastern Europe and the FSU with the means to 
construct liberal democracies. The establishment of the office also signaled the 
importance attached by the OSCE to elections as an emblem of democracy. Within 
the OFE information would be collated and disseminated regarding dates, procedures 
and election results. Its mandate was extended at Prague in 1992 when the OFE 
became the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The new 
responsibilities included monitoring `the implementation of commitments in the 
Human Dimension of the CSCE. ' These commitments included `a set of cooperative 
procedures laid down in the documents finalizing the Vienna follow up meeting in 
1989, as well as the concluding documents of the Copenhagen and Moscow meetings 
on the Human Dimension of 1990 and 1991. ' The ODIHR would `act as a clearing 
house for information on a state of public emergency, elections, population censuses 
etc., ' it would `coordinate the programme of support for newly admitted states', 
`organize implementation review mechanisms of the Human Dimension' and 
`provide assistance to the HCNM' (Zagorski 1994 p93). 
Additionally, the ODIHR contributes to CSCE conflict management measures and 
strategies (Ghebali and Sauerwein 1995 ppl54-155). One of the functions of the 
ODIHR is to undertake exploratory visits before OSCE missions are dispatched to 
those areas. The ODIHR is designed to support the CIO in preparing mandates for 
new missions. The work of the missions is facilitated through the ODIHR's provision 
of human rights documentation. At a mundane level the ODIHR offers training 
programmes and seminars. The ODIHR advises the media and scrutinizes its 
activities particularly in relation to the media's involvement in elections (Annual 
Report 1996 on OSCE Activities pp17-19). 
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The ODIHR has been widely involved in the conduct and observation of 
parliamentary, presidential and local elections in Eastern Europe and the FSU. In 
terms of the ODIHR's oversight of electoral proceedings, the office examines how 
electoral law is implemented, how candidates are selected, how campaigns are run 
and the nature of media access available to both candidates and parties. The 
Budapest Summit 1994 saw a further enhancement of these powers. This meeting 
gave greater emphasis to the long term role that the ODIHR could play in electoral 
observations especially with regard to strict observation of the media before, during 
and after elections. In addition, it was hoped to improve inter-organizational 
coordination of the supervision of elections (Prins and Wurzner 1996). 
Where concerns have arisen over the conduct of elections, the ODM may attempt to 
address problems where they arise, make recommendations on matters of procedure 
and propose measures to further develop confidence and transparency in this area 
(Annual Report 1995 on OSCE Activities pp24-28). Despite these measures, the 
intense involvement of the ODIHR in all aspects of the election processes leads the 
office open to charges of direct interference and manipulation of political processes. 
For example, the CIO responding to operations carried out by the ODIHR has 
legitimized the conduct and outcome of elections in cases where other international 
bodies have advised that election outcomes be annulled. An example of this type of 
situation is documented in the chapter on Bosnia. 
One of the more innovative OSCE posts was created at Helsinki in 1992. Whereas 
many of the other new OSCE bodies appeared to have been the result of ideas taken 
from a variety of existing international organizations, this particular mandate 
appeared to offer something creative and new. The post of High Commissioner on 
National Minorities (HCNM) emerged from a Dutch proposal. This was designed to 
`link security and human rights organically' (Greco 1995 p11). The decision to adopt 
the mandate stemmed from a perception that issues surrounding national and ethnic 
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minorities were the most likely to generate conflicts (Rotfeld 1994 p228). Since the 
HCNM's inception in 1993, the post has been held by Max Van der Stoel, a former 
Dutch Foreign Minister. 
The HCNM functions as an instrument of early warning and action at the earliest 
possible stage. The idea is to reduce tensions between ethnic groups that would 
otherwise lead to conflict and could endanger peace, stability or relations between 
OSCE states. The HCNM can respond using discreet and subtle diplomacy to reduce 
ethnic tensions. If the HCNM considers that a situation of tension may lapse into 
serious conflict he can issue an early warning to the OSCE. This provides a formal 
acknowledgment of how serious the situation has become (Huber 1993 pp3l-32). 
The HCNM can make the OSCE aware that a situation of tension has reached a stage 
`at which containment by the High Commissioner is no longer possible' (Zaagman 
1995). This provides `a clear mechanism for the stepping up of responses by OSCE 
member states to growing conflict' (Huber 1994 p27). However, an awareness of 
potentially serious conflict is no guarantee that constructive responses by OSCE 
states will be forthcoming. 
The work of the HCNM involves visiting states, consultations with minority groups' 
representatives, government bodies, NGOs and other relevant people. The HCNM 
may make several visits to a region after which he will submit recommendations to 
the government concerned and remain informed as to the progress of the 
implementation of these recommendations. The HCNM can demonstrate autonomy, 
flexibility and discretion. The HCNM is able to tailor his involvement to the 
specifics of each case (Huber 1994 p25). The HCNM has, for example, devoted 
substantial time to dealing with the problems faced by Russian and Hungarian 
minorities and the situations faced by Roma communities. This has involved visits to 
Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, the Baltic states, Ukraine and Moldova. The HCNM's 
visits have also included Albania, Macedonia, and the states of Central Asia (Matejka 
1996 p106). 
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The HCNM has thus proved to be a useful tool in the discrete resolution of festering 
minority issues. For example, in Estonia the HCNM applied low key diplomacy and 
was able to assist in the containment and de-escalation of tension. Mid-1993 saw the 
HCNM successfully stave off serious confrontation over the status of ethnic Russians 
resident in Estonia. Through consultation with the involved parties the HCNM, along 
with assistance from the Council of Europe, helped to ensure that amendments were 
made to the Law on Aliens (Mullerson 1997 p54). The HCNM by issuing assurances 
from involved parties also helped to `defuse the potential explosiveness of 
referendums on national territorial autonomy organized by some ethnic Russians in 
response to the original more controversial Law on Aliens' (Huber 1994 p26). An 
important feature here was the support given to the HCNM by the CIO. In this 
instance the HCNM was mandated to make comments regarding the law (Huber 1994 
p26). Another feature that has contributed to the HCNM's general effectiveness has 
been the close collaboration with OSCE field missions and with other 
intergovernmental agencies, notably, the Council of Europe. The recommendations 
made by the HCNM are not legally binding and are dependent on the support of the 
government(s) concerned for their implementation. This is not necessarily a 
weakness although it could be construed as such. It means that a government is 
`advised' by the HCNM who cannot undermine or erode the authority of a state and 
does not therefore affect state sovereignty. This means that the work of the HCNM is 
more likely to be openly accepted by a recipient government. 
The office of HCNM is not however without its shortcomings. Ingo Peters (1995 
p72) notes that the HCNM's activities are subject to strict rules of diplomatic 
confidentiality which contrasts with the professedly open nature of the OSCE. This 
could possibly be justified on the grounds that confidentiality is essential to promote 
sensitive tradeoffs and compromises. To counterbalance concerns over secrecy the 
recommendations which the HCNM makes to the government involved, along with 
the government's responses are eventually made public if both parties agree 
(Edwards 1996 p44). 
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The HCNM does not become involved in cases where minority issues are 
accompanied by `terrorist' activities. The definition of what constitutes terrorism is 
arbitrary. The utility of the HCNM's mandate in such situations may depend on the 
affected state's interpretation of the situation and the definition of terrorism applied. 
This can mean that, in principle, governments can effectively veto the HCNM's 
activities (Peters 1995 p72). It may also mean that parties to a conflict deemed to be 
`terrorist' may be denied access to the HCNM. For example, had the HCNM been 
called upon to intervene in the earliest stages of the Chechen conflict, Russia could 
have attempted to veto such action by portraying the Chechen freedom fighters as 
terrorists. 
The HCNM has nonetheless been the most highly regarded of recent OSCE 
innovations. The HCNM has effectively demonstrated an ability to deal with the 
conflicts `between states and national minorities, whose claims are supported more or 
less openly by the states of origin. ' This is the type of situation most easily inflamed 
into inter-state or civil war (Greco 1995 p11). The HCNM has been able to exert 
influence on the policies of states to whom he has made recommendations. This 
may, in part, be due to the obligation these states have in reporting on how the 
recommendations made by the HCNM are implemented (Matejka 1996 p106). 
The lack of a cumbersome bureaucracy also allows for rapid responses `to fast 
moving and volatile situations. ' This is in contrast to the generally sluggish decision 
making processes within the OSCE. In terms of support, the HCNM can seek advice 
from a number of sources, the ODIHR List of Experts and the Foundation on Inter- 
Ethnic Relations, which was established in the Hague in order to support the HCNM. 
The HCNM can also draw on expertise available across the OSCE area (Edwards 
1996 p45). This has contributed to enabling the office of the HCNM to develop into 
a versatile instrument of conflict prevention. It has afforded the HCNM both 
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autonomy of action along with a flexible network of supporting instruments with 
which to assist his mandate. (For further analysis on the HCNM see Chapter Four). 
OSCE Missions 
In 1991, a decision was taken to observe and assess the compliance of newly 
admitted states to OSCE commitments, particularly those concerning the rule of law 
and the establishment of democratic practices. To facilitate this, early warning, 
intelligence gathering or rapporteur missions were sent by the OSCE to the states 
concerned. Other short-term missions were dispatched under the jurisdiction of the 
CIO (as previously mentioned). Exploratory missions can be sent with the support of 
several states activating the Moscow mechanism. This mechanism has been activated 
with regard to Croatia, Estonia and Moldova (OSCE Handbook 1996 p17). Despite 
what has at times been perceived by receiving states as intrusive surveillance and 
monitoring sanctioned by the OSCE, the affected states have not normally been in a 
position to refuse the missions access. The missions have been construed as 
representative of a legitimate expression of the OSCE's role in the internal affairs of 
a participating state (George 1996). 
Of a somewhat different order, long term missions have been established in order `to 
facilitate political processes aimed at preventing or settling conflict through an OSCE 
presence on the ground' (Hoynck 1995 (a). By February 1997 ten long term missions 
had been established along with post-conflict rehabilitative work conducted through 
an OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya (Survey of OSCE Long term Missions and 
other OSCE Field Activities, 26`h February 1997). Individual missions were set up in 
response to specific issues. Each mission possesses a tailor made mandate and its 
own separate identity, something that makes comparisons between their work 
difficult to make. These small multi-national missions are staffed by `diplomatic or 
diplomatic-military' personnel provided by individual states (Hoynck 1995(a). Staff 
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are seconded for six month assignments which can be extended. This has however, 
led to problems in maintaining continuity (Samuels FCO meeting April 23 1999). 
The missions are more intrusive than the work carried out by the HCNM because of 
their long term presence. The work carried out by the missions creates a visible 
presence and involves mission members in extensive internal travel The missions' 
work involves a wide ranging mandate which includes political, social, military and 
economic matters alongside minority issues. The missions unlike the HCNM do not 
possess an independent authority. They are constrained in their dealings with the 
recipient government which retains the power to withdraw consent at any time for the 
mission's work. When dealing with minority issues the mission must, therefore, 
work cooperatively with the government concerned and not overtly criticize it. It is 
difficult, therefore, for the missions to retain the confidence of minority populations 
without risking expulsion. The more successful missions have overcome such issues 
by developing an effective third party role involving close links with all the parties to 
a conflict. 
The breadth and depth of the knowledge that the missions are able to develop enables 
them to have the greatest understanding of the issues involved when compared to 
other OSCE institutions. The missions are thus able to perform a unique function in 
that they can often substitute for vital elements missing from within the society 
concerned. Reductions in human rights abuses in Kosova during 1992-3 were 
considered to be a direct result of the mission stationed there. The OSCE missions 
have also gained a reputation for often providing the only impartial sources of 
information regarding a conflict. Information is provided about each of the parties to 
a conflict in order to counteract the affects of misleading propaganda and inaccurate 
information which can exacerbate conflicts (Chigas 1996 pp56-59,92). It has been 
suggested that in order to make the missions operate more effectively they need to 
widen their spheres of contact and to increase their profiles (Samuels FCO meeting 
April 23 1999). 
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One example of the work conducted by the OSCE can be seen in the operation of the 
long term mission to Moldova. This was established at the 19th CSO meeting on 
February 40' 1993. The CSCE was concerned to prevent the secession of the Trans- 
Dniester region from Moldova, which was to be achieved via recognition of the 
region's `special status. ' The aim of the mission was to facilitate a `comprehensive 
political settlement of the conflict in all its aspects' (19"' CSO meeting, February 41 
1993, Journal No. 3, annex 3). 
The mission had five main goals. These were: to establish a framework for dialogue 
and to assist the parties to pursue negotiations; to collate and disseminate information 
regarding the situation and to investigate and assess the implications of particular 
incidents; to facilitate talks to achieve an agreement on the status of foreign troops in 
the region and their withdrawal; to offer advice and expertise on areas of political 
settlement such as recognizing human and minority rights, repatriation of refugees 
and finally, to establish a visible CSCE presence in the area and to facilitate 
communication between the parties concerned with the conflict (Survey of OSCE 
Long-term Missions and other OSCE Field Activities, February 26,1997). 
The initial duration of the mission was to be for six months. Subsequent extensions 
of the mission were dependent on the agreement of the participating states and the 
government of Moldova. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed with the 
government of Moldova on May 7 1993 and amended on March 28 1996. The 
mission has examined wide ranging issues including military concerns. Advice has 
been offered to the Moldovan government on language legislation and other human 
rights concerns. In 1994 the ODIHR sent experts to assist the mission following legal 
proceedings against the `Tiraspol Six' and a subsequent death sentence levied against 
Illie Ilascu. If Ilascu had been executed tensions would have heightened which could 
have jeopardized the conflict resolution process. During 1994 the ODIHR in 
conjunction with the mission also led the international monitoring of the Moldovan 
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general elections. Other work supported by the mission has included a public opinion 
survey, the results of which indicated that the majority favoured `a sovereign and 
independent Moldova' (OSCE Handbook 1996 p68). 
In terms of the mission's activity in the conflict resolution process, following the 
signing of a declaration between the then Moldovan President Mircea Snegur and the 
Trans-Dniestrian leader Igor Smirnov on April 28 1994, stating their willingness to 
seek a solution to the conflict, substantive progress was slow on the development of a 
settlement. After a number of meetings, a breakthrough was achieved following the 
signing of an agreement on July 5 1995, in which the two sides agreed to refrain from 
the use of force and economic pressure. The OSCE became the repository for the 
agreement. Moldova and Russia agreed upon the withdrawal of Russian troops 
stationed in Moldova which was a major source of tension in the region during 1994. 
This would take place over a three year period (OSCE Handbook 1996 p26). 
Following the agreement, however, Russia refused to comply. 
On August 2,1996 the OSCE urged progress on defining the special status for the 
Dniester region (George 1996 pp9-10). The mission has also facilitated peacekeeping 
operations supervised by the Joint Control Commission (a non-OSCE body tasked 
with overseeing the security zone between Moldova and Trans-Dniester) and has 
monitored the activities of the Joint Tripartite peacekeeping force comprised of 
Russian, Moldovan and Trans-Dniestrian units (OSCE Handbook 1999 p68). 
However, the mission has failed to achieve sufficient cooperation from Russia, which 
has ignored its commitments to the organization and independently pursued its own 
agenda while attempting to sideline the CSCE process. At one point in the conflict 
Russia introduced a parallel mediation process (Hurlbert 1995 (a) p14). 
The determination of OSCE participating states to maintain the territorial integrity of 
Moldova and to frame and shape any resultant peace agreement has seen the mission 
provide advice and expertise regarding the special status of the Trans-Dniester region. 
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The mission has designed proposals that have initially been accepted by all parties to 
the conflict as the basis for negotiations and have subsequently developed these 
proposals further (OSCE Handbook 1999 pp68-69). Although no settlement has been 
reached to date, the mission's mediation processes have meant that dialogue and 
communication have been provided with a channel through which negotiation can be 
continued. 
Decision making and the OSCE's mechanisms 
OSCE mechanisms are designed to alert participating states to impending or 
escalating crises and to provide an early warning function. Although used 
infrequently, such `mechanisms provide prearranged procedures for consultations and 
decision-making in conflicts or crisis situations. ' The Vienna Document (1990) 
produced a mechanism on unusual military activities to deal with `acute threat 
perceptions' (Peters 1996 p86). The Moscow mechanism can be activated with 
regard to human dimension issues and the Berlin mechanism can be operated when 
serious emergency situations arise. The mechanisms are constructed on a phased 
approach whereby situations are first clarified via consultations with involved states. 
Meetings can follow where fact finding measures are decided upon. From this, 
recommendations can be made regarding the application of other instruments or 
courses of action. 
In addition, an Expert Meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (January 15- 
February 8 1991) produced the Valletta Document. The purpose of this document 
was to outline the principles for dispute settlement. This represented an increased 
commitment to international law than had been evident in earlier CSCE documents. 
The document detailed specific procedures to help resolve disputes between 
participating states. Ingo Peters (1995 pp7l-72) however, has noted several potential 
drawbacks with the application of the mechanism. Like many CSCE documents it 
contains in-built safeguards for states to protect their interests by the ability to veto 
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the application of the mechanism. This has meant that the mechanism is least likely 
to be applied when it is most needed. It is also applicable to inter-state rather than 
intra-state conflict which means that it does not have relevance to many types of 
conflict situations prevalent during the 1990s within Europe. 
Under the Valletta Document any party to a dispute not resolved through direct 
consultation or negotiation may request the establishment of a CSCE Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism. This means that one or more members selected from a 
register of qualified candidates with the agreement of the parties involved and 
maintained by a nominated institution can act as part of the conciliation procedure. If 
the parties in dispute are unable to agree on how the mechanism is composed the 
choice can be assisted by a director of the nominating institution. Parties can only 
reject a limited number of members which means that the mechanism will be 
eventually established (Lehne 1991 p32). If the dispute remains unsettled then a 
party may request that the mechanism comment and advise on the substance of the 
problem. However, these provisions contain in built limitations because unless 
parties agree otherwise any procedural or substantive motion is not binding. 
One drawback of the OSCE dispute settlement is that where a party considers that a 
dispute raises issues concerning its territorial integrity, national defence, title to 
sovereignty over territory or regarding competing claims over jurisdiction over other 
areas, then a mechanism need not be established or continued. The Valletta 
document does not provide a procedure to examine the validity of a claim by a state 
that a dispute falls into one of the above cited categories. The provisions detailed in 
section XII means that a state can at any time block the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes Procedure (Lehne 1991 p32). Consequently, this Valletta mechanism has 
not to date been invoked. 
Another under utilized procedure, the Human Dimension mechanism, (see Vienna 
Concluding Document 1990) was modified and further developed at the Moscow 
meeting in Autumn 1991. This allowed a state to invite a mission of experts to 
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collate information and to facilitate dialogue and agreement amongst parties to a 
conflict. The Moscow mechanism can be activated when information requested in 
the initial stages of the Vienna mechanism has proven to be unsatisfactory. This 
means that a requesting state plus five other states can with the agreement of ODIHR 
sseek to establish a mission of experts. With the support of nine other states the 
requesting state can directly engage the mechanism if previous requests for 
information have not been met (Mottola 1993 p24). 
The Berlin mechanism (introduced at by the Berlin Council in 1991) provides for a 
requesting state plus twelve others to convene an emergency meeting of the CSO 
(Mottola 1993 p24). This was repeatedly and unsuccessfully activated in the case of 
the conflicts in Yugoslavia (Greco 1995 p10). 
The OSCE also possesses the option to activate the `consensus minus one' procedure. 
This allows the CSO or Ministerial Council to instruct political measures which can 
be carried out without the consent of the state concerned in cases where there have 
been gross omissions in the application of OSCE principles (Mottola 1993 p24). This 
procedure was used to suspend the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at Helsinki in 
1992. In terms of judicial adjudication in decision making the 1992 Convention on 
Conciliation and Arbitration was signed by 33 states and after being ratified by 21 
states (Borawski and George 1996) came into force on 5t' December 1994. The 
Convention enables conciliation procedures to formulate non-binding settlement 
solutions and binding decisions in the case of arbitration. The Ministerial Council 
can direct states to seek conciliation (Hoynck 1995 (a). This effectively constitutes a 
consensus minus two approach. To date, however, this Convention has not been 
invoked, neither has the OSCE Court which came into affect in Geneva on May 29th 
1995 heard any cases (Borawski and George 1996). 
The introduction during the early 1990s of certain mechanisms signaled that the 
OSCE was prepared to move away from a sole reliance on consensus. The 
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mechanisms have thus transcended traditional OSCE decision making (Mottola 1993 
p23). However, the infrequent application or inability to activate the mechanisms has 
illustrated the difficulties of practical application. This is not only due to the lack of 
authority that the OSCE represents in attempting to apply the procedures, but also a 
consequence of the inherent resistance of states to erosions of state sovereignty 
enacted through international organizations. 
Consensus however, remains most central to OSCE procedures. Consensus in an 
OSCE context is defined as 'a lack of objections expressed by member states or 
considered by them as an obstacle to the adoption of a decision' (Ronzitti 1993 p42). 
Decision making by consensus has allowed participating states to engage `in all forms 
and methods of negotiation under conditions of complete equality' (Lipatti 1992 
p301). However, `bloc reactions and behaviour patterns still persist, as does de facto 
inequality between large, medium sized and small countries and the many imbalances 
that exist between them' (Lipatti 1992 p305). 
The application of the consensus rule to all procedural and substantive decisions has 
from the beginning of the CSCE process been an important way of expressing the 
equal rights of all the participating states and of respecting universality in the 
decision making processes. This has helped to ensure the legitimacy of decisions 
taken and, by engendering a climate of cooperation, made compromises easier to 
accept while also giving each participating state `increased freedom of action' 
(Lipatti 1992 pp300,305). This has given smaller states elements of protection 
against more powerful states (Mihalka 1995 p19). That said, the general reliance on 
consensus can reduce the content of policy to the lowest common denominator. A 
refusal by one state to agree to policy can amount to a veto. Decision making by 
consensus can make the execution of policy long winded, complicated and 
cumbersome. (For an example of such problems see the chapter on Nagorno- 
Karabakh). 
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Military Aspects of Security 
Despite the absence of an integral military capacity, the OSCE has nonetheless 
overseen the development of arms control agreements and disarmament policies 
along with CSBMs. Such measures have had a role to play in conflict prevention, 
particularly in terms of creating greater transparency between states, enabling 
information to be circulated, stemming the build up of arms races in Eastern Europe 
and the FSU, and in facilitating continued dialogue on politico-military issues which 
have taken place primarily through the Forum for Security Cooperation. 
The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) was established in Vienna on September 
22" 1992 in order to provide a platform for negotiation and a forum through which 
discussion could take place on a weekly basis. The Forum is also responsible for 
staging Annual Implementation Meetings (OSCE Handbook 1999 pp27,63). 
Although the Annual Implementation Meetings have been criticized for degenerating 
into slanging matches between Turkey and Greece and Armenia and Azerbaijan, they 
also have allowed progress to develop on issues like freedom of religion (McKenzie 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Meeting 23 April 1999). The capacity of the FSC 
was enhanced at the Lisbon Summit 1996 when the FSC was tasked to develop `A 
Framework for Arms Control' and `Development of the Agenda on the Forum for 
Security Cooperation' (Lisbon Document -Summit Declaration 1996). 
The Framework for Arms Control was designed to be an integral part of a programme 
to create an interlocking and mutually reinforcing web of arms control obligations 
and commitments. The framework also provided a basis to build upon existing 
agreements: -the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the 1992 Vienna 
Document and the 1994 Code of Conduct. Assigned to the weekly meetings of the 
FSC's Joint Consultative Committee were negotiations to the CFE Treaty. This 
treaty was considered integral to preventing the onset of arms races in Eastern Europe 
64 
and the FSU. It would also deter the deployment of Russian forces extending further 
West than the Urals (Bluth 1995 p220). Through 1996 to 1999 amendments were 
negotiated to the CFE Treaty which were then signed at the OSCE's Istanbul summit 
in November 1999. 
Primarily operating as an early warning device, the Code of Conduct on Politico- 
Military Aspects of Security adopted at the Budapest Summit 1994 was perceived as 
a reaffirmation of the OSCE's commitment to cooperative security. The Code of 
Conduct sets out norms and principles and details the role of armed forces in 
democratic states. The Code outlined how states should relate to each other and how 
states should behave towards their citizens in military matters (OSCE Handbook 
1996 p63 ). The Code acts as a measure to scrutinize violations of OSCE principles 
at the state or sub-state level with regard to military-political issues (Lucas 1996 
p227). 
However, there has been a marked reluctance to invoke the Code. During 1995 
Canada and the EU activated the Code in response to Croatia's activities in Western 
Slavonia and the Krajina (Zaagman 1996). Within days of Russia becoming a 
signatory to the Code its provisions were openly ignored when Russian forces 
launched a violent operation in Chechnya. Doubts then arose over the uneven 
application of the Code, the inability to realize the `early identification of potential 
conflicts' and in encouraging participating states to uphold their commitment to 
jointly prevent, manage and peacefully settle disputes (Lucas 1996 p231 cites VI, 18 
of the Code). 
The failure to apply the Code of Conduct following the Russian invasion of Chechnya 
was indicative of a lack of a genuine commitment to OSCE principles both by Russia 
and the participating states of the OSCE. This was demonstrated by Russia through 
its flagrant violation of the Code and by the participating states through their failure 
to collectively censure Russian actions within the forum of the OSCE. In the early 
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stage of the conflict, the CIO pursued diplomatic initiatives in Moscow and the North 
Caucasus (Hoynck 1995 (b) p148). The independence of the mandate allowed the 
CIO to take action `in the initial sensitive phase of the Chechnyan operation without 
having to seek consensus from all the participating states (Kemp 1996 pl 11). Despite 
an initial involvement by the CIO this did not lead initially to an orchestrated 
international response. 
The Code of Conduct reaffirms the principles of the Geneva Convention. In this 
regard, the Code states `armed forces shall not be used to limit the peaceful and 
lawful exercise of human and civil rights by persons as individuals or as 
representatives of groups not to deprive them of their national, religious, cultural or 
ethnic identity' (Lachowski 1995 p785). In the case of Chechnya, the Vienna and 
Moscow mechanisms were also available but were not advocated. This may have 
represented a lost opportunity to reduce the loss of life and the destruction of the 
region's infra-structure (Lucas 1996 pp234-235). However, even if such mechanisms 
had been invoked they may not have made any difference. 
Turning now to CSBMs, broadly speaking, most of the work undertaken by the 
OSCE could be construed as contributing to confidence and security building 
measures. According to the OSCE CSBMs provide a means of controlling military 
activities while providing `a number of early warning indicators. ' Such measures 
have developed as part of a system for the exchange of military information and the 
verification of that information. In particular, these agreements `have introduced 
strict limits for the key military equipment and personnel held by the states of NATO 
and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization. ' In addition, the Open Skies Treaty is 
closely linked to the OSCE due to its declared support for openness and transparency 
regarding military concerns which is considered to enhance confidence and security 
(OSCE Handbook 1996 pp63,69). 
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Specifically CSBMs, are designed to clarify the defensive intentions of states. This is 
intended to reduce uncertainty and tensions and to curtail the opportunities for 
unexpected attacks through the imposition of a set of constraints on `normal military 
activities' (Efinger and Rittberger 1992 p104). Such provisions were built into the 
structures of the Helsinki Final Act and have been developed and reformulated 
through subsequent CSCE conferences in an attempt to address contemporary 
security requirements in Europe. This can be seen with the Vienna Documents. 
CSBMs provide a framework of `quasi-law' based on the establishment of mutually 
agreed rules and conduct. 'CSBMs are collective arrangements about the function 
and use of military power in peacetime. ' CSBMs do not compromise the autonomy 
of states in determining defence policies. CSBMs are `designed to confirm the non- 
aggressive intentions of all states and therefore to build stable expectations 
concerning their military activities. ' This can be perceived `as a pragmatic 
contribution to peacefully managing the classic security dilemma' (Efinger and 
Rittberger 1992 pp120-121). 
CSBMs can contribute to conflict prevention by decreasing the likelihood of surprise 
attack. Due to an international exchange of information, this creates `regular 
interactions, which facilitates the accumulation of peace promoting routine 
behaviour. ' CSBMs can be considered to promote `the pacifying potential of 
international regimes' (Effinger and Rittberger 1992 p121). CSBMs are loosely 
connected to the OSCE but not dependent on it. They are conducted under the aegis 
of the OSCE but are not an integral part of OSCE institutions. 
In practice, there has been a decline in the application of the provisions of CSBMs. 
For example, there has been a notable reduction in the reporting of military activities. 
These have plummeted from 20 observations in 1987 to one in 1995 (Borawski and 
George 1996). In addition, many states involved in ongoing inspections have not 
been subject to inspection. CSBMs have also been illustrative of the disparity 
67 
between `state conflict related early warning and confidence building measures and 
new requirements mainly related to below state level conflict or fighting. ' Within the 
FSC discussion on regional security issues became deadlocked (Lachowski 1995 
p798). However, following the Dayton Accords of 1995 the OSCE's capacity was 
enhanced when it was accorded oversight of intra-state CSBMs (see chapter on 
Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
Competing visions 
The OSCE has developed a complex institutional structure in comparison to its 
relatively weak authoritative powers with which to address situations of conflict. 
The disparity between structure and powers has resulted, in part, from the competing 
visions held principally by the influential participating states regarding the 
development of the organization. The different perspectives regarding how the 
OSCE should develop can broadly be divided into three categories, maximalist, 
middle of the road and minimalist (Niemtzow 1996). When the Warsaw Pact 
disintegrated during 1990-1991 there was a widely held perception that the OSCE 
possessed the potential to become the main provider of security for Europe. Such 
perceptions were largely abandoned following the inability of the OSCE to act 
decisively during the conflicts over the former Yugoslavia and later on in Chechnya. 
This undermined international confidence in the organization which, in turn, served 
to increase interest in NATO. The East-Central European states in particular 
considered that the OSCE could not provide them with adequate security guarantees 
and increasingly focused on the goal of NATO membership. However, for the 
Western NATO states, the OSCE remained a useful organization with which to house 
states excluded from NATO. For the East-Central European states, participation 
within the OSCE enabled them to demonstrate that they were adopting (and for the 
West that they were extracting from the East Central Europeans) the appropriate 
European credentials. However, the end game remained joining NATO. The 
68 
principal Western states while willing to invest limited resources in the OSCE, 
concentrated on further developing and maintaining a strong and robust NATO. 
From 1989 to 1991 Poland, Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia held maximalist 
positions which withered as NATO membership became more attractive. For these 
states the OSCE was a poor substitute. This thinking reflected considerable 
disillusionment with the OSCE as a vehicle for cooperative security. For the Central 
European and Baltic states security concerns stemmed more from external rather than 
internal threats. More precarious security situations prevailed in, for example, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary (Niemtzow 1996). 
For Moscow's part, while it promoted the concept of a new concert of Europe, there 
was a notable lack of sincerity in its aims to strengthen the powers of the OSCE. 
There was a general awareness within OSCE circles that as long as Russia possessed 
the potential to influence the direction of the OSCE `it was unlikely to become a 
security system based on respect for the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of 
disputes' (Sharp 1997 p24). Throughout the 1990s, Russian policy towards the 
OSCE remained inconsistent. Moscow attempted to manipulate the OSCE in an 
attempt to make the organization malleable to fluctuating Russian interests. Russia 
wanted the OSCE to possess sufficient strength to offer an alternative to NATO as a 
security provider. However, Moscow did not at the same time want the OSCE to gain 
sufficient power to be able to play a leading role in the FSU. Russia consistently 
caused trouble within the OSCE and repeatedly attempted to undermine it (Baev 
1997 p36). This type of behaviour was repeatedly demonstrated, for example, by 
subverting the negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh (see Chapter Five). 
In order to placate Russian opposition to NATO enlargement and to quell fears of 
exclusion both for Russia and for those states remaining outside the first wave of new 
NATO members (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO in 1999), 
new concepts of pan-European cooperation were constructed. This included the 
Russia-NATO Founding Act of 1997 and more specifically under the aegis of the 
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OSCE, the Security Model for the 21St Century and a Russian proposal for a European 
Security Charter (which was eventually adopted in November 1999) further 
developed the concept of the indivisibility of European security. Such concepts 
promoted Russia's goal of enabling the OSCE to become a central coordinator of a 
network of interlocking institutions. Russia was determined to prevent only `soft 
security issues' being allocated to the OSCE while NATO took command of the 
`hard' tasks. This may be why Russia agreed to the concept of peacekeeping forces 
being sent to Nagorno-Karabakh under the general control of the OSCE. Developing 
the ability of the OSCE to undertake `hard' security tasks was an attempt to prevent 
NATO's monopoly on the use of force (Lynch 2000 (a) pp117-118). However, 
NATO enlargement kept the Alliance busy and away from the real problem areas, for 
example, the Caucasus (Baev 1997 p37) 
While the OSCE has been an institution that Russia has manipulated, the OSCE has 
also at times been able to influence Russian responses to changing international 
norms. For example, the international norm of non-intervention has been partially 
eroded. Moscow agreed, for example, to accept the OSCE mission to Chechnya in 
1995. 
Turning to middle of the road perspectives these were advanced in particular by 
Germany after 1991 and by Hungary, Austria and the Netherlands. The German and 
Austrian proposals reflected the two states' exposed positions on the front line of 
Europe sandwiched between East and Western Europe. Germany advanced a concept 
of the OSCE acquiring a strengthened capacity in order to take resolute action when 
responding to threats and crises. German policy towards the OSCE remained 
consistent throughout the 1990s reflecting both the pursuit of German interests and 
the desire to establish new norms based on the inclusiveness of European security 
requirements. Such ideals were reflected in the then Foreign Minister's Hans- 
Dietrich Genscher's 1989 statement advocating that the, CSCE be `institutionalized in 
a manner that would engage the other governments in a dense institutional network 
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based on common security interests, so as not to allow any single state to defect 
without violating its own security interests' (Peters 1999 p196). In turn, the French 
perceived the UN as a more suitable vehicle for advancing its interests (Niemtzow 
1996). France proposed moderated changes to the OSCE infrastructure reflecting 
French determination to deflect the powerful influence of Germany within Europe. 
Minimalist views, finally, have been advanced by the US and Britain. The minimalist 
position dominated the readjustment of existing OSCE structures and mechanisms. 
Such perspectives were, nonetheless, tempered by the need to make concessions to 
other points of view, thus the acceptance in 1994 of the `CSCE First' principle. This 
was an idea to allow the OSCE in the first instance, to tackle conflict within Europe 
without the direct involvement of the UN. The change of name from CSCE to OSCE 
following the Budapest Summit 1994, also signified the enhanced status of the 
organization by emphasizing a more robust and important process than the title 
`conference' had implied. The organization's title change was also designed to 
placate the Russians, still hovering on the edge of European organizations and fearing 
outright marginalization. The change of name was largely cosmetic and in keeping 
with the dominant minimalist perspective. There was neither an `adoption of a basic 
statute relating to international law, ' nor did obligations on participating states 
change in character (Peters 1996 p109). 
Conclusion 
From its origins as a loosely structured series of conferences, the OSCE has 
developed into an organization that now offers a comprehensive package of conflict 
management measures. Despite this extensive institutionalization along with newly 
adopted approaches to conflict management, the OSCE's operations have remained 
constrained. The organization's conflict management capabilities have been 
compromised by a lack of resources and subordinated to the further development of 
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other international organizations, principally NATO. Many mechanisms have either 
been under used or unused. However, the development of these mechanisms 
indicates that certain states are receptive to new ideas and that in the future these 
methods may gain wider acceptance. 
Nevertheless, there has been both resistance and resentment displayed by certain 
states to the OSCE's involvement in the internal affairs of states. While states may 
which to escape the scrutiny of international bodies into their adverse human rights 
records, they may rightly resent such oversight when states pursuing these goals 
within the OSCE may be equally culpable of human rights abuses but receive little or 
no attention. For example the US has been taken to task over the widespread 
application of the death penalty involving the execution of mentally defective people 
and minors, however, while these issues have been discreetly raised in private OSCE 
meetings, good offices are not dispatched to the US in order to institute OSCE 
human dimension matters of `direct concern. ' The OSCE has little presence in any of 
the Western European states either. This indicates that the OSCE is a body primarily 
concerned with engineering political and social change in the post-communist states. 
In addition to an East-West divide over how OSCE principles are applied to states. 
There appears also to be an inequitable application of OSCE procedures within the 
states of Eastern Europe and the FSU. The less powerful states of Eastern Europe 
and the FSU are likely to experience closer OSCE scrutiny and involvement than 
states like Russia who have flouted OSCE principles with seeming impunity. This 
can be viewed as OSCE pragmatism in achieving goals where it is possible but it has 
led to accusations of interest driven policies dominated by power politics and fears of 
destabilizing relations with Moscow. 
By developing new institutions that cover a comprehensive mandate, the OSCE has 
demonstrated its intention in principle to enable these institutions to offer alternative 
methods of dealing with conflict. The gap between ideals and practice may reflect, in 
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part, the natural resistance of states to previously untested or barely tried procedures 
and the difficulties of applying principles in real situations. 
Participating states still appear uncertain as to how the organization should develop 
and what exactly they want the OSCE to do. There may be a reluctance to allow the 
OSCE increased autonomy of action because although this may lead to beneficial 
outcomes such actions may also be subverted to serve the requirements of certain 
participants and can enable powerful European players to exert increasing levels of 
control over weaker states. 
OSCE principles appear more likely to be propounded and adhered to when vital 
interests are not compromised by doing so. This type of situation is clearly 
demonstrated in the Caucasus and Central Asia where the OSCE has kowtowed to the 
`geopolitical constraints' stemming from the influence that Russia wields within the 
region. Here a Russian desire for autonomy of action in regions of the FSU has 
interfered with multilateral initiatives (Huber 1994 p27) while at the same time it has 
suited many OSCE states to acquiesce with Russian oversight of the region. 
Where the OSCE appears to demonstrate success it may be difficult to attribute that 
success to the work of the OSCE alone and not to other factors that may have 
influenced a particular state to adopt a particular course of action. For example, a 
state may be prepared to accept OSCE missions onto its territory because appearing 
compliant to OSCE policy may further its case for early admission into the more 
prestigious international organizations. This can be seen in policies adopted towards 
the OSCE in by Latvia and Estonia in order to advance their case for early admission 
into the EU. 
The OSCE cannot be what its participant states are not. In that the foreign policies 
of OSCE participating states may be driven by the tenets of realpolitik, it is 
unrealistic to expect an international organization to develop in a manner which 
reflects ideals that its participant states only selectively adhere to. 
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Chapter Four: The OSCE and Macedonia 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the role that the OSCE has played in Macedonia from the early 
1990s until the end of 1998. The work that the OSCE has been involved with in 
Macedonia is detailed in order to offer an appraisal of the organization's conflict 
prevention capabilities in a low intensity conflict. The capacity in which the OSCE 
worked within Macedonia served initially to help prevent external conflict 
destabilizing the state. OSCE operations within Macedonia then developed to 
include examining ethnic tensions in order to reduce the likelihood of violent conflict 
or civil war. 
Primarily, the OSCE has attempted to enhance political stability within Macedonia 
through establishing a permanent office: a long term field mission, entitled the 
`Spillover Monitoring Mission to Skopje. ' Such work has been strengthened by the 
close involvement in Macedonia by the HCNM. Both of these mechanisms have 
operated at governmental through to grass root levels. The third major OSCE 
operation has been the Sanction Assistance Missions (SAMs) directed against Serbia. 
Although the SAMs are not related to OSCE conflict prevention measures, a 
discussion is included here to illustrate how their implementation operated to the 
detriment of OSCE conflict prevention measures. The sanctions involved UN, OSCE 
and EU collaboration and were designed to prevent international trade with Serbia. 
During the three and a half year period in which they were imposed, from September 
1992 until October 1996, the Macedonian economy, which had previously conducted 
60% of its trade with Serbia, was severely affected. Such damage was tempered by 
the limited ability of the OSCE, the EU and the UN to execute their sanction 
enforcing mandates, something that in turn served to aid Serbian war aims. Thus, 
the OSCE was working to ameliorate tensions within Macedonia through the work of 
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the long term mission and the HCNM while at the same time contributing to tensions 
by assisting the SAMs. 
The chapter discusses briefly the circumstances within Macedonia that led to OSCE 
involvement. Attention then focuses on the work of the OSCE Spillover Mission to 
Skopje (the long-term field mission). The analysis then turns to the work of the 
HCNM and the SAMs. The chapter will conclude that the OSCE's work in 
Macedonia has made a small contribution towards reducing tensions within that state. 
Such a contribution is tempered by the adverse effects of the SAMs and also by 
international collusion with regional states such as Greece which exacerbated 
political, economic and social problems within Macedonia and fueled a climate 
where political issues were increasingly defined along ethnic lines. The emphasis 
that is placed on ethnicity within Macedonia has made it is easier for politicians to 
assume power on an ethnic platform. Nevertheless, despite a multitude of problems, 
Macedonia remained stable during the period under discussion. 
Macedonian independence 
On September 8t' 1991 a referendum was held after which the Republic of 
Macedonia was declared an independent state following the collapse of the Yugoslav 
Federation. Despite a history of ethnic tensions within Macedonia it was the only 
state to make a peaceful transition from being part of the Former Yugoslavia to 
independence. At this point it was led by a coalition government headed by Kiro 
Gligorov, widely considered to be a moderate former communist official. A climate 
of moderation was also attributed to the attitudes of the leaders of the largest minority 
population within Macedonia, the ethnic Albanians, who for the most part followed 
policies advocating non-violence (Ackermann 1996 p420). 
75 
The declaration of independence created a new state containing a diversity of ethnic 
groups, many of whom had boycotted the referendum. Following the unveiling of 
new citizenship requirements, many members of ethnic groups found themselves to 
be stateless people and subject to discriminatory practices either real or perceived. 
For example, the Macedonian Albanian Party for Prosperity considered that ethnic 
Albanians had been deprived of rights previously enjoyed under the 1974 Yugoslav 
constitution (Schmidt, J 1995 p65). The Macedonian constitution states that all 
citizens are equal, but also declares that `Macedonia is officially the national state of 
the Macedonian people. ' This meant that Macedonians were accorded `the status of 
the only constituent people' (Perry 1994 p83). Other minority groups like the Turks 
and Serbs found their exclusion from constitutional status offensive (Schmidt, F 1995 
p27). This type of policy appeared to run contrary to the government's stated aim of 
creating a multi-cultural state. Within Macedonia there was an undercurrent of 
hostility between ethnic groups. Albanians were subject to `quiet discrimination' and 
were widely regarded as second class citizens. The Roma bore the brunt of open and 
intolerable discrimination, were frequently subject to police brutality and endured 
unfavourable social and economic conditions (International Helsinki Federation for 
Human Rights 1998). 
The Spillover Mission to Skopje 
The OSCE's initial involvement in Macedonia began on 15th August 1992 when the 
15t' CSO meeting considered the possibility of sending missions to the country in 
order to prevent the spread of tensions from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro). The subsequent decision to organize an exploratory 
mission by the middle of September 1992 was an unusual action because Macedonia 
was not to become a full participant of the OSCE process until late 1995 due to 
continual vetoes by Greece. Consequently the organization was operating, in effect, 
out of area. Following Macedonia's admission to the UN, the state was offered 
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`silent observer' status within the OSCE in April 1993, which meant that it could 
attend OSCE meetings but not make comments. In June 1994, Macedonia's 
participation within the OSCE was upgraded to `regular observer' status (Ackermann 
1997 p4). The exploratory mission was designed to assess the political situation 
within Macedonia and to test the Macedonian authorities receptivity to the proposed 
establishment of a monitoring mission. The exploratory mission was also tasked to 
determine the economic impact that war in the region was making on the state. 
The decision taken by the Macedonian government to accept the mission was in part 
a response to international initiatives. The acceptance of such initiatives was 
propelled by the need to develop security measures and to counterbalance the 
hostility displayed towards the state by Bulgaria and Albania and, in particular, the 
oil embargo and trade sanctions imposed by Greece. Macedonia sought to improve 
access to international organizations and to develop its international credentials as a 
potentially suitable candidate for future full participation within the OSCE process, 
international financial institutions and ultimately within the EU and NATO. The 
government sought to assert its pro-Western orientation and a positive approach 
towards the OSCE was a useful vehicle for demonstrating this. The Macedonian 
government was therefore keen to establish a good relationship with the mission 
(telephone conversation with Branko Geroski, November 1997). 
There were a number of concerns which the Macedonian government considered 
could be alleviated by cooperation with international organizations and European 
states. Such concerns arose at the time from the possible influx of refugees from 
Bosnia and the potential for violent unrest occurring in Kosovo. Macedonia's 
defence capability moreover had been eroded following the withdrawal of the Serb 
dominated Yugoslav National Army from its bases within the country in 1992 
(Financial Times Survey- Republic of Macedonia 7th July 1995). The new inter-state 
border with Serbia was consequently not monitored. Internally, meanwhile, the 
demands of the ethnic Albanians were perceived as another potential source of unrest 
77 
(Ackermann 1997 p6 cites material from CSCE Communication No. 282, Prague 16th 
September 1992). 
At the 16`h CSO meeting on 1e September 1992, the CSCE Monitoring Mission to 
Skopje was established. The first three heads of mission were appointed from the 
United States which demonstrated the significance America as a major player within 
the OSCE, attached to the mission in its early years. It was also indicative of US 
determination to support the Macedonian regime and if necessary to involve NATO 
in order to prevent threats to the state's stability (Fraenkel 1997 p32). Further 
regional instability was to be avoided in order to prevent Greece and Turkey, two 
NATO members, being dragged into a Balkan war (Financial Times Survey- Republic 
of Macedonia 7.7.95). However, by 1996, following the signing of the Dayton 
Accords, the Mission was deemed of lesser importance. It was reduced to four 
members and was led by a Danish ambassador. In March 1998, however, following 
violence in Kosovo the mission was increased to eight members (Human Rights 
Watch 1998). 
The mission was named the Mission to Skopje rather than Macedonia in order to 
appease the Greek government who insisted that the name Macedonia belonged 
solely to a Northern province of Greece. This was a compromise suggested by the 
OSCE (Ackermann 1997 p7). Athens was enraged by Macedonia's adoption of what 
it considered to be Greek symbols such as the Star of Vergina on the Macedonian 
flag. The use of the name Macedonia also implied for the Greeks that Macedonia 
had territorial claims to parts of their Northern territory. Greece also objected to 
parts of the Macedonian constitution that expressed concerns for Macedonians living 
abroad (Mickey 1995 p38). 
Greece considered it had legitimate grounds for fearing irredentism on the part of 
Macedonia. These fears were fueled by the popularity of a Macedonian nationalist 
party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for 
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Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), which advocated the union of parts 
of Macedonia that lay outside of contemporary boundaries. The application of trade 
restrictions and sanctions imposed by Greece from 1991 and the subsequent attempts 
by Greece to block Macedonian entry into international organizations was a 
deliberate ploy to wreak economic chaos on the state and to destabilize it internally 
(Mickey 1995 p38). An economic embargo which lasted from February 1994 until 
October 1995, furthermore, was seen as a reaction to the granting of diplomatic 
recognition by Russia on February 4"' 1994 and by the US on February 9`h 1994. The 
economic embargo was strongly condemned by other EU states (The Observer 
11.2.95) and a declaration on February 21st 1994 by the European Commission stated 
that the trade ban violated EU law. The EU reacted by initiating legal action against 
Greece within the European Court of Justice (Mickey 1995 p39). 
The mandate of the Spillover mission to Skopje 
The 17t' CSO meeting of 6`' November 1992 outlined the mission's mandate and 
approved the financial outlay . involved. In Macedonia conflict prevention was 
defined by the OSCE in terms of containment. The primary purpose of the mission 
was `to monitor developments along the borders of the Host Country with Serbia and 
in other areas of the Host Country which may suffer from spill over of the conflict in 
the Former Yugoslavia, in order to promote respect for territorial integrity and the 
maintenance of peace, stability and security; and to help prevent possible conflict in 
the region. ' Site visits were deployed in order to detect sources of tension and 
instability. The OSCE played a role in helping to contain external conflict. It led 
discussions on border disputes between Macedonia and Serbia which, for example, in 
conjunction with contributions from the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 
encouraged Macedonian and Serbian forces to withdraw from a disputed region 
(MILS News 19.08.94). 
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Other objectives in the mission's mandate included to continue dialogue with the 
Macedonian government and to establish contacts with citizens, representatives of 
organizations and political parties. The mission was to assist the work of 
international organizations working in Macedonia and investigate complaints 
concerning political grievances and human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch 
1998). The mission acted in an early warning capacity by voicing its concerns over 
the deteriorating economic situation within Macedonia and outlining the potential 
consequences (OSCE Handbook 1995 p22). This did not however result in a 
forceful international response. It was to be unilateral US intervention (rather than 
OSCE dialogue) that resulted in the signing of the Interim Accord with Greece (and 
the lifting of UN sanctions post-Dayton) (Ackermann 1996 pp412-413). 
The work of the mission meant that attention was paid through an international forum 
to the state of civil and human rights within Macedonia. The underlying reason for 
this was to prevent Albanians in both Kosovo and Macedonia from joining together to 
create a separate state by persuading Skopje to guarantee the rights of ethnic 
Albanians within Macedonia. Another objective was to prevent an increase in 
internal ethnic tension between ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian majority. Such 
efforts to address ethnic tension proved inherently difficult. International pressure on 
the government to tackle ethnic issues was attributed to the radicalization of some 
political elements within the ethnic Albanian communities and to the stirring up of 
animosity and resentment between ethnic groups (Woodward 1995 p393). 
The mission was involved in a complex situation. It was expected to comment on the 
status of minority groups within Macedonia while offering support to the government 
in order to assist the maintenance of stability within the state. The mission produced 
fortnightly reports to the CIO on the political and economic situation in Macedonia. 
However, scant attention was paid within the reports to human rights issues. The 
mission mindful that it was essentially a guest of the government and that its mandate 
could be revoked with fifteen days notice, adopted a cautious diplomatic role. 
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Nevertheless, Skopje complained directly to the mission that its reporting was 
affecting the country's image. This led to a softening of OSCE criticisms of the 
government and blame for unrest was attributed instead to political and national 
extremists. Representatives of minority groups and opposition parties then accused 
the mission of being too close to the government and failing to confront authorities 
about human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch 1998). 
The 1994 census 
Collaborative work undertaken by the mission included organizing a population 
census in June 1994. This was a joint operation organized by the mission with 
funding supplied by the COE and the EU. The decision to arrange a census was 
taken in response largely to high levels of dissatisfaction amongst the ethnic Albanian 
communities with the results of the earlier 1991 census. Accusations of irregularities 
had been leveled against the authorities which had threatened to become a major 
destabilizing factor within Macedonia. The 1994 census again proved highly 
contentious and its finding were disputed (Ackermann 1997). There were criticisms 
of the calibre of the personnel assigned to the International Census Observer Mission 
and to the preparations and conduct of the census (Woodward 1995 Note 32 p477-8). 
Involvement was also lacking of ethnic Albanian experts who were needed to verify 
the statistical data (Mickey 1995 p40). 
The OSCE viewed the opportunity to organize the census as an important event for 
inter-ethnic relations. The census would, according to the OSCE, help to establish a 
political consensus if it was both widely accepted by ethnic groups and considered to 
have been properly implemented (OSCE Handbook 1995 p22). To a certain extent 
such goals were achieved. Despite controversy over the results, ethnic Albanian 
political leaders gave an air of legitimacy to the census figures by asking for 
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`representation proportional to those figures in judicial offices, the national university 
and elsewhere' (Perry (a)1995 p41). 
Elections 
Other areas of the mission's responsibilities included oversight of the election 
processes. The OSCE was involved in three elections during the period of this case 
study, which are each in turn detailed below. 
In October 1994 the mission, in conjunction with the ODIHR, became involved with 
coordinating and consulting with international observers during the preparations for 
the presidential and parliamentary elections (OSCE Handbook 1995 p22). Despite 
the mission's attempts to ensure that democratic practices were followed, allegations 
of fraud and irregularities prevailed. During the first round these included concerns 
over allegations of incorrect ballot lists and ballot manipulations, missing voter 
registration forms and unclear district boundaries. 150 election monitors from the 
OSCE and COE observed the elections. While they noted certain irregularities these 
infractions were not considered serious enough to warrant annulment of the election 
itself. Two international election commissioners did not agree with the observers 
sentiments however, and duly resigned (Perry (a) 1995 p41). 
The two strongest opposition parties, the Democratic Party and VRMO-DPMNE 
refused to participate in the second round of the elections. VMRO-DPMNE along 
with several other of the smaller parties declared the election results fraudulent and 
requested that new elections be held. For these political parties the results were 
wholly undemocratic and were illustrative of `the return of one party rule' (Mickey 
1995 p40). In response, the government refused to stage new elections despite UN 
criticism of the election results (Perry (b)1995 p29). This meant that there was no 
effective parliamentary opposition, something which brought the government's 
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legitimacy into question. Such widespread criticism also provided doubts as to the 
nature of the OSCE's assessment of the conduct of the elections. It raised questions 
regarding the motives behind the OSCE's apparent readiness to verify the results and 
questioned the integrity of its key decision makers. As stated earlier, the OSCE 
became increasingly reluctant to criticize the government for fear of increasing 
instability within the state and was prepared to turn a blind eye to the government's 
blatant abuse of democratic practices. 
Skopje also formally requested that the ODIHR observe the municipal elections. The 
first round of these elections was staged on November 17 1996. This was jointly 
coordinated by the OSCE mission and by the ODIHR. Observers were recruited from 
international NGOs and embassies based in Macedonia along with staff seconded 
from the OSCE long-term mission. In all, 45 teams were stationed around the 
country. 
In the run up to the municipal elections, the ODIHR and the OSCE long-term mission 
engaged in dialogue with the government and held consultations with political 
parties. In its post election appraisal the OSCE conceded that there had been `a few 
problems with voter registration' but considered, overall, that the elections had been 
conducted appropriately (OSCE Newsletter Vol. 3 No. 11 1996). Again the OSCE's 
assessment of an electoral outcome was challenged. The International Helsinki 
Federation for Human Rights Annual Report 1997 maintained that political parties 
had displayed their election propaganda at polling stations. At one polling station in 
Tetova voters destroyed ballot boxes. There were also charges that election 
commissioners had violated the law in favour of the ruling Social Democratic Party. 
In the 1998 parliamentary elections after two rounds of voting overseen by the OSCE 
in conjunction with the ODIHR, the results were widely considered to reflect an 
election conducted under largely satisfactory conditions, especially when compared 
to the 1994 elections. The biggest problem had been a bureaucratic one relating to 
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the unsatisfactory distribution of voter identity cards. However, following the first 
round there were some accusations of irregularities and intimidation. There were 
also allegations that voters had been bribed. In the town of Kocani party activists 
were beaten (International Crisis Group (ICG) Report 4 November 1998). 
After six years in office the government was defeated and a right wing coalition 
government assumed power. The new government included nationalist parties from 
both Macedonian and ethnic Albanians groups (Macedonian Country Report, Annual 
Review, ICG in 1998). As in 1994 voting continued along ethnic lines. The OD= 
had no mandate to provide technical assistance. Its involvement was largely confined 
to analysis and observation. 
The ethnic Albanian University at Tetova 
Attempts to defuse tensions between ethnic groups and between ethnic groups and 
the government, saw the mission along with the HCNM engaged in arbitration. 
Ethnic Albanians attempted during 1995 to establish a private university in Tetova in 
order to meet what they considered to be the specific educational and cultural needs 
of ethnic Albanians and to overcome the effects of institutionalized discrimination. 
The desire to gain legal status for the university came to represent ethnic Albanians 
struggle to improve their rights (The Guardian 20.2.95 p8). 
The government viewed this attempt as illegal and a direct threat to the territorial 
integrity of Macedonia. Concerns were voiced over elements of the ethnic Albanian 
communities that sought to establish a separate state or to join Western Macedonia to 
Albania and Kosova to form a `greater Albania. ' A referendum held by ethnic 
Albanians on 10-11 January 1992 had revealed 90% support for independence from 
Macedonia (Isakovic 1997 p12). Despite acknowledging the need to guarantee 
minority rights the government refused to give permission for the university to go 
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ahead. The ethnic Albanians proceeded to open the university, disregarding the 
government's opposition. Skopje asserted that if separate university education was 
allowed to develop it would lead to a form of apartheid between the two major ethnic 
groups. It was also seen as providing the fuel for increasing ethnic Albanian 
radicalism and furthering demands for secession. The government concentrated its 
efforts on putting education reforms in place and adopting policies of affirmative 
action in order to increase the number of ethnic Albanians going into the state 
university system. To the government's frustration, few Albanians responded (Perry 
(a) 1995 p43). 
Responses were however swift on the part of the Macedonian majority population, 
many of whom grew increasingly resentful of the attention paid to the ethnic 
Albanians by international organizations such as the OSCE. A large sector of the 
Macedonian majority considered international interference to be doubly harmful. It 
accorded special treatment to ethnic Albanians and failed to insist that Greece end its 
illegal blockade of Macedonia something which had contributed to high levels of 
unemployment within the country. Such unemployment chiefly affected the 
Macedonian majority, who had been widely employed in the state and public sectors. 
Ethnic Albanians were largely self employed or already unemployed and so less 
directly affected by rising public sector unemployment. The Macedonian majority 
was aggrieved when money was spent on enhancing ethnic Albanian access to 
education and public sector employment (Woodward 1995 p393). 
The Role of the HCNM 
In Macedonia the HCNM has promoted policies designed to recognize the special 
needs of minorities and has worked to help prevent minorities becoming alienated 
from mainstream society. The HCNM has promoted the concept that a state which 
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accommodates the needs of its minority populations will be more easily able to 
realize domestic interests, thereby enhancing stability and avoiding societal 
fragmentation (van der Stoel 1997 ppl6-17). However, the HCNM's mandate does 
not include reporting `about the host government's respect for OSCE documents 
relating to minority rights' (Human Rights Watch 1998). 
The regular fact-finding missions undertaken by the HCNM have been regarded as 
among the OSCE's most important preventive measures in Macedonia (Ackerman 
1996 p418). This has involved meeting with government representatives and leaders 
of ethnic groups and parties. The HCNM's mediation efforts have covered a range of 
issues of concern to both minority and majority populations. For example, 
citizenship requirements, language and educational issues, the proportion of 
minorities groups that are represented in key professions like the police, army, civil 
service and government appointments and the frequency and quantity of ethnic 
language programmes shown on television and radio (Ackermann 1997 p8). The 
visits undertaken by the HCNM as part of his fact-finding missions are followed up 
by recommendations which he makes to the government concerned. In Macedonia 
these have largely involved compromise solutions. Skopje is under no legal 
obligation either to consider or to adopt any of these recommendations. 
In relation to the controversy over the Tetova university, the HCNM proposed 
alternatives to a separate higher education system for Albanians. For example, a 
quota system (which was adopted) to enable increased access for ethnic Albanians 
and other ethnic groups. The HCNM suggested that a pedagogical faculty in the 
Albanian language could be established at the state University of Skopje. Other 
recommendations included the development of a trilingual Higher Education Centre 
for Public Administration and Business. This could help to improve the economic 
climate within the country and enable increased ethnic minority representation in 
local and regional representation (HCNM -H/C/REF/3/1995). 
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Despite the Macedonian constitution allowing for the establishment of private 
schools and a section of the Copenhagen Document stating that national minorities 
have the right to their own educational facilities, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Stevo Crevenkovski responded by stating that `any solution regarding a private 
university in the Republic of Macedonia has to take into account that such an 
establishment can be founded in the constitutional and legal framework, meaning in 
the Macedonian language or under specific conditions in one of the world languages. 
Your initiatives for assisting the Republic of Macedonia in this sphere should have 
this fact in view' (HCNM-H/C/REF/3/1995). 
Dialogue continued between the government, interested parties and the HCNM, 
however, the dispute over the university continued unabated into 1998. Macedonian 
students at times resorted to violent protests over the government's decision to allow 
Albanian as the language of instruction at the Pedagogical Institute at Skopje. Ethnic 
Albanian leaders continued to press for legal recognition of the status of the 
University at Tetovo. The Macedonian authorities refused to recognize the university 
and would not recognize graduating students' diplomas although the university was 
allowed to operate (Human Rights Watch 1998). 
In the case of the university at Tetova, the HCNM has to date neither managed to 
satisfy the demands of the ethnic Albanian communities nor to persuade the 
government to make more concessions regarding this matter. In February 1998 the 
two largest ethnic Albanian political parties asked the OSCE to replace the HCNM 
due to his `lack of objectivity' following the HCNM's comments that the government 
was not obliged to recognize the university (Human Rights Watch report 1998). The 
university is a particularly sensitive issue to the government and calls into question 
how much influence and control it is prepared to concede to an outside observer of its 
internal affairs. 
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The HCNM has also been accused of unsatisfactory responses regarding other issues. 
There were concerns over the flagrant abuse of police powers during 1997 following 
serious allegations of police brutality directed against ethnic Albanians during 
protests in Gostivar where people were both injured and murdered. The HCNM 
issued one statement on the event in which he understated the number of people 
injured and failed to make mention or criticism of police behaviour. Instead he 
issued platitudes on the importance of rejecting ethnic hatred and pursuing 
constructive dialogue (Human Rights Watch report 1998). 
This not withstanding, many of the points of contention are manipulated by both 
sides. The government has agreed in principle to many of the ethnic Albanians 
demands (US Department of State: Macedonia Country Report 1996). In practice, 
the government has justified delays in regulating minority issues because it says it is 
unable to deal with the volume of work involved. Of the recommended changes 
most would not require much effort or expense to institute (Najcevska 1995 p41). 
Despite his supportive approach to the government, aspects of the HCNM's work are 
an irritant to Skopje. The type of advice offered by the HCNM is indicative of 
Western policy toward Central and Eastern European states generally. Different 
standards of behaviour are requested of Central and Eastern European states than 
Western states themselves choose to adhere to (Lutz 1997 p23). Neighbouring states 
such as Greece and Turkey both possess poor records on minority and human rights, 
escape levels of scrutiny imposed on Macedonia, and still receive the benefits of 
membership of a number of international organizations. While Macedonia is 
required to implement legislative reform on national minorities, Greece continues to 
ignore the existence of minorities on its territory (Najcevska 1995 p41). There have 
been serious attempts to improve the rights of minorities within Macedonia to a 
higher level than that enjoyed elsewhere in Europe (Milcin 1995 p26). For example 
'Macedonian law prohibits the ethnic identification of perpetrators in the media' 
(Barany 199\p520). This is not prohibited in Britain for instance. It was 
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acknowledged by the EU's Badinter Commission that Macedonia was one of a small 
number of states that had satisfactorily met human rights conditions (Ackermann 
1996 p421). There are no clear indications that the OSCE has influenced the design 
of such human rights policies. 
Where the HCNM has played an important role has been in keeping open and 
encouraging channels of communication between conflicting parties in times of 
severe tension. This has helped to engender an atmosphere where dialogue rather 
than a resort to violence is an accepted practice. The HCNM has proven particularly 
skilled at building intimate relationships with parties. This may be attributed to the 
mandate of his office or to his personal diplomatic skills. Both the HCNM and the 
mission have provided a basis from which moderation within a society can be 
promoted and escalatory actions avoided. Such moderating influence has been 
achieved by applying pragmatic approaches rather than adhering to formalities. The 
emphasis has been on persuasion rather than on the application of power or 
measuring compliance with the legal obligations of the state (Chigas 1996 p63). 
The Sanctions Assistance Missions 
The decision to establish the SAMs was endorsed by the 16th CSO meeting on the 
18th September 1992. The idea behind this decision was to enforce the UN imposed 
sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorized in May 1992. The UN 
mandate involved imposing an economic embargo and blockade while severing 
diplomatic, scientific, cultural and sports relations (Skidelsky and Mortimer 1996 
p167). The OSCE's role involved monitoring compliance with the sanctions. 
A number of the OSCE participant states seconded experts and contributed to the 
financial costs of maintaining the SAMs which were operated in Albania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine as well as in Macedonia. The SAMs 
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cooperated within the Sanctions Liaison Group and were overseen by an OSCE/EU 
Sanctions Coordinator. In terms of staff, more than 240 customs officers and other 
experts worked either within the seven SAMs or within the central structure in 
Brussels. The central structure consisted of the Sanctions Coordinator's Office and 
SAMCOMM, the body overseeing communication and coordination. The latter was 
partially financed and staffed by the EU (OSCE Handbook 1996 p37). In order to 
execute the SAMs, the Macedonian police was assisted by a team of 28 customs 
officers from the OSCE. 
From the outset, the OSCE presence was tolerated rather than welcomed. The 
Macedonians perceived the OSCE officials to be a nuisance. Traffic across the 
border was particularly heavy at night when OSCE officials were not so likely to be 
operating. UN forces were frequently unable to do much about the traffic apart from 
count it because the UN lacked the authority to stop and inspect trucks and trains. 
Transport was sometimes turned back at the border crossings but often returned later 
and was allowed to cross (Vogel 1993). 
The UN mandate contained within it provisions to alleviate the effects of the 
sanctions on the states bordering Serbia although Western nations did not respond 
(Owen 1996 p314). Little care or consideration (or financial recompense) appeared 
to have been given to the effects and repercussions that the application of sanctions 
would have on neighbouring states (Financial Times Survey 7.7.95 pp33-36). 
The Macedonian government could not afford adherence to the sanctions agreements 
and turned a blind eye to violations. Serbia's frontier was a `virtually open border. ' 
Macedonia and Albania had developed a thriving market in illicit trade especially 
when contravening oil sanctions. Sanctions were tightened under UN Security 
Council resolution 820 in April 1993, which curtailed the scale of sanctions 
violations. Nonetheless, the supply of goods to ruling elites and the military in Serbia 
continued (Owen cited in Skidelsky and Mortimer 1996 p167). 
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The OSCE considered that the SAMs made `an essential contribution to the 
credibility of the efforts of the international community to stop the fighting in the 
former Yugoslavia' (OSCE Handbook 1996 p36). This statement is strongly 
contested. The sanctions were in place for three and a half years until November 
1995 and were `very unevenly enforced' (Skidelsky and Mortimer 1996 p167). A UN 
official was reported to have commented that as the international community had 
provided no help for Macedonia to secure alternative economic markets or to supply 
economic relief it was unwise to consider that Macedonia could abide by UN 
sanctions (Vogel 1993). This meant that oil and other goods entered Serbia from 
Macedonia and Albania which rendered `much of the work of the SAMs null and 
void' (Owen 1996 p314). The government also engaged in widespread violations of 
the sanctions because of its support for Serbian nationalist forces in Bosnia. Serbia 
was Macedonia's main trading partner and Macedonia remained fearful of the 
military and economic power of the state. A government spokesman acknowledged 
that without trade with Serbia the Macedonian economy would collapse (Vogel 
1993). By January 1996 following the signing of the Dayton Accords, the UN 
Security Council under resolution 1021 and 1022 lifted the arms embargo and 
suspended sanctions against Serbia. 
Conclusion 
Both the long-term mission and the HCNM had entered Macedonia at a time of 
severe economic problems and heightened ethnic tensions. In order to operate within 
a precarious political and economic climate, both OSCE offices addressed the 
prevailing situation in Macedonia through pragmatic and utilitarian policies. For 
example, legitimizing the dubious results of the 1994 general elections illustrated that 
OSCE ideals appeared to have been sacrificed to what the OSCE may have 
considered was the greater good of maintaining stability within the state. Some 
recommendations issued by the HCNM and the mission were incorporated into 
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government policy. In light of such achievements the HCNM and the mission were 
able to influence aspects of government thinking, such as affirmative action. 
However, major points of contention remained unresolved. Despite OSCE 
involvement during the period of time under discussion here, relationships between 
ethnic groups deteriorated. Throughout 1998 inter-ethnic relations became markedly 
worse, especially with regard to Roma and Albanian minorities. This was due to the 
the war in Kosovo and a subsequent large influx of ethnic Albanian refugees into 
Macedonia, something the OSCE was powerless to prevent. 
The mission and the HCNM as mechanisms of conflict prevention attempted to both 
defuse ethnic tensions and to enhance the stability of the state. There was tension 
between the needs of the state and those of ethnic groups which the OSCE proved 
unable to adequately address. Without stable government, inter-ethnic relations 
could not be improved. Attempts by the OSCE to detail the inadequacies of official 
policies relating to ethnic minorities and human rights led the government to charge 
that it was being undermined by the OSCE. In turn, OSCE attentions directed 
towards one ethnic group served to increase hostility and resentment in another. A 
possible alternative course of action could, for example, have been the 
encouragement of policies designed to improve social and political conditions 
generally within the state rather than merely targeting a particular ethnic group for 
courses of affirmative action, which did not appear effective. 
The emphasis on ethnic issues by organizations like the OSCE, rather than on 
creating stable political institutions could be construed as misplaced and 
counterproductive to the long term goals of achieving stability. Arguably, more 
attention needs to be paid to developing measures to strengthen political and 
economic structures that are in turn reflective of the ethnic diversity of the country 
concerned. Susan Woodward (1995 p393-394) has argued that the greatest threat to 
stability has not arisen from ethnic tensions but from `incomplete sovereignty and 
92 
fragile governments' devoid of the necessary resources required to devise their own 
solutions to ethnic problems. 
Nevertheless, Macedonian politics have largely been characterized by tolerance, 
dialogue and moves towards establishing a multi-cultural state (Ruzin 1997 p3). In 
this environment, the HCNM demonstrated the utility of low key diplomacy. The 
mission provided a means of `monitoring events for the international community, 
providing an important sounding board for ethnic minority groups, and for 
publicizing Macedonia's prospects for stability' (Mickey 1995 p39). The HCNM 
offered constructive proposals outlining measures designed to improve relations 
between ethnic groups and between ethnic groups and the government. The ultimate 
decision and responsibility as to whether to act upon such recommendations lay 
with the government, the HCNM had no authority to enforce his proposals. During 
the early to mid 1990s it was in the Macedonian government's interests to adopt a 
policy of at least limited compliance with OSCE recommendations. Since then, the 
organization has proven of limited use for the government. In the early stages of 
OSCE involvement in Macedonia the organization was able to play a substantial role 
as a facilitator and mediator of dialogue. As Macedonia developed its connections 
with other international organizations, such as the EU and NATO, this role 
diminished (Telephone conversation with Branko Geroski November 1997). It has 
not however disappeared. 
The mandates of the mission and the HCNM formed one component of international 
involvement in Macedonia. Stabilizing factors also came from other quarters. For 
example, attention to individual rights remained outside the mandate of the OSCE. 
This area of human rights was taken up by the UN Special Rapporteur for Human 
Rights in FYROM which enabled a law on the National Ombudsman to be passed in 
February 1997. This law established a state body designed to protect the 
constitutional and legal rights of citizens when violated by a state institution. 
Incorporated into the law were far reaching powers of redress (Human Rights Watch 
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1998). This now defunct UN office contributed to the continuing stability of 
Macedonia as did US special interest in the state. Since 1991 the US had contributed 
aid and expertise to Macedonia which was considered of key importance to the 
maintenance of stability in the Southern Balkans. 
What detracted from the OSCE's work in Macedonia was its involvement with the 
SAMs. Attempts were made to implement sanctions, but the difficulties in doing so 
meant that international efforts were less than effective. There also appeared at times 
to be a policy in operation of non-enforcement of sanctions in order to limit further 
damage to the Macedonian economy. Debilitating effects on the economy were, 
however, to increase ethnic tensions through high levels of unemployment and social 
dissatisfaction. 
New sources of instability like the failed banking schemes which emerged in 1997 
and the continuing conflict over Kosovo, which by 1998 had resulted in over 35,000 
refugees entering Macedonia, meant that the government has needed to maintain an 
accomodative policy towards the OSCE despite a desire to concentrate on developing 
closer links to NATO. With regard to future extensions of the mission, the interested 
public within Macedonia has questioned the need for this. The government and 
politicians, however, have generally wanted to see the mission remain for the 
immediate future. Reflecting its pro-European policy the government has been 
reluctant to openly criticize OSCE operations (Ackermann 1997 p10 and Ackermann 
Email 1997). It was also mindful of the political situation prevailing in the Balkans 
and the possible need for future assistance from international organizations like the 
OSCE. 
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Chapter Five: The OSCE and Nagorno-Karabakh 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the role of OSCE conflict management/resolution measures in 
an ongoing and often violent conflict centred on the disputed region of Nagorno- 
Karabakh in Azerbaijan. Here the OSCE has engaged in intelligence gathering, 
negotiation and dialogue. It has also put together proposals to organize and dispatch 
a peacekeeping mission to the region with the idea of separating the conflicting 
parties while developing a political settlement to the conflict. 
The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is of especial significance to the OSCE because 
here for the first time the responsibility for staging a peacekeeping mission has been 
put under the aegis of the organization. While much of the organization's work in 
Eastern Europe and the FSU after 1990 has involved developing and implementing a 
conflict prevention portfolio, the operation proposed for Nagorno-Karabakh if/when 
executed would provide evidence of the OSCE's ability to develop its capabilities 
beyond `softer' conflict prevention initiatives into the realm of `harder' conflict 
management measures which would require military support from external agencies 
such as NATO. 
The first part of this chapter briefly discusses the background to the conflict between 
the Armenians, the Karabakh Armenians and the Azeri government. The discussion 
then examines how the OSCE became involved in the region and the type of policies 
it has pursued. The analysis also considers aspects of geo-politics affecting the 
conflict and how external factors have impinged upon the proposed peacekeeping 
mission and the conflict resolution process. 
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Background to the conflict 
The dispute over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh is the oldest conflict in the former 
Soviet Union. Historically, Nagorno-Karabakh was considered part of Armenia from 
the 2d Century BC until the beginning of the 5thCentury AD. Armenians claim a 
long history within Nagorno-Karabakh which, while convincing, purposely 
`obscure(s) a parallel Muslim presence' (Goldenberg 1994 p157). Only once since 
the 5`' Century has Armenia briefly gained control over Nagorno-Karabakh. This 
occurred during 1921 when the region was assigned to Armenia by the new Soviet 
government. On Stalin's orders this decision was reversed on July 5"' 1921 and 
Nagorno-Karabakh became a region of Azerbaijan. Both parties assumed a historical 
right to sovereignty over the region and viewed Nagorno-Karabakh as the `cradle of 
their cultures' (Goldenberg 1994 p156). 
The current conflict focuses on the wish of the largely Armenian population of 
Nagomo-Karabakh to be granted independence from Azerbaijan and either to become 
an independent republic or to become part of a `greater' Armenian state. The 
Karabakh Armenians have claimed that just as Armenia and Azerbaijan had the right 
to secede from the Soviet Union in 1991, so Nagorno-Karabakh has the right to 
secede from Azerbaijan (Tchilingirian 1997 p42). Such views are opposed by the 
Azeris who maintain that Nagorno-Karabakh is a part of Azerbaijan and should 
remain so. The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh are opposed to living under Azeri 
jurisdiction because they claim to be victims of Azeri discrimination. Such claims 
have fueled secessionist demands. The Azeris attribute Armenian grievances to the 
rise of aggressive nationalist forces attempting to resurrect the idea of a `greater 
Armenia' and deny any legitimacy to claims of injustice. 
In the late Soviet period what had begun as a protest over discrimination against 
Armenians `descended rapidly into violence with little attempt at mediation in 
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between' (Goldenberg 1994 p154). The struggle for control over Nagorno-Karabakh 
intensified as the Soviet Union collapsed. Following declarations of independence 
by Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1991, the conflict was transformed from a domestic 
dispute to a conflict attracting international diplomacy. The conflict was also 
redefined, changing from one involving claims to self determination to one involving 
demands for outright secession (Adalian 1995 p327). 
Prior to the current conflict (which led to the expulsion of Azeris from the enclave) 
Armenians constituted 70% of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azeris 
30% (Azerbaijan Embassy Document, supplied 1998). Episodic violence occurred 
during the 1960s and 1970s but tensions were more openly expressed following 
Gorbachev's policy of glasnost. Moscow at this point imposed a special 
administration. This was a futile attempt at containment. Widespread violence 
ensued leading in 1988 to forced population transfers. For the Armenians this evoked 
historical memories of genocide committed against fellow Armenians by the Turks in 
1915-16 (Adalian 1995 p313). The violence escalated in 1990 leading to over 
200,000 Armenians vacating Baku. As tensions heightened during 1991 the 
Nagorno-Karabakh parliament declared the creation of the Nagomo-Karabakh 
Republic. The declaration of independence was not recognized by any other state 
including Armenia. The Azeris retaliated by announcing their intention to withdraw 
Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomous status and to impose a Turkish name upon the 
capital city Stepanakert. The Karabakh Armenians then held a referendum which 
resulted in overwhelming support for independence and the first parliament was 
elected. 
The conflict developed into full scale war during February 1992. This led to the 
displacement of over one million people on both sides (MacFarlane 1997 p34). 
Attempts by Russia and regional actors to broker agreements and secure a cease fire 
continually foundered. Between 1992 and the cease fire brokered by Russia during 
1994 most of the military objectives of the Karabakh Armenians were realized. Azeri 
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territory was captured forming the Lachin corridor, linking Armenia to Nagorno- 
Karabakh. This transformed the psychological link between Armenia and Nagorno- 
Karabakh into a physical reality (Goldenberg 1994 p168). The resolve to achieve 
secession by the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh was further strengthened by such 
territorial gains. Armenia in turn waged undeclared war against Azerbaijan. However 
Armenia's role as an aggressor remained unacknowledged internationally where the 
state was largely perceived as neutral to the conflict. This was despite Armenia 
legally considering Nagorno-Karabakh as part of its territory following the December 
1 1989 resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic 
and regardless of Armenia's political and military support for the Armenians of 
Nagorno-Karabakh (Cornell 1997). 
Establishing the Minsk Group 
Following the failure of a multitude of unilateral peace making initiatives which had 
been pursued by Russia, Iran, Turkey, Kazakhstan and Italy, the UN decided in late 
1992 that the OSCE would be a suitable body to devise conflict management and 
resolution measures for Nagorno-Karabakh (MacFarlane 1997 p34). At this time 
there had been concerns that the conflict could escalate. After an initial UN study of 
the conflict and in consideration of the rapidly expanding operations in other areas, 
the UN decided to involve the OSCE in order to remove any further burden from 
itself (Manas 1996 p124). Agreement reached between heads of states during the 
Budapest Summit of 1994 indicated that the political will to provide a multi-national 
peacekeeping force to Nagorno-Karabakh was present (Hoynck 1995 (b) pp150-151). 
Such willingness to prepare an OSCE peacekeeping operation may have been a 
reaction to the OSCE's failure to take decisive action in the Former Yugoslavia 
during 1991-1992. The organization needed to enhance its credibility. Such a 
proactive mood had yet to be dampened by a substantial international commitment to 
Bosnia and by the Russian invasion of Chechnya following Budapest. 
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As the UN was considered already too over burdened to undertake further 
peacekeeping responsibilities, the OSCE then became an obvious choice. However, 
the OSCE lacked a military capability. Deploying a peacekeeping mission under the 
aegis of NATO would have been unacceptable to Russia which remained opposed to 
granting NATO access to former Soviet republics. However, OSCE oversight of a 
peacekeeping mission combined with NATO military resources was an option 
considered after NATO agreed during 1992 to make resources available to the OSCE. 
The OSCE was also attractive because of the drawbacks of Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping operations. CIS peacekeeping is both 
`Russian inspired and dominated' and motivated by unilateral security interests. A 
CIS led force was opposed by Azerbaijan which was reluctant to allow Russian 
troops on its territory. Russian peacekeeping' had proven to be clearly distinct from 
international practice (Lynch 2000 (b) pp178-179). This may have been another 
factor contributing to Azeri aversion. Baku was, however, willing to accept OSCE 
led forces (Mihalka 1996 (a). Moscow meanwhile saw the benefits of sharing 
`political and material responsibility for peacekeeping operations with the UN and 
the OSCE. ' The situation also presented a means of curtailing independent Russian 
activity in the Caucasus. 
Russia suggested a multilateral peacekeeping force of which half the troops would 
be Russian and the entire force would be under Russian command. However, it was 
agreed at the 1993 Rome Council meeting that the deployment of third party military 
forces would have to be `consistent with CSCE principles and objectives. ' Along 
with Russia, Austria, the Baltic States, Croatia, Hungary, Norway, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom and Ukraine reportedly volunteered to supply peacekeeping forces. No 
decision was reached as to how a peacekeeping mission would be established or what 
percentage of staff and troops each country would supply (Manas 1996 pp124-125). 
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For the OSCE, the chance to prepare for a peacekeeping mission presented a number 
of opportunities. The OSCE could develop and then test its capabilities in conflict 
management, extend its mandate and enhance its prestige. It also meant there was an 
opportunity for the OSCE rather than the UN to take responsibility for peacekeeping 
in Europe. The UN would provide support to the OSCE in the form of providing a 
political mandate along with technical expertise (Hoynck 1995 (b) p152). Russia had 
undertaken `peacekeeping' operations in the CIS but `without a legitimizing 
international mandate' (Manas 1996 p124). The US, keen to develop mechanisms of 
control over Russian behaviour, pushed hard for an OSCE peacekeeping involvement 
in Nagorno-Karabakh. OSCE oversight of peacekeeping in Nagorno-Karabakh would 
enable Russia to participate in multilateral peacekeeping while being subject to the 
constraints of international censure. 
Prior to 1992, the idea of the OSCE leading a peace process had not been mooted. 
Following the break up of the Soviet Union and with the parties to the conflict having 
violated OSCE commitments, there was an opening for OSCE action. The OSCE had 
previously avoided involvement in what was perceived as an internal conflict. This 
situation was reviewed following Azerbaijan and Armenia's admission to the OSCE 
process at the Prague meeting of the OSCE Council on 30-31 January 1992 (Paye and 
Remacle 1995). A Rapporteur Mission to Armenia and Azerbaijan 12-18 February 
1992 `confronted the CSCE with the serious post-Soviet conflict in Nagorno- 
Karabakh' (Hoynck 1994 (b) p121). This led to calls by the CSO for an immediate 
cease fire and the implementation of an agreement reached between Russian, 
Armenian and Azeri Foreign Ministers. The CSO also called for the imposition of an 
arms embargo against the warring forces and subsequently succeeded in establishing 
safe corridors in order to deliver aid which also facilitated the exchange of hostages 
and the dead (Paye and Remacle 1995). 
OSCE involvement in the peace process was launched at the 8t' CSO meeting held on 
13-14 March 1992. This entry was not without complications. While the OSCE had 
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a mandate to operate in the CIS region, it was at the same time reliant on the support 
of Russia. Russia feared that the principal players in the region- the US, France and 
Turkey- would use the OSCE as a vehicle for penetration into the Caucasus (Baev 
1997 p37). Russian policy was characterized by ambivalence. While Russia courted 
international support, Moscow feared marginalization of its independent role in the 
conflict if the OSCE became heavily involved (Baev 1997 p26). Moscow's goals 
were `to obtain the legitimation and support of the OSCE for Russian peacekeeping 
operations' (Lynch 2000 (a) p104). 
Nevertheless, following the 8t' CSO meeting a second mission headed by Jan Kubis 
in the capacity of CIO of the CSO was dispatched to the region with Russian 
agreement. It became the `first short term mission to go beyond its mandate as an 
information gathering vehicle and call for long term CSCE intervention' (Hoynck 
1994 (b) p122). On 24"' March 1992 the CSO agreed, under US influence, that the 
OSCE `must play a major role in promoting a peace process relating to the conflict. ' 
Jiri Dientsbier was sent to the region to examine the possibilities for establishing a 
cease fire. The CIO was requested to convene a conference in Minsk to include the 
contributions of eleven of the OSCE's participating states - the direct parties of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, the host country Belarus, the then OCSE troika states of the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republics, Germany and Sweden. A number of other 
interested states, Italy, France, the Russian Federation, Turkey and the US were also 
included. This collection of states became known as the Minsk Group (OSCE 
Handbook 1999 p63). 
The formation of the Minsk Group represented an organizational innovation for the 
OSCE. It signified that the OSCE was officially in control of the mediation and 
resolution process and served to elevate the organization's status. This was further 
reinforced by the key OSCE players taking leading roles within the Minsk Group. 
Establishing the Minsk Group was an attempt to circumvent the cumbersome 
procedural processes of the OSCE in order to make it easier to achieve political 
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consensus over appropriate measures to address the conflict. Such a diplomatic 
innovation was consistent with developments within the OSCE during the early 1990s 
when previously untried and untested procedures, mechanisms and institutions were 
rapidly created. A mediating body was necessary that would represent Russian, 
Armenian and Azeri interests while adding external input into the proceedings. 
Other OSCE procedures that might have been applied to the conflict remained 
unused however. This may have been due to the time scale of OSCE institution 
building or to existing procedures being unsuitable. The scale of the conflict may 
have rendered the application of measures like the Moscow mechanism redundant. 
Other bodies were designed with conflict prevention and low intensity conflicts in 
mind and were therefore not suitable for consideration in this case. For example, the 
HCNM was not established until December 1992 while preparations to develop the 
Minsk process were underway during early 1992. The full scale military conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh was in any case beyond the scope of the HCNM's mandate as `an 
instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage. ' The Minsk Group, 
therefore, represented an initial attempt to go beyond conflict prevention measures 
into an intensely complicated conflict requiring a capacity for conflict management, 
mediation and resolution. Initially the Minsk Group's work was overseen by two co- 
chairs. These, in turn, received guidance from the CIO. However, by setting up the 
Minsk Group the OSCE had effectively delegated responsibility for the negotiation 
process to a collection of states who would be unable to remain neutral due to their 
interests in and links with the region. This meant that the process would be fraught 
with problems (Fuller 1992 cited in Adalian 1995 p330). This situation was not 
unavoidable. There were of, course, 55 participants of the OSCE process all 
supposedly concerned with upholding the values of the OSCE. Therefore, an 
alternative group of states could have arguably been delegated to take part in the 
Minsk process. 
102 
The Minsk Group was part of a process that would culminate in a formal peace 
conference. The aim of the proposed Minsk conference was to spearhead OSCE 
efforts in order to devise a political solution to the conflict (OSCE Handbook 1995 
p35). Despite OSCE efforts it has not (to date) been convened. 
OSCE states had derived experience of peacekeeping operations from collaborative 
involvement in UN operations. Previous UN operations were to be studied in order 
to avoid their shortcomings. It was decided to involve the UN and the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and to send a monitoring mission to the region 
once a cease fire had been reached. Such measures failed to prevent an escalation of 
the conflict as Armenian forces seized Shusha the last Azeri city in Nagorno- 
Karabakh along with territory forming the Lachin corridor in May 1992. During this 
period OSCE mediators unsuccessfully tried to enter the region. Attempts by the US 
to convene an emergency meeting of the Minsk Group were thwarted by Armenia 
following international condemnation of the extension of the conflict which further 
violated Azeri territorial integrity (Paye and Remacle 1995). For the remainder of 
1992 the OSCE achieved little in the way of success and the Minsk process remained 
in deadlock. 
Early attempts at mediation had resulted in stalemate because neither side was 
prepared to grant a major concession regarding the status and security of Nagorno- 
Karabakh (Mihalka 1996 (a). The main problem with developing a political 
settlement to the conflict was the perceived difficulty of reconciling the principles of 
self determination for the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian minority with the rights of 
the Azeris to maintain the territorial integrity of their state (MacFarlane 1997 p34). 
The right to self determination, however, did not have to mean outright secession and 
so adherence to both principles, (both enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act), still left 
room for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. 
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Despite the setbacks, there were benefits to early OSCE involvement. A forum had 
been provided within which the two sides could clarify their positions and this 
allowed the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to at times be unofficially represented. 
The existence of an international framework through which the possibilities for peace 
could be explored offered hope to the parties involved and enabled the opposing 
parties to meet to discuss their views (Adalian 1995 p330). The peace process, in 
effect, became institutionalized something which allowed efforts to resolve the 
conflict to be sustained rather than merely convened on an ad hoc basis. A 
breakthrough appeared to have been achieved when in mid 1993 the Karabakh leader 
Georgy Petrossian was removed from power leading to a more conciliatory stance on 
the part of the Karabakh Armenians. In June 1993 an OSCE peace plan was signed 
by Karen Baburyan. This collapsed following a renewed Karabakhi offensive 
(Webber 1996 p229). 
An initial Russian response was to oppose OSCE action on the grounds that the 
organization did not possess the experience necessary to competently handle a 
peacekeeping operation. Russian concerns were centred on reducing OSCE 
capabilities. Russian attempts to strengthen the OSCE in order to undermine NATO 
had meant that Russia had to give the OSCE an opportunity to prove its worth (Baev 
1997 p36). However, when such opportunities conflicted with Russian interests 
reasons were forwarded as to why the OSCE was not suitable to take action. 
The Russian position was one of opportunism (Rotfeld 1995 pp294-5). This served 
to further complicate the peace process. Russia attempted to manipulate OSCE 
policy to suit its domestic or foreign policy objectives. Moscow sought to subvert the 
influence of the OSCE and to marginalize the organization's role in the region, 
constantly seeking alternatives to OSCE involvement. Russia appeared reluctant to 
cede what it perceived as a loss of influence over Armenia and Azerbaijan and 
attempted to exert a form of hegemonic control over the two states. Moscow 
provided substantial military support and expertise to the Armenians after the then 
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Azeri President Albufez Elchibey refused to enter the CIS in 1992. Four months 
later the Azeri government was forced to resign and Azerbaijan entered the CIS. 
Despite international acceptance of the independence of the two states, Russia 
continued to regard Azeri affairs as part of Russian politics. Moscow also viewed 
OSCE actions as compromising its authority in the Caucasus but was forced to accept 
OSCE intervention because unilateral Russia involvement in Azerbaijan was 
unacceptable to the Azeris (Mihalka 1996 (a). 
However, when another breakthrough arrived in May 1994 in the form of a cease fire 
it was a result of Russian rather than OSCE efforts Nonetheless, the OSCE may have 
played an indirect role in helping to achieve this. Russian negotiations to secure the 
cease fire may have been intensified as a result of Moscow's wish to directly compete 
with the OSCE. If the OSCE had not become involved in Nagorno-Karabakh a 
constructive response by Moscow may not have been forthcoming. Following the 
cease fire, joint Russian and OSCE efforts intensified. Such cooperation did not, 
according to the Russian Ambassador to Nagorno-Karabakh Vladimir Kazimirov, 
allay mutual suspicions and competition as both Russia and the OSCE sought to 
dominate the resolution process (Baranovsky 1995 p254). Russia was ready at this 
point to deploy its own peace keeping forces under the aegis of the CIS in order to 
monitor the cease fire. Heads of observation posts would also be Russian. This was 
an attempt to thwart an earlier OSCE proposal that international observers would 
monitor both the activities of the peace keepers and the combatants. By the end of 
1994 the Azeris were calling for a larger OSCE role in the region resisting strongly 
Russian attempts to station military units in Azerbaijan (Allison 1994 p9, p50). 
Having successfully negotiated a cease fire, Moscow anticipated retaining a central 
role in negotiations. Russian success here was designed to demonstrate that its role 
and not that of the OSCE was vital to the successful resolution of the conflict 
(Hurlbert 1995 (b) p12; Baev 1997 p36). The mediation efforts of the Minsk Group 
were at this stage largely bypassed by Russia's more aggressive approach, which, in 
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turn, failed to yield worthwhile results (Fuller 1995 p63). Russia alleged OSCE 
interference in the conflict and considered the organization irrelevant to its 
settlement. Moscow's perceptions of the possible uses of the OSCE in Nagorno- 
Karabakh were subjugated to Russian interests in the region more widely (Hurlbert 
1995 (b) ppl2-13). 
As eluded to earlier, prior to the OSCE's Budapest Summit in 1994, Russia was 
anxious to prevent NATO's dominance in European security and proposed 
strengthening the OSCE as an alternative. OSCE heads of states did not give support 
to the Russian idea of strengthening the OSCE. They also rejected Russian proposals 
on third-party peacekeeping. Its support of the OSCE notwithstanding Moscow 
sought to prevent the OSCE taking a `leading role' in the FSU (Lynch 2000 (a) 
p112). Russia however, was then compelled to allow the OSCE a greater role in the 
peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow hoped that financial constraints and 
chaotic bureaucracy would thwart the peacekeeping operation. Russian objectives 
were eventually realized as the OSCE's attention and resources increasingly focused 
on Bosnia during 1995. However, a political settlement involving the deployment of 
CIS peacekeeping troops had eluded Russia because the Azeris were unwilling to 
allow Russian forces on to their territory. Baku was willing to accept OSCE peace 
keepers but expressed concern that a peacekeeping operation could freeze the 
situation on the ground. Among the Karabakh Armenians one of the barriers to 
compromise was the fear that as a non-state party their interests would not be 
protected by any agreement that fell short of outright independence from Azerbaijan 
(MacFarlane 1997 p35). The Karabakh Armenians were afraid that if they retreated 
from captured territory without securing credible international guarantees they would 
then be subject to retaliation (Hoynck 1995 (b) p151). 
Despite such problems, the Budapest Summit proved in some respects a turning 
point in trying to resolve the conflict and a number of important steps were taken 
(Baranovsky 1995 p254). Informal consent was given by 18 participating states in 
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response to an Italian initiative to enable a peacekeeping force to be dispatched to 
Nagorno-Karabakh. This failed to materialize due to OSCE insistence that a political 
settlement must be realized first (see below) (Fuller 1995 p63). Measures were 
outlined designed to placate Russia and to bring it firmly on board the Minsk process. 
For almost two years the Minsk Group had been undermined by a parallel Russian 
peace process (Chigas 1996 pp69-70). The OSCE agreed to merge its mediation 
efforts with Russia. Decisions were made regarding the Co-Chairs of the Minsk 
Group and the establishment of the High Level Planning Group (see below). 
Adopting Russia as one of the Co-Chairs was an attempt to coordinate and harmonize 
the work of the Minsk Group and that of Russia within the OSCE framework (Annual 
Report of the Secretary General 1995 on OSCE Activities p18). It also signified 
`recognition of Russia's prominent role in the peace process' (Baranovsky 1996 
p254). Within the Minsk Group both Western and Russian proposals agreed on the 
need to guarantee Azeri territorial integrity while ensuring that Nagorno-Karabakh 
achieved extensive autonomy (Lynch 2000 (a) pl 15). 
The decision to closely involve Russia in the role of a peacemaker sat uneasily along 
side the billion dollar levels of military support and aid Russia had provided to 
Armenia. However, Russia proved a fickle ally of Armenia. During November 1995, 
for example, the Russian government reputedly supported Baku's aims in the Minsk 
Group to regain Nagorno-Karabakh on the condition that the Azeris granted military 
basing rights to Moscow (Lachowski 1996 (b) p748; Manas 1996 p145). Moscow 
also offered concessions to the Azeris in an attempt to regain control of an early 
warning radar complex in Azerbaijan (Lachowski 1996 (b) p748). However, as 
Russia's relations with Georgia deteriorated Armenia became increasingly important 
to Moscow in the Transcaucasus (Lynch 2000 (b) p175). 
Nevertheless, when the US subsequently took up the role as a second permanent Co- 
Chair in 1997 its activities were equally questionable having provided substantial aid 
to Armenia while maintaining Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act which 
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prohibited direct US governmental assistance to Azerbaijan. The Clinton 
administration's subsequent attempts to remove the prohibition were thwarted by 
Congress (Danielyan 1999 a). France in turn would become the third Co-Chair in 
1997 (see below). It possessed a sizable Armenian diaspora population which led the 
Azeris to question French legitimacy in the peace process. 
Returning to earlier developments, the Minsk Group made some practical 
contributions to resolving the conflict. The Co-Chairs oversaw the signing of an 
accord on February 6 1995 which strengthened the cease fire. The Minsk Group 
established processes through which armed incidents could be settled. These proved 
nonetheless to be under utilized but were subsequently strengthened by additional 
measures (Kazimirov 1996 p82). In terms of diffusing tensions between the 
conflicting parties the Minsk Group with assistance from the International Committee 
of the Red Cross and Russia was able to secure the release of prisoners of war and 
hostages (Kazimirov 1996 pp81-2). This campaign was timed to coincide with the 
first anniversary of the cease fire. During 1995 a number of disengagement 
procedures were also agreed upon (Manas 1996 pp69-70). 
The work of the Co-Chairs also focused upon the psychological elements of conflict 
resolution. Attempting to exert influence over the conflicting parties, the mediators 
considered how to mould perceptions of the conflict and alter attitudes to the variety 
of ways in which the conflict could be resolved (MacFarlane 1997 p34). This also 
involved attempts to intensify the negotiation processes in order to bring differing 
positions closer together in order to realize a political settlement. A variety of 
diplomatic methods were used besides the rounds of negotiations and meetings that 
had taken place Visits to the region were undertaken to allow direct dialogue to take 
place between the Co-Chairs and the parties to the conflict (Kazimirov 1996 p83). 
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Preparations for peacekeeping 
At the CSO meeting of May 1 1992 the decision was taken to start preparations for 
the possible deployment of a peacekeeping mission (Hoynck 1994 (b) p122). 
Following this, on 9-10 July 1992 the Helsinki Summit took on the responsibility for 
crisis management by agreeing to organize the peacekeeping mission. The first 
planning group, the Advance Monitoring Group, convened in July 1992. In order to 
make logistical arrangements the Initial Operations Planning Group was established 
in May 1993 which was succeeded by the High Level Planning Group (HLPG) 
following the Budapest Summit 5-6 December 1994. From these groups, plans were 
formulated to construct an observer mission containing between 300-700 personnel. 
The planning involved close liaison with the Minsk Group. Visits were made to the 
conflict zones to gather information (Vilen et al., 1996). The HLPG was essentially a 
flexible concept adapting to the momentum of the negotiation process. The constant 
use of fact finding missions enabled its options to be revised. 
During 1995 the CIO appointed a Personal Representative to the conflict. His 
mandate was to achieve a political settlement to the conflict and assist with measures 
designed to maintain the cease fire (Annual Report 1995 on OSCE Activities p18). 
The role was of a facilitator developing confidence building and humanitarian 
measures. The High Representative gave assistance to, developed contacts between, 
and linked together the work of the CIO, the HLPG, the Co-Chairs of the Minsk 
Group, the conflicting parties along with international organizations like the UN. For 
the Personal Representative and his five assistants much of their time was taken up 
with monitoring the line of contact between the conflicting parties (OSCE-'The 
Conflict Dealt with by the Minsk Conference'). 
Before a peacekeeping operation could be dispatched to the region a number of 
stringent pre-conditions needed to be satisfied. Firstly a political agreement had to be 
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signed before any deployment could go ahead. There must have been a cessation of 
hostilities and a cease fire in place. The peacekeeping operation could only be 
launched with the consent and at the request of the conflicting parties. A UN 
resolution supporting the operation needed to be passed (Wilhelm Hoynck (the then 
Secretary General of the OSCE) 1995 (b) p152). Moreover, `the mission would last 
for a certain period of time only. ' The conflicting parties would be required to 
actively cooperate with the peacekeeping forces and be able to guarantee the safety of 
the OSCE troops (Tchilingirian cites Major-General Heikki Vilen head of the HLPG, 
1997 p43). This precondition questioned the whole concept of the peacekeeping 
mission. If conditions were to be so safe as to not endanger the lives of peacekeeping 
forces why would peacekeeping troops be required and what would they be expected 
to do? From the outset OSCE states were determined not to become engaged in 
protracted peacekeeping arrangements. The length of the peacekeeping operation 
was to be determined at the beginning and it would be terminated at the earliest 
possible stage. 
The stringent preconditions rendered a deployment near impossible. Such 
preconditions may have been so tightly formulated because governments may have 
calculated that there was little political capital to be gained from unfettered 
engagement in the conflict. There would not be public support for peacekeeping 
operations in such a remote region which would, in turn, put the lives of troops at 
risk. There was also the risk that if the conflict was ongoing, peacekeeping troops 
could inadvertently become another party to the conflict and subject to attack. There 
may have been a lack of urgency to resolve the conflict at this time with the war in 
Bosnia proving to be a more pressing concern. 
The most fundamental issue surrounding the proposed peacekeeping operation was 
concerned where the necessary military resources could come from. Although a 1992 
NATO decision had opened up the possibility of making military resources available 
to the OSCE it was not clear whether NATO would be prepared to make good on this 
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in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia was in any case likely to veto such a 
proposal rendering the possibility of NATO support unlikely. Other possible 
contenders like the already over committed UN or the WEU, operating out of area, 
were also unlikely to take up the challenge. 
Complications were likely to arise over what types of measures would be included in 
a peacekeeping operation. The role of the peace keepers was to separate the parties 
to the conflict while a peace agreement was being finalized and put into practice 
(MacFarlane 1997 p34), yet it appeared uncertain how that would be achieved given 
the limits of the mandate. Concerns were expressed that peace keeping troops could 
be over run. Problems were anticipated regarding the command and control 
structures of multi-national forces. For example major powers could object to their 
troops taking orders from smaller states. Small states in turn may wish to intervene 
in operations as was the case in previous UN missions to Somalia and Yugoslavia. 
Planning was delayed by differences between Russian and OSCE perspectives on 
constructing guidelines for third party forces (Manas 1996 p124). Preparations for 
the peacekeeping operation were completed in 1995 (OSCE Decisions 1995 
Reference Manual p2). 
Financing the proposed peacekeeping operation also appeared problematic. It would 
be difficult to raise the required finance from voluntary contributions of OSCE 
participants particularly in view of the estimated costs of the operation which could 
amount to ten times the annual budget (Vilen et al., 1996). Estimates for the number 
of troops required varied from 4,000 to 6,000. The potential costs for the first year 
were thought to be in the region of $300 million (Manas 1996 p124). To develop a 
peacekeeping capability within the OSCE would require a large injection of resources 
both financial and bureaucratic into the organization in order to effectively manage 
operations (Chigas 1996 p96 note 133). Generating broad support for sponsoring 
such an initiative could prove problematic. Whereas the proposed peacekeeping 
operation was of importance to some OSCE states this was not uniformly the case. 
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The peace process 1996-1998 
By 1996 US and Russian proposals for a peace settlement were largely in harmony. 
These included recognition of Azeri territorial integrity, extensive autonomy for 
Nagorno-Karabakh and a transport link via Lachin. In addition to its desire to gain 
access to Azeri oil fields, Russia was anxious to restore control over borders of the 
former Soviet Union. Moscow wanted to be able to patrol the border between 
Azerbaijan and Iran and gain firmer control over the anti-missile radar cited in 
Azerbaijan. The conflicting parties however remained unable to reach agreement on 
the status and security of Nagorno-Karabakh, along with the areas of Lachin, Shusha 
and on issues surrounding refugees. The Foreign Minister of Nagorno-Karabakh 
conceded that the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh no longer sought union with 
Armenia and implied that a confederation with Azerbaijan might be accepted 
(Mihalka 1996 (a). 
However, Russia continued to undermine the Minsk process, encouraging the 
Armenians to press for Russian peace keepers rather than accepting a force 
commanded by the OSCE. This led the US to accuse Russia of prolonging the 
conflict (Hoagland 1996 pA21). Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh could be perceived 
as `instruments of Russian policy aimed at retaining Moscow's control of the rich and 
strategically vital southern regions of the FSU' (Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 1998). 
However, the Karabakh Armenians were not necessarily pawns of the Russian 
government. The Nagorno-Karabakh leadership had repeatedly requested meetings 
with the Azeri government. This would have avoided the complicating influence of 
external states' interests. Azerbaijan agreed to hold direct talks with the leadership 
of Nagorno-Karabakh but only within the context of the Minsk Group. Direct 
negotiations were perceived by the Azeris as a prelude to the Karabakh leadership 
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seeking independent status for the region (Keesings Record of World Events October 
1997 p41878; Williams 1998 pA29). International mediators blamed the 
intransigence of the conflicting parties and the failure to accept compromise for the 
inability to resolve the conflict (Baleyev 1996 p42). The CIO remarked that the 
leaders of the parties needed to make a sober appraisal of the situation in order that 
negotiators could be more adequately instructed (OSCE Newsletter May 1996 p5). 
Later in 1996 at the OSCE's Lisbon Summit in December, the CIO put forward three 
principles that would form the basis of any settlement. These were accepted by all 
states except Armenia. OSCE states recognized Azeri territorial integrity They 
acknowledged that Nagorno-Karabakh should be allowed the highest level of 
autonomy and maintained that security guarantees should be given to the Armenian 
population of Azerbaijan. The Summit statement reflected support for the territorial 
integrity of Azerbaijan which meant that there was no support for Nagorno- 
Karabakh's independence or unification with Armenia. Armenia threatened to veto 
the Lisbon Document. The statement on Nagorno-Karabakh had to be issued 
separately as a statement of the CIO. Armenia was opposed to the statement arguing 
that it predetermined the status of Nagorno-Karabakh rather than allowing that 
decision to be taken by the Minsk Conference. Armenia attributed blame for the 
subsequent breakdown of negotiations to the Lisbon statement (Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 1998). 
During 1997 determined efforts were made to resolve the conflict. This included 
restructuring the Minsk Group. Prior to this there had been two co-chairs, one of 
which was Russia following decisions taken at the 1994 Budapest Summit. The 
other had been a rotating co-chair. It was agreed to create a troika to include the 
Azeri choice of a US representative and the OSCE proposal to include a French 
representative (as noted above). This decision served to revitalize the negotiation 
process. The injection of a fresh impetus into the negotiation process was important 
because the OSCE lacked power to resolve the conflict although it was likely to 
remain as the main forum for negotiations. The influence of Russia and the US 
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which found expression through the triumvirate chairmanship was considered the 
most viable way of encouraging the conflicting parties to arrive at compromise and 
agreement (Tchilingirian 1997 p43). 
By May 1997, the troika had devised a new set of proposals to resolve the conflict. 
This involved a phased approach whereby issues that could be resolved quickly were 
to be dealt with first and more problematic concerns were to be delayed. The plan 
involved Armenianwithdrawal from occupied territory, an end to the Azeri blockades 
of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, the right of refugees to return, international 
peace keepers to be deployed and negotiations to be held on the eventual status of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Shusha and Lachin (Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe 1998). The proposals gave Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous status within 
Azerbaijan and its own constitution but demanded that the enclave's armed forces be 
reduced. It called for Armenian forces to be withdrawn from five regions in 
Azerbaijan, Shusha and the Lachin corridor which could be policed by the OSCE. 
Nagorno-Karabakh would also become a free economic zone (Keesings News Digest 
for June 1997 p41710). 
Armenia objected strongly to a phased resolution of the conflict based on a structured 
timetable of events arguing `that withdrawal of Armenian forces would give Baku 
tangible benefits without ensuring Nagorno-Karabakh's security. ' Nonetheless, the 
Minsk Group appeared optimistic that a settlement could be achieved by the end of 
1997. On 21 September, the Minsk Group mooted the concept that a formal decision 
on Nagorno-Karabalh's status could be delayed until other issues had been resolved 
and continued to urge compromise. It reiterated that the OSCE would not accept 
independence for Nagorno.. Karabakh nor unification with Armenia (Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 1998). 
Following the Lisbon Summit the Minsk Group had applied pressure on the then 
Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian to support the Lisbon proposals. A 
breakthrough appeared to have been achieved when in the autumn of 1997 Ter- 
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Petrossian appeared ready to accept proposals for resolving the conflict. However, he 
informed the Minsk Group repeatedly that the Armenian people would not accept 
them. The proposals generated deep division both within the Armenian government 
and the public (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1998). 
Eventually, Ter-Petrossian was prepared to collaborate with the Minsk Group, 
however, the OSCE body did not equip him with the concessions he needed to enable 
widespread acceptance of the proposals within Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and 
to allow the Armenian leader to stay in power. A carefully orchestrated coup was 
hatched that led quietly to the overthrow and subsequent resignation of Ter- 
Petrossian who was succeeded by a Karabakh hard liner, Robert Kocharian, following 
elections in March 1998. The phased approach was indicative of a degree of 
flexibility in the peace process, nonetheless, this proved insufficient to maintain Ter- 
Petrossian in power. By the winter of 1997 the talks conducted through the Minsk 
Group were again deadlocked. This meant that the work of the Minsk Group came to 
a standstill and the likelihood of renewed violent conflict was greater than before 
Ter-Petrossian's departure (Goble 1998). 
Nagorno Karabakh's president, Arkady Ghukassian, was dismissive of Armenian 
attempts to broker a settlement, stating that `Armenia has not been authorized to 
settle the dispute on our behalf (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
1998). The leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh also considered that the Clinton 
Administration was favouring Azerbaijan in the resolution process perceiving the 
phased approach as `a symptom of oil diplomacy. ' The Karabakh president stated, 
'Azerbaijan has oil, but only we can contribute the necessary stability to give it value' 
(Williams 1998). However, any agreement was unlikely without the support of the 
Armenians. Nothing happened in Nagorno-Karabakh without the tacit agreement of 
the Armenians (Reiff 1997). The Armenian leader, Kocharian favoured adopting a 
package settlement rather than the phased solution grudgingly accepted by Ter- 
Petrossian (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1998). 
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During November 1998 the Minsk Group offered a new set of peace proposals to the 
conflicting parties with the idea of offering a face saving solution that was acceptable 
to all sides (Danielyan 1999 (b). The plan involved forming `a common state' 
between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh (Keesings Record of World Events 
November 1998 p42636). By the end of 1998 no consensus had been reached on 
outlining a basis for formal negotiations (OSCE- `The Conflict Dealt with by the 
Minsk Conference'). The Azeris refused to accept the new proposals because they 
threatened the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Instead Baku demanded a return to 
the plans it favoured, those put forward by the OSCE in 1997 which allowed 
Nagorno-Karabakh broad autonomy within Azerbaijan (Keesings Record of World 
Events November 1998 p42636). 
By the end of 1998 a settlement had continued to elude the Minsk Group. 
Differences displayed between representatives of participating states reduced the 
effectiveness of OSCE mediation. Earlier, the Azeri President, Aliev, maintained 
that Russia was attempting to bring negotiation processes back under its full control 
and sought to remove the US and the OSCE from participating in the resolution 
process. It was considered that a failure in the OSCE led peace talks would be to 
Russia's advantage. It would discredit international mediation and bring the 
negotiation processes under Russian control. Russia did not want a peace settlement 
that would bring stability to the region because this would create conditions 
favourable to Western economic expansion in the region. It would also remove 
Russia's ability to exert pressure on the Azeris with Moscow anxious to secure 
concessions from Baku on a number of issues (Balayev 1996 p42). Nevertheless, 
Azerbaijan was misguided to equate ensuring the West's economic interests with 
support for the Azeri position over Nagorno-Karabakh. `Economic projects have not 
led to any serious political dividends' for Azerbaijan but instead have led to increased 
tensions in relations between Baku and Moscow (Baleyev 1996 p42). 
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However, the increasingly independent role of the US within the Minsk Group 
ensured that intense negotiations continued. Washington developed a close 
relationship with Aliev in order to secure US rights to Caspian oil fields, thought to 
contain resources estimated at 4 trillion US dollars. This would give the US access to 
alternative energy sources rather than having to rely on Middle Eastern markets 
(Baker 1997 p12). Geo-politically, it would result in more American leverage over 
both regions and increase US chances of staving off fierce competition from other 
major regional players such as Russia, China, Iran, Turkey and France. Other 
reasons lay in a US fear of a potential Islamic regime in Azerbaijan which led 
Washington to firmly back Aliev's secular government. Although these factors 
increased the likelihood of a settlement they did not mean that a peace plan would be 
framed to advantage Azeri interests. Aliev was determined to secure his son as his 
successor. Such internal political battles appeared likely to affect the ways in which 
other fundamental Azeri interests were pursued. It appeared likely that the US would 
influence Azeri acceptance of any peace proposals and that the Azeris, anxious for a 
close relationship with the US, would settle to less than their full advantage. For 
Baku close alignment with the US would enhance stability within the state. It could 
enable inward investment into Azerbaijan to be generated, allow access to US 
markets, make a future peace settlement more viable and provide a powerful 
counterweight to threats posed by Russia. 
Conclusion 
The proposed peace keeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh is the most ambitious 
project that the OSCE has been charged with. The conflict in the region was 
inherently complicated and would have tested the capabilities of any organization. It 
was a brave attempt by the OSCE to operate independently from the UN and develop 
a European peacekeeping capability. The Minsk Group was in itself a unique 
structure designed to proffer an effective method of conflict resolution. It was 
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unfortunate or maybe inevitable given the enormous stakes arising from oil and 
strategic interests in the region, that the Minsk process became severely compromised 
through competing state interests. If conflict resolution measures applied through the 
Minsk Group or a similar forum are to succeed in the future this could demonstrate 
that Europe and the US have the ability to address its regional conflicts. It would also 
curtail the influence of external states, like Iran, which may offer support to a 
particular party in the conflict and challenge the interests of key OSCE participants. 
Towards the end of the 1990s the political climate between Russia and the West 
hardened making the implementation of a future peacekeeping operation look 
increasingly remote. OSCE resources were also extensively committed in the 
Balkans. The appeal of securing resources, commitment and extra-mural support for 
a peacekeeping operation to Nagorno-Karabakh had waned. Nagorno-Karabakh 
remained the only case of an OSCE proposal to organize a peacekeeping mission. 
The complexities over issues surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh made it evident that at 
this stage of the organization's development, coupled with its lack of a military 
capability, a peacekeeping mission was an overly ambitious target. This may be why 
similar proposals for OSCE peacekeeping measures in other areas of Europe have not 
been forthcoming. In addition, there was not an adequate amount of international 
confidence in the capabilities of the OSCE to give the organization the authority, 
legitimacy, support and resources it would need for such an undertaking. 
Nevertheless, the peace process continued apace. OSCE actions had been 
circumscribed by Russia's desire for hegemony in the region and the interests of 
major OSCE players. From 1997 the choice of the three Co-Chairs, US, Russia and 
France demonstrated that it was the interests of these states that would drive the 
peace process. The Minsk Group's involvement in the peace process had added an 
international dimension to the resolution process. While the Minsk Group 
encouraged negotiations to continue it also increased the number of parties to the 
conflict and multiplied the range of interests needing to be satisfied through an 
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eventual agreement. Internationalizing the conflict had led to a more complex 
situation although there appeared to be no alternative to this. In terms of advancing 
the peace process more progress had been made when the two parties circumvented 
the Minsk process and talked directly to each other (Sheets 1996 p33). Furthermore, 
the limitations of the OSCE as an organization of states meant that issues surrounding 
the non-state participation of the Karabakh Armenians in the negotiations were never 
satisfactorily addressed. 
The OSCE was unable to prevent the interests of the major powers in the region 
conflicting with the flow of the resolution process. The pursuit of such interests had 
been encouraged by the choice of the co-chairs and the participants of the Minsk 
Group. As an alternative to the contemporary composition of the Minsk Group it is 
not unrealistic to suggest that a number of OSCE states not directly interested in the 
conflict could have provided impartial mediation. That they did not is indicative of 
the fact that an alternative group of states would have lacked the necessary influence 
to exert leverage over the conflicting parties. The way in which the Minsk Group 
was composed gave support to the argument that it reflected the interests of its major 
participants. By late 1998 however, the US appeared to dominate proceedings, 
effectively sidelining the Minsk Group along with Russia. The case of Nagorno- 
Karabakh clearly illustrated that power interests were paramount in the resolution 
process and that the Minsk Group provided an arena for these to be pursued. If 
success was eventually attributed to the work of the organization it would result from 
the interests of the dominant state(s) being in tune with those of the parties to the 
conflict. The US had in effect supported both the conflicting parties- vital economic 
interests and the desire to support a US orientated regime were at stake in Azerbaijan. 
Its support for Armenia tended more towards an ideological identification with the 
state and a determination to uphold a `Christian' culture by offering political and 
economic support to a state surrounded by Islamic influences. 
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Where the OSCE was effective was in addressing the logistical components to 
peacekeeping and in providing channels for sustained dialogue. The Minsk Group 
remained intact throughout the undulating processes of negotiation and the numerous 
political crises afflicting the parties to the conflict. The Minsk process demonstrated 
that there was concerted international attention focused upon the conflict and that 
multilateral rather than unilateral negotiations would be expected. Russia alone was 
not going to be allowed to dictate the terms of any eventual agreement, nor to 
successfully manipulate the interests at stake or to frustrate attempts to secure a 
lasting peace settlement. The OSCE was not adept at exacting leverage over the 
conflicting parties and possessed no organizational instruments to achieve this. 
Concerns had also been raised over the organization's ability to secure adequate 
financial resources for the operation. However, US and European involvement in the 
Gulf War and Kosovo demonstrated that resources are always forthcoming where the 
stakes are raised and the political will present. Most fundamentally, the difficulties 
involved in attempting to resolve an ongoing conflict illustrate clearly the importance 
of developing and utilizing effective early warning systems and conflict prevention 
measures. 
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Chapter Six: The OSCE and Bosnia-Ilerzegovina 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an assessment of the OSCE's work in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
from the early 1990s until late 1998. The OSCE's mandate is divided into two 
distinct stages, 1991-1995 and the second stage from 1995-1998, which was 
delineated by the Dayton agreement. The first part of the chapter briefly discusses 
the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This provides an explanation of the 
complex circumstances into which the OSCE was called to act. The discussion then 
turns to examine the first stage of the OSCE's work in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 
light of the minimal role that the organization was able to play. The emphasis then 
turns to the Dayton agreement and aspects of OSCE involvement. Each of three 
areas of responsibility accorded to the OSCE are examined. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn offering an appraisal of the OSCE's work. 
The background to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
In order to operate effectively, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 
was dependent on consensus being reached between the six republics and two 
autonomous provinces that comprised the SFRY. During the 1980s as Yugoslavia 
slipped into economic crisis, the republics proved unable to act collectively to 
instigate necessary reforms and instead pursued regional interests. By the late 1980s 
Yugoslavia had become a dysfunctional state. The republics of Croatia and Slovenia 
no longer wished to subsidize or share their wealth with the poorer regions of 
Yugoslavia (Bookman 1994 p177). Austerity measures imposed by the IMF and 
World Bank increased animosity between the republics. By 1988 inflation ran at 
1200% (Thomas 1998). 
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Social tensions rose adding to a general air of desperation. As dissatisfaction 
heightened, the Serbian leader, Slobadan Milosevic, rose to power, propagating 
ethnic nationalism. His nationalist policies were matched by Franjo Tudjman, who 
rapidly rose to power in Croatia. Nationalism created a sense of community and 
purpose while providing scapegoats for economic and social problems. Initially, 
Milosevic had intended to take over SFRY `as part of a communist counter reform 
reaction. ' However, by 1989 Milosevic had `acquired an unchallengeable standing in 
Serbia' using both communist and nationalist rhetoric. His attempts to gain majority 
control of the federal government were thwarted by Slovenian and Croatian 
independence (Malcolm 1994 pp213-216). Following Slovenia's departure from the 
Federation in 1991 Milosevic's goals were revised. The emphasis was then placed on 
establishing a Greater Serbia (Thomas 1998). 
Prior to these events, during the Autumn of 1990 Western intelligence revealed that a 
break up of the Yugoslav Federation was about to occur which would result in 
horrendous levels of violence. Meetings held by both NATO and the then CSCE in 
November 1990, however, voted not to take any preventive action (Dyker and 
Vejvoda 1996 p164). Instead, `the West chose to ignore the danger signals when 
action would have been effective and less costly. As late as Autumn 1991 a 
preemptive Western presence in Bosnia would have been sufficient to maintain 
stability (Schopflin 1998 pp18-19). 
Slovenia and Croatia had been the first two of the Yugoslav republics to declare 
independence in June 1991. Germany immediately recognized the independence of 
the two states and offered inducements to ensure that other EU members did 
likewise. For Bosnia, recognition removed the `constitutional protection' it (had) 
`enjoyed for the territorial claims of the two regional imperia, Serbia and Croatia' 
(Dempsey 1998). A ten day war between Slovenia and the Serb controlled Yugoslav 
National Army (JNA) ensued which ended via EU mediation. 
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International recognition had occurred without first securing the rights of minorities 
living in Croatia (Slovenia possessed a largely homogeneous population). The US 
keen to see the collapse of the SFRY as the largest post Soviet socialist state gave 
covert support to right wing nationalist forces which in turn also received backing 
from Germany and Austria. Under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman capitalism was 
imposed in Croatia. Minorities were deprived of citizenship, employment and 
pension rights. Thousands of Serbs were expelled from Croatia while others were 
attacked or murdered (Petras and Vieux 1996 p14). As provocation increased, the 
Serbs of Croatia turned increasingly to Milosevic for military support. During July 
1991 war broke out between the Serbian led JNA and Croatia. A UN brokered cease 
fire was subsequently negotiated in January 1992. 
After the EU had recognized Slovenia and Croatia, this left three courses of action 
open to Bosnia all of which led to war. The first was that Bosnia could remain part 
of the rump Yugoslavia and be governed by Milosevic. This was unacceptable to 
both Muslims and Croats. The next option was to accept the division of Bosnia 
between Croatia and Serbia. This was proposed by Milosevic and Tudjman and was 
unacceptable to Muslims and to those Croats and Serbs who wanted to maintain a 
unified Yugoslavian state. The third option was the course taken, which was to apply 
for international recognition as a sovereign state. This proved unacceptable to the 
Serbs (Glenny 1993 pp143-144). 
On February 29- 1 March 1992 a referendum was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
determine public support for independence following the disintegration of the SFRY. 
The Serbs who comprised 32% of the population boycotted the referendum. 63% of 
eligible voters took part, of these 99.4% voted in favour of independence (Sonyel 
1994 p28). Not wanting to live under Muslim rule, the Bosnian Serbs on February 29 
1992 declared themselves part of a separate state within Bosnia. Following the 
declaration of independence by Bosnia, Serb attacks on the Muslims and Croatian 
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areas began in March 1992. The independent Bosnian state was recognized by the 
EU on April 6 1992 and by the US the following day. The US Secretary of State 
advanced the argument that international recognition would indicate that Bosnia had 
international protection and deter Serbian aggression. This was not to be the case. 
The low intensity conflict which had been simmering in Bosnia then imploded into 
full scale war (Woodward 1995 pp146-147). Serbia mobilized its minority 
population in Bosnia to take up arms and then invaded Bosnia. The Serbian war aims 
were to expel or exterminate the three million Muslims living in Bosnia in order to 
create a Greater Serbian state (Sonyel 1994 p28). The Bosnian Croats also wanted to 
merge areas of Bosnia with Croatia. The majority of the Muslims of Bosnia were 
determined to maintain a unified and multi-ethnic state (Dempsey 1998). 
The under armed and poorly organized Bosnian Army comprised small numbers of 
Serbs and Croats but mainly consisted of Muslims. The army was repeatedly 
defeated by the Serbs and Croatian militias. Both Serbs and Croats engaged in 
vicious campaigns of murder, destruction and rape designed to annihilate the 
Muslims. A UN arms embargo had been placed against Yugoslavia in September 
1991. Following the recognition of Bosnia the embargo was still applied as though 
nothing had changed. This was maintained by the insistence of the UN Security 
Council under pressure (from the pro-Serb regimes) of Britain and France (Bennett 
1995 p188). (Britain and France were determined not to see the development of a 
Muslim state within Europe). (Russia also gave widespread support to the Serbs). 
This was arguably the biggest contribution by the West to the destruction of Bosnia. 
The war may have been over within four months if the Bosnian government had been 
allowed to defend itself (Malcolm 1996 pp243-244). The ratio of Serb to Bosnian 
weapons had been 9: 1 (Lukic and Lynch 1996 pp246-247). The Bosnian army was 
reinforced through covert arms supplies, principally from Iran, Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia with the tacit agreement of the US. However, the Serbs maintained an 
overwhelming military advantage. The intense fighting in 1993 between Muslims 
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and Croats ended formally in August 1994 following the signing of the Washington 
Agreement. This created the precarious Muslim and Croat Federation of Bosnia. 
Anxious to stem the flow of refugees into Western Europe, six `safe areas' were 
established. The UN imposed a no fly zone over Bosnia to be enforced by NATO. 
These areas proved to be death traps and were subject to constant bombardment by 
Serbs. The Muslims of Bosnia would be guarded by UN forces whose mandate 
entitled them not to return fire if the Muslims were attacked but only if UN soldiers 
were shot upon (Malcolm 1994 p250). Selective NATO operations against Serb 
targets began in February 5 1994 after a mortar attack in Sarajevo killed 68 people. 
In July 1995 Serbs over ran the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa. This led to mass 
executions of thousands of Muslim men. It was not until August and September 1995 
that NATO launched air strikes to protect the remaining four safe areas (Thomas 
1998). However, a strong Croat and Bosnian-Croat offensive against the Bosnian 
Serbs in Western Bosnia and the Krajina proved to be the decisive factor that brought 
the Serbs to their knees (Corwin 1999 p233). On September 8 1995 the Foreign 
Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia agreed to a peace agreement, nominally preserving Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a complicated confederation. 
The causes of Bosnia's destruction resulted from Serbian strategic aims combined 
with ethnic nationalism that was virulently anti-Islamic. The policies pursued by 
Milosevic encouraged the systematic murder of Muslims. During the war more than 
150,000 people were brutally murdered and over two million were expelled from 
their homes (Malcolm 1994 p251-252). While atrocities were committed by all 
parties the Bosnian army's `actions were never characterized as systematically 
criminal' (Thomas 1998). Bosnia's destruction was also a result of `the 
misconception and fatal interference of the leaders of the West' (Malcom 1994 
p251). 
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The Dayton accords gave less advantage to the Muslims than under any of the other 
previously proposed peace plans. The failure of the US to encourage the Bosnian 
Muslims to accept any of the earlier proposals meant that by 1995 they occupied less 
territory in Bosnia losing land in Eastern Bosnia to the Serbs and land in the centre to 
the Croats (Owen 1995 p364). This put paid to the idea of US support for the 
Muslims of Bosnia (Guardian 1.1.97 p7). `At the cost of tens of thousands of lives, 
the US blocked European peace initiatives in order to safeguard its political 
leadership on the continent via NATO. ' The then US Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher stated, `there will be no peace agreement in Bosnia unless NATO and the 
United States, the United States in particular, take the lead in the implementation of a 
peace agreement' (Petras and Vieux 1996 p4). 
Dayton resulted partly from a need to profit from a successfully orchestrated peace 
process in order to service the domestic political needs of the Clinton administration. 
With a presidential election looming Clinton needed to demonstrate a coherent 
foreign policy. It was forecast that UNPROFOR would collapse following the 
hostage crisis, (when UN troops were captured by Bosnian Serbian forces during May 
1995), there also remained the possibility of a US troop deployment to rescue UN 
forces and considerable pressure was being exerted by Congress to ensure the lifting 
of the arms embargo (Daalder 2000 p163). 
Earlier in 1995, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, 
Richard Holbrooke, (who became the chief negotiator and architect of the Dayton 
accords) had stated that Bosnia represented `the greatest collective security failure of 
the West since the 1930s' (Holbrooke 1995 p40). Holbrooke acknowledged that the 
war could have been stopped with Western intervention in 1991-92 and that a better 
deal for the Bosnian Muslims could have been secured than what was eventually 
achieved at Dayton (Holbrooke 1998 (a). Resolving the conflict became crucial to 
`developing a new sense of purpose for the alliance' and restoring its credibility and 
that of the US. Dayton served to fulfill this goal (Daalder 2000 p188). In the talks 
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leading up to Dayton, the US made it clear that US assistance would end if Sarajevo 
were to scupper the negotiations (Holbrooke 1998 (b) pp273-4,282,288). Moreover, 
the US was clearly anxious to stem increasing Iranian influence in Bosnia and 
establish American hegemony in the region. Holbrooke angered at the performance of 
international organizations, particularly the UN, throughout the conflict over Bosnia, 
demanded unilateral US negotiations (Holbrooke 1998 (a). The US monopoly of the 
peace process was to enable American domination of the restructuring of Bosnia and 
oversight of a virtual international protectorate designed to engineer a political future 
for Bosnia reflecting American values (Petras and Vieux 1996 pp24-25). 
The early involvement of the OSCE in Bosnia 
In the pre-Dayton period, the OSCE role in Bosnia was negligible. Britain and France 
had dominated the course of international involvement through the UN and EU. Their 
containment approach had prevented a Western led military response to the crises and 
had enabled the Serbs to achieve their war aims (Loza 1996 p28). 
By the time war had broken out in Bosnia in 1992, the OSCE's role in the conflict 
was largely subordinate to the work of the WEU, EU, UN and NATO. In the early 
stages of the conflict, the OSCE proved unable to make any impact on the situation. 
This was a continuation of OSCE inactivity following the out break of war between 
the JNA and Slovenia and the conflict between the Serb and Croats during 1991. The 
OSCE's role was reduced to holding meetings, debates and passing resolutions 
(Rotfeld 1993 p173). Both the US and Russia had vetoed OSCE action on the 
grounds that the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia were internal matters (Dyker and 
Vejvoda 1996 p164). 
In addition, there was a variety of other reasons for the OSCE's inability to respond 
to the war in Bosnia. The OSCE was largely unprepared for such conflict and the 
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scale of the crisis overtook the organization. The conflicting interests of the 
participating states, as previously mentioned, hindered the development of collective 
responses and had contributed to the onset of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. 
During the early 1990s the OSCE was still largely designed to deal with inter-state 
conflict and lacked the institutional capacity to deal with inter-ethnic strife (Huber 
1993 p30). The Bosnian conflict was widely perceived as inter-ethnic war and so the 
OSCE was conveniently not considered an appropriate medium through which the 
situation could be addressed. However, the conflict could be perceived as containing 
elements of both inter-state and intra-state conflict with coterminous Serbian led 
attacks against the sovereign state of Bosnia and inter-ethnic conflict arising within 
Bosnia. Despite developing a range of instruments and mechanisms to deal with 
conflicts, at the time of the Yugoslav crises these were still being voted upon 
(Woodward 1995 p274). Most importantly, while the OSCE could monitor violations 
of its principles it did not possess mechanisms to enforce standards (Wheeler 1993 
p143). 
One instance of the inability of OSCE states to coordinate an effective response to an 
ongoing conflict was demonstrated in events that followed the OSCE's Rome 
Summit of 1991. In Rome, OSCE states had agreed to support the idea that the 
unanimity rule could be suspended where there was sufficient evidence of human 
rights violations. However, in July 1992 the participating states were unable to agree 
on the expulsion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), (Montenegro and 
Serbia), for violating core OSCE principles in the former Yugoslavia. This was due 
to the threat of a Russian veto. Instead it was agreed to suspend the FRY from 
inheriting the seat of the former Yugoslavia. A German proposal during 1991 that the 
OSCE should have the ability to place sanctions against states resisting intervention 
had fallen on deaf ears (Wheeler 1993 pp141 and 143). One consequence of the 
suspension was that during the war in Bosnia when dialogue with Belgrade was 
essential, contacts with Serbia had to take place on an ad hoc basis enabling the 
Serbian leadership to play off one set of negotiators against the other. By way of 
128 
reprisal, Belgrade suspended OSCE missions to Vojvodina, Sanjak and Kosova. This 
deprived the OSCE of accurate on the spot knowledge of human rights abuses 
perpetuated against Albanians and Hungarians (De Fraye 1997 p184). 
Throughout 1992 the OSCE had developed infrastructure in order to make flexible 
and more intrusive responses to conflicts possible (Huber 1993 p30). Where 
instruments existed they remained under utilized or unused due to the inability of 
OSCE participating states to achieve consensus on how such measures could be 
implemented. There was a reluctance to see existing or newly acquired instruments 
activated or further developed. For example, while the OSCE was given the right to 
monitor human rights behaviour of its participating states, governments were 
reluctant to allow the organizations enhanced powers `to enforce respect for human 
rights' on the grounds that such abilities could be used to legitimate `humanitarian 
intervention in their internal affairs in the future' (Wheeler 1993 p143). 
By 1994 the OSCE's role in Bosnia remained negligible. A small mission to 
Sarajevo was established during the year proffering a low key role. The mission was 
staffed by three expatriates who supported the work of the three ombudspersons 
assigned to Bosnia and cooperated with UNPROFOR (OSCE Annual Report 1994). 
Following the conclusion of the Dayton accords in 1995 the OSCE's work in Bosnia 
started in earnest. By then the political situation had changed from one of war to a 
precarious state of `peace' encouraged by the deployment of military contingents 
from NATO. The OSCE mandate expanded and was tailored to the reconstruction 
programme designed for Bosnia. 
The Dayton Accords 
The Dayton Accords gave the OSCE responsibility for implementing three aspects of 
the accords, human rights provisions, arms control and CSBM agreements along 
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with organizing and administering elections. These were areas in which the OSCE 
possessed varying levels of expertise and experience. Arms control and CSBMs 
apart, it is not altogether clear why the OSCE was chosen to administer these tasks 
rather than the UN which was already involved with civilian programmes in Bosnia. 
There was a low level of public awareness regarding the work conducted by the 
OSCE. It was unlikely from the outset that any organization could meet the 
unrealistic targets outlined at Dayton. The OSCE would not therefore, attract the 
same type of adverse publicity that a failing UN operation could generate. 
The OSCE did, however, possess certain advantages. Russian involvement within the 
OSCE and Dayton, was presented as important. Following NATO attacks on Serb 
positions within Bosnia which Russia had been unable to prevent and Moscow's 
marginalization from the Dayton negotiations, there was a need to avoid publicly 
humiliating the ailing state and to bolster the Western backed Yeltsin's prospects in 
the forthcoming Russian presidential elections (Parrish 1996 p22). Through 
participating in the OSCE, Russia could become involved in the civilian aspects of 
the mandate on an equal basis to Western states and could present itself as influential. 
The OSCE unlike the UN had an untarnished public image in the Balkans. In 
addition, because the OSCE was based only on political commitments it possessed 
more flexibility (Sica 1996). The involvement of both NATO and the OSCE was 
made necessary by the Pentagon's insistence that the military and civilian aspects of 
the Dayton Agreement would be separated. The US funded military operations while 
the EU assumed responsibility for economic reconstruction (Woodward 1996 p15). 
The Dayton accord was a peace plan which maintained the `contradiction of 
simultaneous division and unity. ' This was demonstrated when Bosnia became a 
state of two entities (Vukadinovic 1997 p19). Within the Dayton agreement there 
was the acknowledgment that Bosnia continued to exist while the division of the state 
into three ethnic entities confirmed the de facto situation which ethnic cleansing 
imposed on Bosnia (Siladzic 1996 p56). The agreement included a territorial 
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settlement which maintained the 51: 49% division between the two entities, the 
Muslim and Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska (Malcolm 1996 p268). 
While donor agencies attempted to reunite the country, three parallel processes of 
reconstruction and transition occurred, one in each zone. The Dayton Accords was a 
divisive policy legitimizing ethnic separation which had been designed and endorsed 
by Western governments. It also highlighted the inability of both the EU or the UN to 
resolve the conflict (Vukadinovic 1997 p21). 
The OSCE, for its part, was handed an impossible mandate given the contradictory 
nature of the peace agreement, the limited resources, and the realities on the ground. 
There were concerns that the OSCE was not up to the job. The OSCE was to 
administer its responsibilities under Dayton by restructuring its existing mission in 
Sarajevo. Following the Budapest Ministerial Council on December 8th 1995, an 
OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina was established. The head office in 
Sarajevo supported five regional centres and fielded delegations in 35 localities 
across Bosnia and Herzegovina. The US which had hammered out and forced 
through the Dayton accords assumed leadership. French protests over US leadership 
were overruled (Mihalka 1996 (b) p45). Robert Frowick was the first of a series of 
American ambassadors to head the mission. At full strength, the mission consisted of 
255 staff and had an annual budget of $25 million (Sica 1996). The mission was 
given a high level of resources in comparison to the OSCE's overall annual budget 
which stood at $33 million at this time. In 1996 this comprised 46.29% of the 
OSCE's budget (OSCE Handbook 1996 Annex XI). While this was a large amount 
for an OSCE mission it was minimal in relation to the demands of the mandate. 
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The Elections 
The Bosnia and Herzegovina General Elections September 141996 
It was stipulated in the Dayton accords that elections would be held between six to 
nine months after the agreement came into effect. The OSCE was to ensure that 
conditions were present to allow free and fair elections to take place. It was hoped 
these would take place in a politically neutral environment and that that the 
electorate could participate without fear or intimidation and be able to cast votes in 
secret. Freedom of expression, the media, association and movement was to be 
encouraged within the republic (The Dayton Peace Accords Annex 3 p25). In reality, 
the country was in turmoil, there were over two million refugees and hundreds of 
thousands of displaced people (OMRI Daily Digest January 19 1996). The 
subsequent elections were to achieve little other than to reward the perpetrators of 
war with governmental status and access to substantial amounts of international aid 
and assistance, in the ethnically pure enclaves within the Muslim and Croat 
Federation and the Republika Srpska that they had set out to create and would 
legitimately control. 
The OSCE undeterred by the chaotic conditions in Bosnia, allocated high levels of 
resources and deployed a large degree of political manipulation to ensure that 
elections proceeded. Both the general and municipal elections had been scheduled to 
take place in September 1996. Despite intense pressure from the US following the 
acknowledgment of a high level of irregularities, it was decided to postpone the 
municipal elections. These were staged instead in September 1997. In the run up to 
the September 1996 general elections, the OSCE established a fund of DM 7.5 
million to assist political parties and candidates with election advertising and 
expenses (OSCE Newsletter August 1996). Problems soon arose regarding the 
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distribution of money, with accusations that funds were being received by suspected 
war criminals and mafia (Marcus 1997). 
Unsurprisingly, the election campaign was dominated by the three parties who each 
represented the three main ethnic groups, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the 
Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (HDZ). Despite a virtual monopoly of the media by the three main 
parties, attempts were made by the OSCE mission to open up public access to 
information and assist with voter education. OSCE efforts were of limited success, 
they included a Free Elections Radio Network (FERN) which broadcast a national 
independent programme of election information (OSCE Newsletter July 1996 p7). 
Often such attempts were blocked. At one stage Serb authorities banned broadcasts 
from the Lisina transmitter (OMRI Daily Digest August 16 1996). 
The rules and regulations that the OSCE had developed failed to prevent systematic 
violations of the electoral code in government controlled media. In Croat and Serb 
controlled regions the authorities monopolized the media and few independent 
sources existed. The state controlled media was used by authorities to smear their 
opponents, to disseminate secessionist messages and to pursue their own agendas. 
Media access for opposition parties was effectively blocked through the imposition of 
excessive access fees. In the Muslim and Croat Federation problems existed but were 
less severe. FERN broadcasts were received throughout the country and made a 
positive impact. Where abuses were reported the OSCE Media Experts Commission 
had the power to impose fines but routinely failed to react to many of the violations 
or instead issued only warnings (Borchgrevink et al., 1996). 
The OSCE established an Elections Appeals Sub-commission (EASC) to deal with 
complaints, which proved to be ineffective. 64% of complaints were dismissed or 
denied by the EASC. Such complaints related to the election campaign and violence 
involved within it or registration related problems. Where the EASC did take action 
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this had little effect on the parties concerned. Voters were free to register their vote 
in any municipality, either where they were living, had previously lived or may 
choose to live in the future. Evidence emerged which revealed that tens of thousands 
of Serbs refugees had been manipulated by the Bosnian Serb authorities. The SDS in 
Doboj, Republika Srpska were found guilty of denying humanitarian aid to refugees 
unless they agreed to vote in their new settlements. This was in order to cement 
territorial gains by orchestrating a Serb majority in formerly Muslim areas (Keesings 
Record of World Events August 1996 p41237). A public apology was demanded and 
a $25,000 fine levied against the SDS (OMRI Daily Digest 16 August 1996). The 
fine was not money that the SDS had to pay out to the OSCE but money that was with 
held by the OSCE to the SDS and so it was not a strong deterrent to discourage future 
violations (Paul 1996). Widespread registration irregularities were also carried out by 
the Bosnian Croats (George 1996). 
OSCE officials themselves doubted whether conditions would allow the 1996 general 
elections to go ahead. On August 14 the CIO reportedly expressed serious doubts 
regarding how free and fair the elections could be expected to be. The CIO had 
earlier stated that he would not give his automatic approval to the outcome of the 
elections unless he could be certain that the `concepts of free, fair and democratic 
retain their meanings. ' The CIO was particularly concerned over ever increasing 
levels of intimidation and discrimination including attempts to create ethnically pure 
states, problems over freedom of movement and the return of refugees (OMRI Daily 
Digest Augustl6 1996 and June 5 1996). Since the Dayton accords the population of 
displaced persons had grown by 90,000. The continued expulsions and eviction of 
minorities meant that it was unlikely that there would be many minority communities 
left, making the possibilities for repatriation increasingly remote (Paul 1996). 
The ICG recommended that the September 1996 General elections should be 
postponed because of the problems mentioned above. In response Frowick 
maintained that the elections must go ahead. Instead of postponing the elections he 
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decided to issue warnings over possible courses of OSCE action should these 
problems fail to be addressed (OMRI Daily Digest August 20 1996). It was however 
apparent months before the elections were due to be staged that the minimum 
conditions to allow free and fair elections to take place would not be reached by 
September 1996 (Anderson 1996). 
The OSCE's own assessment of the electoral climate reportedly changed from stating 
that conditions must be `free and fair' to `reasonably democratic' to `reasonably 
democratic Balkan style' (Paul 1996). Despite the cautious language of the OSCE's 
Coordinator for International Monitoring (CIM), he did actually admit that the 
elections took place in conditions that were in some cases below the minimum 
standards of the OSCE Copenhagen commitments and that there were problems with 
registration, the media, the electoral campaign and freedom of movement. Where 
problems were noted they were not considered serious enough to compromise the 
election results (Second Statement of the CIM plin The OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Reports 1996). 
An ICG report accused the OSCE of an upward revision of the electoral figures in 
order to record a more plausible turnout. The ICG argued that once the figures had 
been adjusted to account for spoilt ballot papers and refugees who were eligible but 
did not vote the figures among Serbs was 98.5% and amongst Muslims 103.1% (cited 
in Keesings Records of World Events September 1996 pp41279-41280). The OSCE 
subsequently `revised' its estimate of the Bosnian electorate. Western officials 
considered that 200,000 ballots had been cast fraudulently and that Alija 
Izetbegovic's victory had been secured by fraud (Independent 25.9.96). In response 
an OSCE legal tribunal recommended a recount but this was refused by a panel of 
OSCE senior officials and representatives of Bosnia's three main ethnic groups. 
Frowick stated that `possible mistakes' did not make any significant difference to the 
outcome and he confirmed the validity of the elections result (Keesings September 
1996 pp41279-41280). Critics accused the OSCE of succumbing to US pressure in 
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order that the US could claim that the implementation of the Dayton accords was on 
schedule (OMRI Daily Digest September 30 1996). 
The Bosnia and Herzegovina Municipal Elections September 13-14`h 1997 
Prior to the municipal elections, the CIO stated that their purpose was `to achieve 
new structures of authority in municipalities around the country' (Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs March 6 1997). The idea was to reverse some of the gains secured 
through ethnic cleansing by allowing people who had resided in the municipalities in 
1991 to vote for councillors who would represent their interests. It was the most 
extensive operation undertaken by the OSCE (Hockstader 1997 (a) pA20). The 
OSCE was to oversee elections in 135 municipalities and one city council. This was 
a complicated operation from a logistical perspective involving screening the names 
of around 20,000 electoral candidates. In under eight weeks 2.4 million voters had 
been registered. 
Again the pre-election period was marred by serious problems and attempts at 
fraudulent registration were rife. For example, OSCE officials were forced to close 
registration centres and order the re-registration of voters because of fraud involving 
the Bosnian Serb authorities in Brcko (Keesings Record of World Events June 1997 
p41704). Although the rules and regulations had been revised in light of the problems 
experienced in the 1996 general elections, organized campaigns designed to 
intimidate voters were disclosed. 
The integrity of the OSCE was frequently compromised. At one stage the SDS was 
decertified from standing in the elections in Pale. Despite the grounds for the 
decision being in line with the Dayton provisions, Frowick over turned the decision 
after receiving support from the US and the Contact Group. Frowick stated ' you 
can't expect free and fair elections. We try to make it as democratic as we can' 
(Hockstader 1997 (b) pA18). However, Frowick had feared for the safety of Western 
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election observers including 200 Americans after news that the Pale Serbs were 
preparing to attack them. This led to questions as to what the NATO led 
peacekeeping forces were doing in Bosnia if the OSCE could be forced to retract 
legitimate decisions (Hill 1997) due to fears over their personnel. ODIIIIR issued 
muted criticism of Frowick's decision on the grounds that it set a bad example 
(OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Reports- Bosnia and Herzegovina Municipal 
Elections 13-14 September 1997 p7). 
Throughout the election campaigns extreme propaganda and hate campaigns were 
rife. Working with the Office of the High Representative, the OSCE's Media Expert's 
Commission adopted measures designed to refocus the media. The Pentagon made 
aircraft available to jam anti-Western broadcasts transmitted by Bosnian Serbs 
(Hockstader 1997 (a) pA20). NATO considered sending an additional 3000 troops to 
enable the elections to go ahead (Keesings Record of World Events May 1997 
p41655). The considerable SFOR presence still required two years after Dayton, at 
and on route to polling stations illustrated the fragility of the peace process. The 
OSCE considered that the parties were manipulating the election processes as a 
method of continuing the conflict by other means (OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Reports- Bosnia and Herzegovina Municipal Elections 13-14 September 
1997 Assessment issued by Javier Ruperez p2). 
Up until the eleventh hour it was uncertain that the elections would go ahead. The 
HDZ urged its supporters to boycott the elections on the grounds that conditions were 
not present for free and fair elections to take place. A power struggle within the SDS 
also threatened to scupper its participation. The SDS decided to participate after 
Serb radio reported that the OSCE agreed not to organize the arrest of indicted war 
criminals at polling stations. The HDZ participated after intense diplomatic pressure 
had been exerted on Franjo Tudjman by Western diplomats (Keesings Record of 
World Events September 1997 p41833). 
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It was a major achievement that the elections took place without violence. The 
OSCE acknowledged that the elections were still a long way from complying with 
acceptable international standards and OSCE commitments (OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Reports-Bosnia and Herzegovina Municipal Elections 13-14 September 
1997 Assessment issued by Javier Ruperez p4). The outcome of the elections 
appeared to once again confirm and reinforce ethnic separation with voting 
conducted along sectarian lines. Stability depended on a continued international 
military presence rather than developing democratic regimes. 
82 parties had contested the elections along with 9 coalitions and 159 independent 
candidates. In the Muslim and Croat Federation the real power lay in the hands of the 
governors of the cantons who had been elected the previous year. During the 
elections thousands of people returned to the towns that they had resided in 1991 to 
cast votes and tens of thousands cast absentee ballots for councils in their former 
home towns (Hockstader 1997 (a) pA20). The voter turn out was 60% and of those, 
90% had cast votes for officials in areas that they had resided in before the war 
(Keesings Record of World Events September 1997 p41833). The SDA and its 
coalition partners gained control of Srbrenica. This was a clear victory for OSCE 
policy (as previously mentioned) that was designed to counteract the effects of ethnic 
cleansing (Keesings Record of World Events October 1997 p41874). The problem 
for the OSCE was that if the organization was successful in reversing some of the 
gains achieved through ethnic cleansing how could the results then be implemented if 
they proved unpopular given the reluctance of NATO leaders to become involved in 
internal political battles in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hockstader: 1997(a) pA20). For 
example, how could elected officials belonging to one ethnic group be installed in 
territory controlled by another if NATO was unwilling to guarantee their safety? 
OSCE interventions continued after the elections to monitor the conditions under 
which the municipal councils were created. Work continued to ensure that political 
parties adhered to the rules and regulations governing final certification of the 
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election results. OSCE officers were forced to mediate, to issue threats to parties and 
to decide on the political positions that majority parties would have to give to 
minority parties (ICG Report-Is Dayton Failing? 1999). The Bonn Conference in 
December 1997 ruled that municipalities failing to comply with regulations for the 
implementation of the elections results would be subject to final and binding 
arbitration by the OSCE Head of Mission and the High Representative (OSCE 
Newsletter January 1998). The OSCE also attempted to counteract some of the 
problems apparent in the elections by revising rules and regulations and devising 
new measures to strengthen political processes. 
Elections to the Republika Srpska People's Assembly November 22-231997 
Elections were held after the Assembly was dissolved in July 1997 by President 
Biljana Plavsic following allegations of corrupt practices by SDS members. However, 
the Assembly refused to be dissolved and continued to meet which led to a 
constitutional crisis. Despite lacking a mandate under Dayton, the OSCE became 
`openly involved in the internal politics of Republika Srpska' and actively supported 
Plavsic (Corwin 1999 p240). The OSCE organized elections were designed to break 
the deadlock between Plavsic and her hard line nationalist rivals led by the former 
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. There were no reports of major incidents 
(Keesings Record of World Events November 1997 p41933). The election returned a 
pro-Dayton government with both Croat and Muslim Bosnian representatives while 
hard line nationalists lost their parliamentary majority (US Department of State: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997). The 
People's Assembly elected a pro-Western moderate Milorad Dodik as the new Prime 
Minister of Republika Srpska on January 18 1998 (Keesings Record of World Events 
January 1998 p42023). This was hailed as a victory for OSCE policy. However, 
Dodik's election was thought to have been engineered through the involvement of the 
High Representative of the Peace Implementation Council (Dempsey 1998). 
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The Bosnia and Herzegovina General Elections 12-13 September 1998 
The optimism displayed following Dodik's election in November 1997 quickly 
evaporated following the election of a hard line Bosnian Serb, Nikola Poplasen to the 
office of President in the 1998 General Elections. Open Western support for Biljana 
Plavsic was thought to have been a factor in Poplasen's victory (ICG Report- Is 
Dayton Failing? ). Two weeks prior to the elections on a visit to Republika Srpska, 
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright highlighted the economic benefits that 
Bosnian Serbs could expect to receive if they voted Washington's way. The OSCE 
reacted to the likely victory of Poplasen by delaying the release of early results. Nine 
of Poplasen's allies running for the Bosnian parliament were disqualified for 
violating election rules. Western officials also considered the possibility of 
abandoning the election results (Dempsey 1998). Momcilo Krajisnik a Serb hard 
liner was defeated in the contest for the Serbian seat of the collective Bosnian 
presidency to a moderate. However, a hard line Croat replaced a more moderate 
Croat leader at the executive level. The SDA leader, Alija Izetbegovic, retained his 
position on the collective Presidency receiving the largest number of votes (Keesings 
Record of World Events September 1998 p42521). However this situation would be 
challenged by the OSCE. 
OSCE Ambassador Robert Barry maintained that there had been a continual erosion 
of general support for nationalist politicians at the legislative level. Barry considered 
that in comparison to the 1996 general elections, nationalist parties had fared less 
well (Keesings Record of World Events September 1998 p42521). Of the four sets of 
elections since 1996, the 1998 elections had `slightly reduced the power of the ruling 
nationalist parties. ' Following the 1998 general elections, attempts to institute multi- 
ethnic administrations became farcical in most of Bosnia and Herzegovina's 
municipalities. Ethnic minority politicians held positions where they were sidelined 
and isolated from decision making. They were `there because the OSCE put them 
140 
there. As soon as the international community turns its back they will be removed' 
(ICG Report- Is Dayton failing? 1999). 
The conduct of the 1998 general elections was widely reported as satisfactory. 
Turnout was 78% and there were no reports of violence. Nevertheless, administrative 
problems hampered the elections. There were massive errors in voter lists. In one 
municipality, Doboj, over 3000 people were disenfranchised. During 1998 it had 
become apparent that the OSCE was not operating as an impartial referee, which had 
been envisioned by Dayton and was actively involved in trying to unseat nationalist 
parties from the three ethnic groups. At an OSCE Democratization Branch Seminar 
in Teslic in October 1998 the circulation of an OSCE internal document revealed 
strategies which involved building up the Social Democratic Party, in order to defeat 
the SDA at all electoral levels (ICG Report-Is Dayton Failing? 1999). 
Human Rights 
Annex 6 of the Dayton Agreement provided the framework for human rights 
provisions to be developed within Bosnia. The OSCE established a Commission on 
Human Rights and appointed a international Human Rights Ombudsperson who 
would report to an OSCE Human Rights Chamber where allegations of human rights 
violations could be addressed (Mihalka 1996 (b) p45). Such work was supported by 
the HCNM and ODIHR. The Ombudsperson had wide powers of investigation and 
could issue conclusions. Parties found to violate human rights would be required to 
produce a written explanation as to how they would comply with the conclusions. 
However, after issuing a number of binding decisions, authorities in all entities often 
failed to cooperate with the Human Rights Ombudsperson. In some cases this led to 
the Peace Implementation Council's High Representative imposing binding decisions 
(Amnesty International USA Annual Report 1999). 
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The forty staff of the OSCE implemented a democratization strategy which included 
a major programme devised to monitor and report on human rights. This involved 
intervention on behalf of individuals in order to end patterns of abuse. Measures 
were also designed to develop unity between the two entities, work with youth 
groups, support voter education and elections at the grass root level. Concerns were 
voiced from the start over the small scale of the human rights monitoring mission, 
the inexperience of many OSCE staff and their lack of human rights training. Despite 
such problems, the OSCE was the only international organization to possess a 
number of `specifically designated human rights field monitors. ' Nonetheless, while 
professional reports were produced, inadequate numbers of OSCE staff meant that 
only a limited snapshot of the human rights situation could be described. Human 
rights were implemented sluggishly. Violations continued. Minorities were subject to 
deaths in police custody, beatings, arrests, detentions, bombing and grenade attacks. 
People were dismissed from jobs, denied health care, refused ID documents and 
illegally evicted from their homes (Paul 1996). A lack of resources prevented the 
OSCE from involvement in time consuming cases such as forced evictions. 
While the OSCE was not responsible for returning refugees, it had a degree of 
responsibility for creating conditions allowing refugees to return to their homes. By 
the end of 1997 of the 2.3 million people displaced from their homes and the 
additional 80 000 displaced since the end of the war only 381 000 had returned home 
and only 22 500 returned to areas where the army of their ethnic group did not control 
the territory (Sharp 1998 p27). During 1998 the General Accounting Office recorded 
that ethnic violence in Bosnia had increased significantly. The previous 18 months 
had seen numerous bomb attacks, shootings and intimidation (Dempsey 1998). The 
scale of the problems involved, hampered OSCE attempts to create conditions 
conducive to the return of refugees. As the OSCE continued to extend its human 
rights mechanisms already limited resources became increasingly thinly spread and 
depleted. 
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Guaranteeing human rights was widely considered to be the best way of creating 
security within a state. However, the limitations of Annex 6 of the Dayton accords 
meant that the human rights component was similar to agreements for countries not at 
war and did not taken into account the unstable situation in Bosnia. The parties were 
not concerned by the penalties for infringing the agreement (Fournier at al 1996). 
The OSCE could set but not enforce standards. The emphasis placed upon improving 
human rights was swiftly subsumed within the structure of the OSCE's election 
responsibilities. This led to a concentration on elections to the detriment of other 
important human rights issues (OHR Document: Implementation of the Human 
Rights Provisions of the Peace Agreement, Mid-Term Review Conference, Florence, 
June 13 1996). The OSCE had little know how `in the operational dimension of 
human rights' (Sica 1996). 
While the OSCE's work was hampered by a lack of resources human rights were 
further eroded in both entities partly by the elected authorities who exacerbated 
ethnic divisions and were directly or indirectly involved in perpetuating human rights 
violations. The OSCE's mandate was further compromised by the restricted practices 
of international organizations supporting the work of the organization. Here for 
example, NATO wary of `mission creep' interpreted its mandate in a restricted way 
despite being given far reaching powers at Dayton. The NATO commander's powers 
were similar to those of a military governor (Mihalka 1996 (b) p44). Despite this, 
NATO's military capabilities were not used to `enforce the civilian provisions of the 
treaty. ' This resulted in refugees being unable to return home to areas controlled by 
different ethnic groups (Moore 1996 p5). 
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Arms Control and CSBMs 
The OSCE's oversight of the negotiations and implementation of measures to control 
armaments and develop CSBMs were the most successful aspect of the Dayton 
accords that the organization administered. The OSCE possessed considerable 
experience in these areas. Nevertheless, it was the first time that the OSCE had been 
called upon to assist with the restoration of cordial relations between former warring 
parties (Fournier et al 1996). In this regard, three sets of negotiations emerged from 
Dayton. The parties were to reach agreement on CSBMs, arms and military 
limitations and sub-regional arms control agreements under the auspices of the FSC 
(Sica 1996). The underlying idea was to create parity between the three parties and 
prevent the onset of an arms race in the Balkans. This would also involve the US 
designed Equip and Train programme aimed at integrating the Muslims of Bosnia 
and the Bosnian Croat forces into a single unit. The promise of an Equip and Train 
programme had been offered to the Bosnian Muslims as an inducement to sign the 
Dayton accords. It was also a means of forcing the Bosnian government to sever its 
links with Iran, expel Mujahadin and to curtail the state's Islamic connections. 
Izetbegovic acquiesced, with both military and economic aid resting on meeting these 
conditions (Daalder 2000 p151). 
Despite the Equip and Train programme Muslim and Croat armies continued to 
operate separately. A 2: 1 ratio was agreed for the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. A sub-regional military balance would be 
created between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Federation and 
Croatia on a 5: 2: 2 ratio. The ratio was set by the OSCE because the parties could not 
agree on limits (Prienda 1997 p10). The major drawback with the agreements was 
that they did not cover light weaponry with which the wars had been fought. 
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The Agreement on Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was concluded in Vienna on January 26 1996. It was modeled on the 
1994 Vienna Document and took some of its provisions from the 1990 CFE Treaty 
(Lachowski 1998 p536). However, additional restrictions and restraining measures 
were included. This agreement was significant because it was the first time that 
warring parties had moved from war to arms control within a matter of weeks 
(Gyarmati cited in Fournier et al., 1996). The agreement was designed to increase 
confidence between the parties in order to `reduce the risk of conflict' (Lachowski 
1998 p536). This included measures facilitating the exchange information on 
weapons stockpiles and manufacturing capabilities, `risk reduction mechanisms and 
cooperation and notification and observation of, and constraints on, certain types of 
military activities' (Lachowski 1996 (a) p736). 
In order to implement the agreement, the OSCE's new mechanisms included Military 
Liaison Missions (MLMs) and the prevention of imported arms until the arms control 
reduction talks had established limits. The MLMs enabled the de facto creation of 
`the first continuously functioning trans-entity military structure in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina' (OSCE Fact Sheet on the Achievements of the Office for Regional 
Stabilization 1997). However, it was not until June 1998 that the MLMs were created 
and then these did not function properly. The armies were reluctant to cooperate and 
preferred to rely on the OSCE to take responsibility. In addition there was no 
parliamentary oversight of the army (ICG Report 1999). Nevertheless, the OSCE 
established a number of bodies through which talks could be conducted, ambiguities 
ironed out and compliance overseen. The agreement was important because of the 
large multilateral peace enforcement operation available to support it (Fournier et al., 
1996). 
Despite several loopholes within the agreement, - for example, there were no 
provisions to prevent the introduction of new foreign forces and a lack of restrictions 
on international training programmes (Lachowski 1996 (a) p737) - the progress of the 
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CSBM agreement proceeded remarkably well. This was despite the lack of OSCE 
leverage to ensure compliance. During the first two years, problems emerged with 
implementing the agreement which were of minor rather than major significance. 
For example, the Republika Srpska notified two activities which lay outside the 
parameters of the agreement. These were subsequently scaled down. Some success 
was noted when `synergy developed between CSBMs and the regional arms control 
process' and a number of voluntary measures was conducted. The OSCE had worked 
to strengthen the agreement by facilitating measures designed to promote cooperation 
between the parties. For example, voluntary meetings were held between officers of 
the two entities under OSCE auspices that further developed confidence building 
measures (Lachowski 1998 p537). 
Arms Control 
Turning to arms control, the Florence Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control of 
14 June 1996 detailed numerical ceilings for five categories of heavy military 
hardware. The signatories were Bosnia and Herzegovina (which included the two 
entities of the Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation), Croatia and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The first phase of the reductions was concluded by 
December 31 1996. During 1997 there was some confusion over the amount of 
weaponry held and uncertainty over what should have been destroyed. Although the 
OSCE had carried out systematic evaluations, NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) 
who were assisting OSCE operations, relied on random checks. The parties hurled 
accusations at each other of under-reporting, concealment, abusing exemptions, not 
reporting equipment from the Equip and Train programme and preventing site 
inspections (Lachowski 1998 pp517-518). For example, the Republika Srpska 
alarmed at the latest military hardware being supplied to the Federation of Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina, engaged in delaying tactics (ICG Report cited in Lachowski 1998 
p517). 
Despite the exploitation of loopholes within the agreement, by the end of the 
reduction period the OSCE confirmed that 6580 weapons had been destroyed and 
that 180 inspections had been conducted, for the most part satisfactorily. The parties 
were considered to have fully met their obligations in terms of equipment limited by 
the agreement. There were still shortcomings for example, `insufficient security 
cooperation. ' To further improvements the OSCE suggested new measures, for 
example, inspections of undeclared sites to begin in 1999 (Lachowski 1999 p635). 
The OSCE's work had assisted with establishing a competent inspection regime and 
exchange of information. Working through the Florence Agreement, the OSCE 
contributed to increasing military stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was a 
pre-cursor to creating a stable regional military balance (Lachowski 1998 pp520- 
521). The FSC was to hold negotiations to enable the parties to establish a regional 
balance. However, this has not been implemented nor have participating states been 
identified. The main reason being that the instability emanating from a Serbia 
controlled by Milosevic makes most Balkan states reluctant to consider arms control 
(ICG Report- Is Dayton Failing? 1999). 
Conclusion 
The OSCE was unequipped to design effective responses to the conflict over Bosnia. 
In the first stage of OSCE involvement, from 1991-1995, the organization was 
prevented by its participating states from making any serious attempts at conflict 
management and resolution. However, there was nothing to suggest that had the 
organization been allowed a more meaningful role it could have delivered results. 
During this period there was a lack of European confidence in the OSCE which, 
when combined with the open pursuit of states' interests in the Balkans, provided an 
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atmosphere that would have tested the abilities of any institution. Other international 
organizations proved equally inept and it was the unilateral involvement of the US 
that forced through the arguably unsatisfactory Dayton peace settlement. 
On the basis of this settlement, the status of the OSCE was elevated and it was 
handed its most challenging task to date. Of the three areas of responsibility 
delegated to the OSCE, the organization proved relatively successful in only one, 
namely the oversight of arms control arrangements and CSBMs. However, an 
inability to adequately address the supervision and conduct of elections and human 
rights issues was not necessarily a reflection of the inadequacies of the organization. 
It had more to do with the situation created within Bosnia by the policies pursued by 
ultra-nationalists and the legitimization given to their actions via the Dayton 
agreement supported by Western Europe, Russia and the US. The organization of the 
first set of elections was a mammoth task given that it was an attempt to impose 
democracy onto what still was in many respects a war zone. In such circumstances it 
was remarkable that elections were able to proceed at all. However, the outcomes 
rather than preparing the ground for democracy served to legitimate the perpetrators 
of genocide and reinforce ethnic division. This continued to largely be the case 
throughout the period of time under discussion here. 
Susan Woodward (cited in Riskin 1999) has argued that `many of the initial 
assumptions about the impact of elections have not been supported. ' The crucial role 
that elections played as part of an international plan to create peace and allow 
refugees to return home made necessary a continuing international presence. 
Woodward states that the conflict is `now between local actors and international 
institutions. ' There was no indication as to how a withdrawal strategy could be 
developed allowing Bosnian authorities to take responsibility for running their own 
administration along with control and maintenance of a viable political system. 
Due to a lack of resources and to ineffective support from NATO, the OSCE paid 
less attention to human rights issues. While there was much documentation of human 
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rights abuses little effective action was taken to redress the situation. For example, 
by failing to provide the means through which refugees could return to their homes 
ethnic divisions became further entrenched. What was worse was that people were 
still continuing to be forced to leave their homes while ethnic cleansing continued 
under the eyes of international forces. Such difficulties partly arose out of a US 
policy that divided military and civilian responsibilities between different 
international organizations something which prevented effective coordination 
between the various bodies. What was needed was a central coordinating body 
(Sharp 1999). 
The OSCE in the post-Dayton period had responded to the situation in Bosnia in an 
ad hoc manner by establishing new institutions to deal with issues as they arose. 
After each new problem was recognized a new institution appeared to deal with it. 
The result was a bewildering array of institutions which because of the absence of an 
underpinning system of authority was unable to address the problems they were set 
up to manage. This problem was not particular to Bosnia but characterized the 
general way the OSCE responded to issues. As it stood, the Dayton agreement was 
weak and unlikely to provide the foundation for a stable and durable peace within 
Bosnia. 
The OSCE remained important within Bosnia because European powers had been so 
reluctant to become militarily involved. However, the continued dependence by the 
Europeans on the US and ultimately NATO indicated that the OSCE's role in Bosnia 
was both fashioned and constrained by the agendas of its participating states. For 
example, there was general collusion with US demands to legitimize the outcome of 
the 1996 general elections. 
The US had a major influence on the direction of OSCE policy towards Bosnia. The 
Bosnian conflict had illustrated how far Europeans were from developing a unified 
and effective security policy and how much they still depended upon the US. This 
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served to emphasize US hegemony. Bosnia provided a new purpose for NATO 
alongside a reassertion of its continuing importance as the only effective guarantor of 
European security. Sustained involvement in Bosnia was seen as crucial to retaining 
US leadership in NATO. Dayton was `based on a clear eyed view of US interests' 
which included preventing further `meddling by Iran' in Bosnia (Albright 1997). 
Economically, Bosnia was important to the West as a region rich in coal and 
minerals. It was also important as part of a possible route for transporting oil from 
the Caspian region. The Balkans was also vital as a logistical strategy ground for 
advancing geo-political interests in Central Asia (Rippert 1999). 
Continued European involvement in Bosnia was dependent on a sustained US 
commitment to the region. Britain's policy towards Bosnia maintained strong 
support for US leadership. The OSCE's involvement in Bosnia represented a means 
of involving Russia. Moscow continued to use opportunities created by its 
involvement in Bosnia to maintain influence within the state and within OSCE circles 
to press for a stronger organization (UK Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence- 
Minutes of Evidence - 31 March 1999). Germany was anxious that the OSCE 
mission should succeed due to its geo-political situation, having borne the brunt of 
accommodating Bosnian refugees. It had committed over $12.4 billion in financial 
aid to Bosnia (German Government information). 
For the OSCE, its human rights mandate was clearly limited and restricted to a 
narrow range of tasks. While the OSCE's mandate concentrated largely on elections, 
other areas of human rights that were not an OSCE prerogative were sidelined by 
international agencies. Although not an OSCE matter, official government estimates 
reveal 60% of Bosnian workers to be unemployed. However, figures could be nearer 
to 80% (Dempsey 1998). The right to employment is widely recognized as a human 
right. In the light of this it would appear that more resources needed to be allocated 
to employment creation. It cannot be said that the right to vote is more important 
than the right to work. From the OSCE's emphasis on elections it can be said that 
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elections were deemed of greater importance because what was at stake was not the 
human rights issues of the Bosnian people, but Western intervention designed to 
create a form of political system deemed acceptable to Western interests. What had 
emerged instead by the end of 1998 was an unacknowledged international 
protectorate running Bosnia and Herzegovina employing thousands of international 
workers and diplomats. The human rights of the Bosnian people appeared to be 
ignored because they were not allowed to decide upon and design the structure of 
their own political system. As the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, said, 
we must succeed in Bosnia and `make our own vision a reality. ' `Those who reject 
the US vision of Bosnia will not receive US help' (Albright 1997). 
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Conclusion 
The thesis has sought to describe the nature of the OSCE's work in the post-Cold 
War period as it relates to conflict prevention, management and resolution. The 
conclusion will discuss the OSCE's strengths and weaknesses and the relevance of 
neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist theories to the case studies. From this, 
general conclusions about the OSCE can be drawn. Several suggestions are outlined 
as possible considerations towards the future development of the organization. 
The type of intervention that the OSCE has adopted offers a range of measures not 
previously seen in Europe. In the post-Cold War period the OSCE broke new ground 
by taking on responsibility for developing conflict prevention measures (Hurlbert 
1995 (a). The OSCE has at the same time retained traditional competencies. The 
OSCE performs wide ranging functions which include measures to support the 
development of democratic and civil society. In this regard, the OSCE fills a gap 
which is not presently catered for by either the EU or NATO. Both organizations 
lack aspects of the OSCE's speciality in nation building (White 1999). The OSCE 
also fills the gap between diplomacy and military involvement (Smith 1999). The 
OSCE has been able to enter regions of the Russian Federation, such as Chechnya, 
where no other international organization can. The work performed by the OSCE 
also serves to reduce the heavy political costs of potential NATO intervention in 
areas of conflict (White 1999). 
The OSCE's abilities to address different forms of conflict have contributed to the 
organization becoming one of the pillars of the evolving European security system. 
The OSCE's mechanisms have assumed importance as `tools of first resort' for the 
participating states as they try to address intra-state conflict. Attempts to control 
conflict have gone hand in hand with measures designed to construct and `consolidate 
democratic forms of governance' (Flynn and Farrell 1999 pp 508-512). 
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The work conducted by the OSCE has relied on fostering cooperative relationships 
between participants and the organization. `Political consultation within the OSCE 
fulfills a reassuring function for all participating states' (Greco 1995 p5). In all areas 
of its conflict management responsibilities, the OSCE has readily adopted creative 
approaches that suggest a transcendence of previously held concepts regarding the 
timing and nature of intervention. 
In terms of conflict prevention measures, the OSCE has largely succeeded in 
overcoming the resistance of states to organized and acknowledged forms of 
intervention into their internal affairs. In this regard, the OSCE has become uniquely 
intrusive. The OSCE along with the COE, form part of an international movement 
generating new norms regarding what constitutes acceptable behaviour of 
governments towards minority populations, in an environment where definitions of 
security increasingly take into account human rights. Humanitarian intervention has 
led to a progressive erosion of state sovereignty when human rights issues are at stake 
(Greco 1995 p5). States are increasingly being required by the international 
organizations they subscribe to, to consider human rights issues in a way that 
previously they were not. 
The OSCE's lack of coercion in implementing conflict prevention mechanisms may 
be one important reason why measures have frequently been accommodated by 
recipient governments. The involvement of the OSCE in conflict prevention has seen 
the organization at its most productive. It has proven to be a cost effective 
engagement especially when compared to the often high human and material costs of 
multilateral or unilateral involvement in ongoing conflicts. There remains potential 
for the OSCE to further strengthen and develop its conflict prevention capabilities. 
For example, by establishing an early warning centre. This could combine research 
and intelligence gathering facilities with the development of early warning devices. 
More resources could also be provided to existing offices, like the HCNM. 
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While there is room for strengthening the OSCE's conflict prevention capabilities, in 
the area of conflict management and resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, the 
OSCE needs to improve collaboration with other agencies, for example, the EU, 
NATO and the UN, if effective operations are to be implemented. With regard to 
oversight of peacekeeping operations, the OSCE has to resolve issues regarding 
where external military resources would be drawn from and how they would be 
composed. As other international organizations like the EU assume new 
responsibilities, that may encroach on existing OSCE responsibilities, further inter- 
organizational coordination is required. 
Appraising the case studies 
In Macedonia the OSCE adopted a discreet, facilitative approach designed to operate 
in conjunction with the government and the parties to the conflict. Here, the OSCE 
relied upon cooperation and accommodation in order to assist with the maintenance 
of peace and stability within the state. Adopting an inclusive approach, channels of 
communication enabling sustained dialogue to take place were created, allowing for 
information to be exchanged and confidence to be increased. Through cooperation 
facilitated by the OSCE, states are encouraged to consider and adopt courses of 
action that they might otherwise have not considered or may have rejected and are 
offered support in order to carry out such changes. 
Despite criticism that the OSCE's operations were biased in their support for the 
government, the work of both the mission and the HCNM can be interpreted as 
attempts to both support the government and create more favourable conditions for 
minorities within Macedonia. Minorities were therefore aware that international 
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scrutiny of the government's behaviour along with constant monitoring of conditions 
within the state was taking place. 
Skopje's openness to the programmes of the OSCE may have rested upon the fact 
that the organization aimed to work in harmony with the government and had no 
mandate to impose coercive and forceful regimes. While the OSCE could make 
suggestions to the government as to how to improve inter-ethnic relations it had no 
powers of enforcement and therefore relied upon establishing effective working 
relationships. The Macedonian government cautiously received OSCE proposals. It 
has neither rejected or wholeheartedly embraced the organization's suggestions and 
has instead selectively implemented them. Intervention took place in the early stages 
of the conflict and has continued while the conflict remained latent. This is 
illustrative of an innovative problem solving approach adopted by the OSCE. The 
work of the OSCE has been indicative of a `degree of autonomy and moral authority 
to move against misrule and intolerance while at the same time being flexible enough 
to accommodate different views and methods' (Krupnick 1998 p50). The role of the 
HCNM clearly illustrates this. 
Turning now to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. This case illustrates the 
difficulties of involvement in an ongoing conflict and therefore serves to emphasize 
the importance of preventive diplomacy at an early stage of a conflict. In this case, 
the high stakes involved to all the parties concerned were of crucial importance. 
The idea of placing a multilateral peacekeeping force in Azerbaijan involving a 
substantial military contingent proffered a risky interventionist strategy. What was 
unusual about the OSCE's involvement here was the willingness of the organization 
to develop its capabilities into the peacekeeping field. This also meant that the 
parameters for external military intervention in the FSU were extended. The decision 
that Nagorno-Karabakh would be the first site for this type of OSCE operation is a 
possible reflection of the optimism with which the organization acted in the early 
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1990s along with a desire to enhance its capabilities. Russia may have agreed to the 
idea in order to develop the organization's `hard' security capabilities and was keen 
to gain OSCE support for CIS peacekeeping operations. Moscow then created an 
environment to ensure that an OSCE led peacekeeping mission did not go ahead in 
order to preserve its freedom of movement in the Transcaucasus region. The 
organization's attempts to develop conditions conducive to establishing both a 
conference to discuss peacekeeping and a peacekeeping mission were severely 
circumscribed by the ability of Russia to prevent the OSCE from carrying out its 
previously agreed role. 
Attempts to resolve the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh were hampered by the 
parties themselves, whose intransigence and insistence on achieving maximal 
outcomes complicated the processes of achieving an acceptable peace agreement. 
The OSCE did not possess effective response mechanisms towards encouraging the 
conflicting parties to arrive at a settlement. However, there is nothing to suggest that 
any other international organization could have achieved a different outcome. 
Despite its weaknesses, the OSCE has played a facilitative role during the conflict 
over Nagorno-Karabakh. The organization has contributed to sustaining the 
negotiation process and the work of the Minsk Group was useful in setting up 
discreet channels for dialogue. The parties to the conflict had sufficient confidence 
in the diplomatic processes overseen by the OSCE to avoid the resumption of 
violence and also to avoid seeking to end the conflict through military means. The 
Minsk Group provided continuity and consistency to the resolution process and 
allowed for a multilateral approach to problem solving which served to prevent a 
Russian monopoly of the peace process and prevented the possibility of Russian led 
CIS `peacekeeping' forces being imposed on Azerbaijan. 
Turning now to the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, here weaknesses within the OSCE's 
approach were again apparent. Early in the development of the conflict the OSCE 
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was prevented from taking a meaningful role. At that stage in the organization's 
development it had neither the mechanisms to take effective action nor could it 
sustain its participating state's confidence in its abilities to design suitable courses of 
action. Clearly, the organization was powerless in `countering committed aggressors' 
(Peters 1995 p77). However, following the conclusion of the Dayton Accords it was 
deemed a suitable organization to take on the Herculean task of organizing elections 
and overseeing human rights provisions and arms control agreements. The OSCE 
then had to attempt to implement the unsatisfactory provisions of an inadequate 
`peace' arrangement. In only one of these areas did the OSCE demonstrate success, 
through the arms control agreements. Human rights were only nominally addressed 
and the conduct of the elections proved inadequate. Three years after the conclusion 
of the Dayton accords there was only minor evidence to suggest that democratic 
processes were becoming self sustaining. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina tensions between coercion and accommodation were 
apparent. For example, while the OSCE wanted to encourage the development of 
democratic processes, its methods of doing so became increasingly to rely on dubious 
measures to ensure that `suitable candidates' were installed. Here, one of the 
organization's strengths, its impartiality, was also called into question. While the 
OSCE wanted to promote democracy, it at times attempted to exclude ultra- 
nationalists from holding office, even though when legitimately elected under due 
democratic process these figures had the right to take up these positions. The 
democratic processes supported by the OSCE then at times became questionable. 11 
This situation illustrates the problem of how devise appropriate methods of dealing 
with politicians intent on using the electoral processes to undermine democracy. 
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The explanatory power of competing theories 
Neo-realism 
The contribution of neo-realism to this thesis largely lies in discussing how states 
have used the OSCE to pursue their interests either directly or indirectly. This has 
occurred in order to secure both short term and longer term objectives. Neo-realists 
maintain that states are occupied with determining whether cooperation facilitates or 
hinders the achievement of relative gains. It not obvious how involvement with the 
OSCE has enabled its participating states to achieve relative gains, yet they have still 
demonstrated considerable commitment to the organization. The work of the OSCE 
has largely appeared to operate against the development of another of neo-realism's 
concerns, the security dilemma. 
However, OSCE participating states have readily been able to invest in conflict 
prevention measures because the implementation of such measures has not 
compromised the vital interests of the states directly involved or those of other OSCE 
participants also engaged in securing implementation. 
The case of Macedonia illustrates how the conflict prevention measures implemented 
by the OSCE were accepted by Skopje for pragmatic reasons, namely to safeguard the 
stability of the state and to strengthen relations between Macedonia and Western 
states. The idea was to demonstrate suitable Western orientated credentials in order 
to assist Macedonia aims of securing aid, investment and access to international 
organizations. It was frequently apparent that Skopje could accommodate more of 
the OSCE's suggestions with little effort involved, but considered that its immediate 
interests were not served by doing so. Skopje, mindful of not appearing overly 
receptive to conflict prevention measures designed to accommodate the demands of 
ethnic Albanians, feared alienating its Macedonian supporters. For their part, the 
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OSCE's participating states failed to offer more robust economic and political 
measures in order to strengthen stability within Macedonia. Instead, OSCE states 
preferred to carefully protect their relationships with adjacent states, such as Greece, 
which were regarded as more vital than those with Skopje. The implementation of 
the Sanction Assistance Missions in Macedonia can also be seen as the pursuit of an 
interest dominated international agenda overriding the needs of a small Balkan state. 
The OSCE's involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh highlighted how major OSCE states 
sought to manipulate the organization's resolution processes to pursue their own state 
agendas. For example, Russia's involvement with the OSCE's resolution measures 
fluctuated in accordance with Moscow's changing perceptions regarding the utility of 
the organization to facilitate Russian foreign policy objectives. The US used the 
Minsk process as a means to resolve the conflict in a way that would promote 
American economic and political objectives in the Caspian Sea region and shape the 
nature of its future relationships between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The US also 
sought to use the OSCE process to influence the nature of the recipient states' 
relationships with other regional powers, namely, Iran. 
In other cases of OSCE involvement where violence had already broken out, as in 
Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan, OSCE conflict management measures have proved 
less than effective principally because influential states have for their own reasons 
failed to confront Russia or to provide the necessary resources needed to support 
effective activities undertaken by OSCE missions (Chigas 1996 p63). Chechnya 
provides another example of the OSCE's inability to tackle violent aggression. Here, 
prominent states were unwilling to jeopardize relations with Moscow in order to 
strongly censure Russian atrocities. The OSCE action was limited to the dispatch of 
an Assistance Group to the region, where it established political processes through 
which channels for dialogue and negotiation were provided. 
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The engagement of the OSCE in the post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina revealed in part a collective decision taken in order to protect the 
reputations of both NATO and the UN from further damage. International 
expectations of what the OSCE could be expected to achieve were limited. The 
OSCE was then tasked with overseeing operations that lacked adequate resources and 
international confidence in its abilities to effectively execute its tasks. OSCE states 
used the reconstruction process as part of a longer term process designed to create a 
state that would ultimately reflect Western values and interests. 
Neo-liberal Institutionalism 
From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, which recognizes that states may 
pursue their interests through an international organization such as the OSCE, the 
organization has, nonetheless, demonstrated the efficacy of international cooperation. 
The OSCE has provided a platform through which security issues of common 
concern can be raised and addressed. The risks involved in direct intervention in 
intrastate conflicts have been reduced for states because cooperative action 
channeled through the OSCE has allowed for the pooling of resources and expertise 
and has legitimized decision making. International cooperation channeled through 
the OSCE has increased the credibility of collective commitments and provided the 
means of addressing often complex problems. 
The concept of multilateral conflict prevention is a liberal principle, and suggests that 
the development of the OSCE does not accord with neo-realist concepts. For 
example, the presence of the in-country missions can be seen as mechanisms 
operating against the establishment of the security dilemma. The OSCE in this 
instance has facilitated transparency between parties and provided forums where their 
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concerns and grievances can be aired. Despite criticisms that European states could 
have acted more robustly, the utility of the facilitative approach that the OSCE 
adopted in Macedonia indicates that new multilateral approaches have been 
developed to address internal conflicts. The preventive diplomacy conducted by the 
OSCE in Macedonia has contributed to the state's avoidance of the collapse into the 
types of chaos experienced by other Balkan states. The OSCE's role as an 
intermediary between the ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian government operated 
against the establishment of a security dilemma, by providing channels for dialogue 
along with proposals for improving inter-ethnic relations. The cases of Latvia and 
Estonia also provide other examples of illustrations where the OSCE has contributed 
to the largely effective implementation of conflict prevention measures. 
In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh the OSCE facilitated dialogue, linkages and the 
provision of a multilateral forum where negotiations could be monitored and 
scrutinized. While the power political interests of key states were apparent within 
this process the OSCE provided a facility whereby negotiations could be conducted 
encouraging transparency. Despite shortcomings, the negotiation processes 
facilitated by the OSCE acted as a safeguard against the unilateral involvement of 
Russia. It also strengthened concepts regarding the utility of negotiation as a means 
of conflict resolution while at the same time not disguising the real difficulties 
involved in attempting to resolve conflict. Although the key participants of the 
Minsk Group were states with substantial interests in the region, this may have aided 
the resolution process rather than merely allowing such states an arena within which 
to play out their interests. The close relationships that the states who co-chaired the 
Minsk process had with the conflicting parties could have enabled the Co-chairs to 
exert the type of influence that would otherwise have been lacking. 
The OSCE's involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina again lends support to neo- 
liberal institutionalist theory. It became apparent that multilateral responses were 
necessary in order to provide a means of reconstructing the state and to respond to the 
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needs of refugees. The reconstruction measures required were clearly beyond the 
capabilities of individual states and were an example of the potential for international 
organizations to facilitate cooperative responses to a post-conflict situation. Without 
such assistance, violent conflict was likely to resume with the attendant problems 
spilling over into adjacent European states. Here, the OSCE dealt with some of the 
broader, multi-faceted concepts of security alongside military issues, (which 
transcended the traditional neo-realist emphasis on security as a predominantly 
military issue) providing expertise in the areas of human rights, elections and arms 
control. The OSCE's oversight of arms control agreements and confidence and 
security building measures operated against the security dilemma through the 
provision of information and allowed for enhanced transparency between the 
previously conflicting parties. 
This not withstanding, fundamental OSCE's weaknesses in both Bosnia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh were the organization's lack of enforcement powers in an arena 
where power-political interests were seen to dominate. However, to enable the 
organization to act in such a way would essentially compromise its strengths, which 
are its non-threatening, consensual approach to problems, resting on confidence 
building and a lack of coercion. If the OSCE became an organization that provided 
both cooperative measures and forceful sanctions of its participants' behaviour this 
could damage states' confidence in the utility of cooperation (Chigas 1996 p82). 
When, for example, consensus exists to alter existing norms of state behaviour it is 
more significant because states have the ability to prevent such developments (Farrell 
and Flynn 1999 p512). 
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Constructivism 
While the relevance of both neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism is apparent 
in the case studies, there are areas of the OSCE's performance that are not 
satisfactorily explained by either theory. Other perspectives such as constructivism 
have something different to say here. For example, neo-realism does not recognize 
nor explain why states have adopted norm construction as a means of developing a 
new European security system. Neo-liberal institutionalism fails to discuss why 
European states have pursued `a philosophy of international order that links their 
relations with one another to a specific form of domestic rule' (Flynn and Farrell 
1999 p530). Here constructivists can add to the debate by offering ideas discussing 
the nature of norms, values and identities. From a constructivist perspective, the 
OSCE has been important in changing the way people in the OSCE region think 
about security. This is occurring because the organization is `helping to devise, 
diffuse, and institutionalize the concept of comprehensive, indivisible, and 
cooperative security. ' In this regard, the OSCE has facilitated a learning process 
encouraging governments to adopt reassurance and trust building measures. This is 
encouraging an increasing `sense of mutual identification in the region' (Adler 1998 
p148). 
The OSCE's record of achievements need not be solely assessed by outcomes in 
individual conflicts but can be assessed more broadly. For example, by the ways in 
which the organization's values have diffused into the practices of other international 
organizations, assisting the creation `of a foundation of community practice and 
behaviour. ' From this perspective the OSCE has been effective in modifying 
definitions of security and furthering concepts of cooperative security (Adler 1998 
pp119-148). The European Stability Pact devised by the EU was based explicitly on 
OSCE principles (Greco 1995 p10). OSCE methods have influenced the ways in 
which NATO has adopted community building approaches. The OSCE model has 
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effected the structure of the multilateral Arab-Israeli peace talks. Such approaches 
have enable the OSCE to extend its institutional norms to Eastern Europe and 
beyond (Adler 1998 pp119 -148). 
Other issues 
The OSCE has developed into an organization designed to address the risks and 
uncertainties emanating mainly from the weaker states of Eastern Europe and the 
FSU. Possibly more confidence could be generated in its legitimacy as a pan- 
European cooperative security system if the OSCE was seen as an organization that is 
also an appropriate forum through which to seriously address similar problems 
arising in the West. As an example, the HCNM could visit Northern Ireland to 
suggest measures to improve relationships and reduce inequalities between 
Protestants and Roman Catholics. 
The OSCE's methods of treatment of the conflicts it has been involved with has 
meant that the often deep rooted causes of conflict are not dealt with. These could 
include structural, economic and social inequalities, which the OSCE has only 
limited means to address. International, external or internal factors that may have 
contributed to the cause of the conflict are obscured because many conflicts are 
frequently understood in terms of their ethnic components. This leads to a tendency 
to locate the source of the problems with those who are directly engaged in the 
conflagration. In particular, it absolves responsibility from external actors who have 
contributed either directly or indirectly to the onset of conflict. In this sense the 
OSCE is not equipped to play more than a palliative role. 
Ultimately, it is meaningless to talk of what the OSCE can or cannot achieve. Its 
abilities are reliant on what the participating states are prepared to allow the 
organization to do. Decisions taken which permit OSCE involvement `are subject to 
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national political considerations, that is the result of the comparisons between the 
different national preferences regarding the various institutional options that are 
available' (Peters 1995 pp77-78). The OSCE is not an independent actor although 
certain offices like the HCNM possess limited autonomy. The OSCE is essentially 
what its participants allow it to be and its successes and failures are also theirs. 
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Appendix One 
Map of Macedonia 
Source: OSCE Handbook 1999, OSCE Secretariat, 3rd Edition, Vienna, p57 
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Appendix Two 
Map of Nagorno-Karabakh 
Source: OSCE Handbook 1999, OSCE Secretariat, 3`' Edition, Vienna, p64 
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Appendix Three 
Bosnia and Ilerzegovina 
Source: The Dayton Peace Accords - General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, US 
Department of State. USIA Regional Programme Office, Vienna, 1995 
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